The numbering of paragraphs of the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra follows Lamotte’s critical edition.
See Radich 2007, p. 1257 on the relationship between āśrayaparivṛtti and dauṣṭhulyakāya. Saṃdh. is the only text in the entire Kangyur in which the term dauṣṭhulyakāya is found.
See Powers 2015. Unfortunately, I haven’t been able to consult this reference work at the time of completing this translation.
Here is a list of the sigla I used to identify the various witnesses of Saṃdh.:
(1) Witnesses of the sūtra found in the available Kangyurs and canonical collections (MsK = manuscript Kangyur, PK = xylograph): K
(2) Xylographs of the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī of the Yogācārabhūmi from the Tengyur: VD Degé, VG Golden, VP Peking. My thanks go to Kojirō Katō for having shared with me the bibliographical detail of these witnesses. The Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī is also available in Chinese under the following title: 瑜伽師地論卷第七十六攝決擇分.
For the reference of possible additional folios, see Chayet 2005, p. 67 (n°615—1 folio, n°590—6 folios).
解深密經疏 (ZZ369) is a text originally composed in Chinese that has been translated into Tibetan. On Wonch’uk’s life and works, see Powers 1992a.
I would like to warmly thank Zhuoran Xie (Vienna University) for her assistance in reading this text.
See Schmithausen 2014, pp. 419–20, n. 1852. On necessary adjustments to Lamotte’s rendition of the original Sanskrit terms, see Hakayama 1984, p. 180 and Delhey 2013.
See Tillemans 1997 for a review of Powers 1995. From a general perspective, it seems that Powers chose to ignore the work and methodological approach of Lamotte and Frauwallner.
See Schmithausen 1987 and 2014, Delhey 2013, and Skilling 2013 on the simile of the illusionist (māyākāra), which is also included inter alia in the Māyājāla, a sūtra also quoted in the Yogācārabhūmi.
See Steinkellner 1989 and Powers 1992a, 1992b, and 1998. For a review of Powers 1998, refer to Wedemeyer 2003.
See Lamotte 1935, p. 12ff., Ware 1937, Edgerton 1937, Edgerton 1953, p. 558, and later Keenan 1980, p. 126, Powers 1991a, and Powers 1993b, p. 28ff.
Research relevant to terminological choices, syntactic reading of complex passages, and interpretation of the meaning includes Powers 1991b, 1991c, 1993b, pp. 41–77 (chapters 1 to 4); Tillemans 1997 (chapter 1); Matsuda 2013 on Sanskrit terms (chapter 2); Wayman 1974, Tillemans 1997, Mathes 2007, Matsuda 2013 (chapter 3); Katō 2002, Lusthaus 2002, Waldron 2003, Buescher 2007, 2008, Muller 2011, Schmithausen 1987 and 2014, Brunnhölzl 2018 (chapter 5); Frauwallner 1969, Takahashi 2006, Schmithausen 2014 (chapter 6); Frauwallner 1969, Tucci 1971, Tillemans 1997, Mathes 2007, Schmithausen 2014, Brunnhölzl 2018 (chapter 7); Takasaki 1966, Lamotte 1970, Lin 2010, Matsuda 2013, Schmithausen 1984, 1987, 2005, and 2014 (chapter 8); Obermiller 1933, Matsuda 1995 (chapter 9); Braarvig 1985, Kapstein 1988, Steinkellner 1989, Sakuma 1990, Yoshimizu 1996, Xing 2005, Lin 2010, Yoshimizu 2010 (chapter 10).
See Billeter 2014. I would like to thank Professor Tom Tillemans for having drawn my attention to Billeter’s principles of translation.
“Une compilation assez maladroite”; see Lamotte 1935, p. 17. For an extensive discussion on the date and composition of Saṃdh., see Lamotte, pp. 14–25. See also Schmithausen 2014, p. 354ff. regarding the relation between the various chapters of Saṃdh.
rin po che sna bdun does not refer to jewels only, as found in Lamotte (1935) and Keenan (2000). I follow here Powers (1995), Cornu (2005), and Cleary (1999).
The logical subject of ’jig rten gyi khams dpag tu med pa rgyas par’gengs pa’i’od zer chen po shin tu mnga’ ba is the palace (khang). Cornu (2005) and Keenan (2000) seem to read this phrase as a qualifier for the seven precious substances.
The first paragraph of the nidāna is a presentation of the place where the Buddha is dwelling. As already mentioned in the introduction, a succession of compounds, mainly bahuvrīhis, enables the topicalization of the temple (khang). Lamotte’s translation reflects this literary device, contrary to Powers who does not topicalize the palace to the same degree on account of some ambiguities regarding the logical subject of a few clauses describing this palace. To illustrate this point, it seems unclear whether the adjectives “steadfast,” “enduring,” or “free” in Powers’ translation qualify the temple or the beings attending it. Cornu mainly follows Powers here but the grammatical necessity to indicate the gender and number of qualifiers in French limits the risk of confusion, which is obviously not the case in English. Regarding the usage of tenses, Lamotte is the only translator who uses both narrative past and present in this first paragraph. He thus switches from the past tense to the present tense in order to describe the characteristics of the temple, a decision I chose not to follow in the present translation.
Lamotte, Cornu, and Powers do not translate the anaphoric pronoun de in ’jig rten las’das pa de’i bla ma’i dge ba’i rtsa ba las byung ba. Powers explains in a footnote (see Power 1995, p. 313, n. 3) that this pronoun refers to gnosis according to Wonch’uk, although his translation does not reflect this interpretation. Since wisdom has not been mentioned earlier in the text and since the pronoun de is anaphoric, I read de as referring to the Buddha. Moreover, the concept of “root of virtue” is usually associated with persons and we have a reference to dbang sgyur ba in the next qualifying phrase.
