The Nibandhana commentary explains the term arthaviniścaya twice. It first states, “ ‘Distinctly ascertaining the meanings’ means classifying/analyzing the dharmas” (arthānāṁ viniścayo dharmāṇāṁ pravicayaḥ, Samtani 1971, p. 73). This interpretation equates arthaviniścaya with the key term dharmapravicaya (“classifying the dharmas”), a synonym of “higher cognition” (prajñā), “special insight” (vipaśyanā), and, importantly, abhidharma.

The second explanation is slightly more elaborate: “For sentient beings, by listening to this, there is an ascertainment of the meaning/purpose in manifold ways; thus, this is a name wherein the meaning corresponds” (arthasya vividhākāreṇa niścayo bhavaty etat-śravaṇāt sattvānām ity anugatārthā saṁjñā, Samtani 1971, p. 83).

Samtani (1971, p. 57ff.) argues against taking the word artha to here signify “meaning(s),” and suggests instead that it should be understood as “topic,” “subject matter,” or “category”; thus, while Ferrari’s previous rendering would translate into English as “the determination of the meaning” (“la determinazione del significato,” Ferrari 1944, p. 588) and match our own preference, his own translation of arthaviniścaya is “compendium of categories” (Samtani 2002, p. 3). Bhikkhu Ānandajoti prefers “analysis of the topics” (Ānandajoti 2016, front cover), which also matches Norman’s preference (“analysis of the (Buddhist) topics,” Norman 1973, p. 677).

While we do not think that translating as either “category” or “topic” is, per se, wrong (for, one could say, the two senses of artha as “topic” and artha as “meaning” are somewhat overlapping), the arguments offered by Samtani do not entirely convince us. One of his arguments is that dharma = “category,” and therefore, since the commentary tells us that artha = dharma, it follows that artha is a category; here our difficulty is with the premise, since we believe that here dharma means “entity” rather “category,” and indeed dharmas as entities are meanings/referents as opposed to words (śabda). Another argument adduced by Samtani is based on his interpretation of a quote from Yaśomitra, where artha is equated with viṣaya, which in turn Samtani explains as “subject matter.” However, we think that the context of that passage (Wogihara 1989, p. 23) rather strongly suggests that it is not explaining the word artha as meaning “subject matter” but rather as “object,” i.e., viṣaya as “domain,” here in the sense of the domain of sensory activity of one of the five sense faculties. Yaśomitra is here explaining the term artha appearing in the expression “objects of the sense faculties” (indriyārthāḥ, Abhidharmakośakārikā 1.9).

Furthermore, we are not entirely sure that the sense of artha in the two explanations offered by the Nibandhana is exactly the same; we think that in the second explanation it is quite possible that artha (in the singular, unlike in the first interpretation) also, or maybe even primarily, carries the sense of “purpose” or “goal” (one could say “what is meaningful,” with a bit of a stretch). It is also quite likely that different nuances of the sense of artha are implied in the commentary, which is a virtue rather than a defect in Sanskrit writing (as we understand it).

We opted for “meaning” for the following reasons: it has a somewhat more vague/less specified feel (to us; “ascertaining the topics” could well mean ascertaining which topics are there (rather than, in fact, ascertaining their meanings); and, also taking into account other passages where the term arthaviniścaya occurs, we think it desirable to retain at least a suggestion of the opposition between “word” versus “meaning” (śabda vs. artha), which is of crucial importance in the Buddhist tradition (“relying on the meaning rather than on the words” is one of the four reliances (pratiśaraṇa); “relying on the topics” or “on the categories” may not sound too far from “relying on the words,” let alone be its opposite. Thus, “meaning/meaningful/purpose/what has purpose” is the range of meanings that we primarily read in the artha appearing in the expression arthaviniścaya.

The following passages use the term arthaviniścaya in contexts that are different from our sūtra, and thus we do not claim that any of them, or even all of them taken together, should lead to a conclusive ascertainment of the meaning of artha. However, we think they may clarify our purpose in using “meaning”:

“The awareness of all sounds of speech; the awareness of the etymological explanations; the awareness of the distinct ascertainment of the meaning/what is meaningful/what is of benefit; the avoidance of what is not of benefit/what is meaningless” (sarvarutajñānaṃ | niruktivyavasthānajñānaṃ | arthaviniścayajñānaṃ | anarthavivarjanaṁ, Samādhirājasūtra 37.27; Dutt 1941, p. 18).

“He sets aside the incoherent meaning/unconnected purpose; he is very certain in respect to the distinct ascertainment of the meanings/purposes” (asaṃsaktam artham uddharati suviniścito bhavati arthaviniścaye, Śayanāsanavastu, Gnoli 1978b, p. 45).

“This is a negation of the word-meaning; the real thing is not set aside. In this way, the distinct ascertainment of the meaning should also be understood in respect to other sentences” (śabdārthapratiṣedho 'yaṃ na vastu vinivāryate | evam anyeṣv api jñeyo vākyeṣv arthaviniścayaḥ, Prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārthaḥ of Dignāga, Tucci 1947, p. 58; Tucci here translates arthaviniścayaḥ as “determination of the things,” p. 65).

“What is the distinct ascertainment of the meaning? It is where there is a distinct ascertainment in respect to six meanings. Which six meanings? The meaning of own-being, the meaning of cause, the meaning of result, the meaning of karma, the meaning of yoga, and the meaning of occurrence” (arthaviniścayaḥ katamaḥ| yatra ṣaḍarthān ārabhya viniścayo bhavati || katame ṣaḍ arthāḥ | svabhāvārthaḥ hetvarthaḥ phalārthaḥ karmārthaḥ yogārthaḥ vṛttyarthaś ca, Abhidharmasamuccaya, Hayashima 2003, p. 858).