The clause dbang sgyur ba’i rnam par rig pa shin tu rnam par rig pa’i mtshan nyid is problematic. Lamotte translates it in the following way: “très pur, il se caractérise par une pensée maîtresse de soi.” Cornu and Powers follow the reading found in D, folio 2.a; S, folio 4.a; K
nges par ’byung ba. In Skt. niḥsaraṇa or niryāṇa, which have the meaning of setting forth, issue, exit, departure, escape, a road out of town. The analogy here is not about emancipation or renunciation as Powers and Cornu translated it but rather with the metaphor of the journey. In that sense, what is meant here is the departure to reach the palace. Lamotte (1935), Keenan (2000), and Cleary (1999) follow Xuanzang’s translation: 大念慧行以為游路 (Cbeta, Taishō 676). Interestingly enough, F does not have nges par ’byung ba but just ’byung ba.
rin po che’i pad ma’i rgyal po chen po yon tan gyi tshogs mtha’ yas pas brgyan pa’i bkod pa la rten pa na bzhugs te. This clause has been translated in various ways depending on how one understands the compound rin po che’i pad ma’i rgyal po chen po yon tan gyi tshogs mtha’ yas pas. Lamotte (1935), Powers (1995), and Cornu (2005) read it as a dvandva: “II est orné de qualités infinies, de joyaux, de lotus et de grands rois” (Lamotte 1935, p. 167); “this pattern was adorned with boundless masses of excellent qualities, and with great kingly jeweled lotuses” (Powers 1995, pp. 5–6); “paré d’infinies qualités et de grands lotus royaux incrustés de pierreries” (Cornu 2005, p. 26). However, it seems to me that it would be better to read this compound as a karmadhāraya. Folio 5.a offers a variant reading that could support this interpretation: yon ten gyi tshogs mtha’ yas pas/ brgyan pa’i rin po che chen po pad mo’i rgyal po’i bkod pa’i gnas na nyan thos kyi dge ’dun tshad med pa dang / thabs gcig tu bzhugs te. In addition to this problem, one should note that Lamotte’s translation of the compound rin po che’i pad ma’i rgyal po chen po as a dvandva is inaccurate here. Powers’ reading of this term is correct.
chos in the sense of qualities as understood by Lamotte (1935), Powers (1995), and Cleary (1999).
spyod yul; gocara. This term refers here to an object perceived by the six senses, so its semantic field pertains to perception as opposed to meditative practice, in which case it would be close in meaning to ālambana (“referential object”). Translating all these terms with “object” would conflate these various semantic fields in the context of the present text.
bsam gyis mi khyab pa rnam par ’jog pa (cf. rnam par gzhag pa bsam gyis mi khyab pa; acintyavyavasthānaḥ, see Mvyut 359). Compare with Lamotte: “ses attributs sont inconcevables” (Lamotte 1935, p. 168); Powers: “positing [doctrines] inconceivably” (Powers 1995, p. 7); Cornu: “il était entré dans l’indicible” (Cornu 2005, p. 26).
dus gsum mnyam pa nyid tshar phyin pa; tryadhvasamatāniryātaḥ (Mvyut 360). The term niryāta means here “adept, perfected, perfectly skilled” (see Edgerton 1953, p. 303).
byang chub sems dpa’ thams cad kyis ye shes yang dag par blangs pa. See Mvyut 366: ye shes byang chub sems dpa’ thams cad kyis yang dag par mnos pa; sarvabodhisattvasampratīcchitajñānaḥ. One should follow here the translations of Lamotte (1935), Keenan (2000), and Cleary (1999).
de bzhin gshegs pa ma ’dres pa’i rnam par thar par mdzad pa’i ye shes kyi mthar phyin pa. See Mvyut 368: de bzhin gshegs pa ma ’dres pa’i rnam par thar pa’i mdzad pa’i ye shes kyi mthar phin pa/ de bzhin gshegs pa ma ’dres pa’i rnam par thar par mdzad pa’i ye shes kyi mthar phin pa; asaṃbhinnatathāgata-vimokṣajñānaniṣṭhāgataḥ. See also Mvyut 5192: dbyer med pa; ma ’dres pa; ma ’dres pa’m dbyer med pa; asaṃbhedaḥ. If we understand ma ’dres pa in the sense of dbyer med pa, or even zung ’jug (yuganaddha), the meaning of the term is “indivisible/in unity,” conveying the notion of nonduality of the sameness mentioned several times in this introduction. Lamotte translates ma ’dres pa with “non diversifié,” Cornu with “distinctement,” Powers with “uniquely,” Keenan with “unified.” I don’t think one should understand ma ’dres pa with the meaning of kevala in the present case since it is associated with ye shes in other contexts where the idea of being exclusive to a particular person (e.g., buddhas) is negated (see Keenan 1980, p. 782ff.).
mtha’ dang dpung med pa’i sangs rgyas kyis mnyam pa nyid thugs su chud pa. One should read here instead: mtha’ dang dbus med pa’i sangs rgyas kyi sa mnyam pa nyid bu thugs su chud pa; anantamadhyabuddhabhūmisamatādhigataḥ (see Mvyut 369).
D, folio 2.b: nam mkha’i khams kyi mthas gtugs pa, which stands in apposition to chos kyi dbyings kyis klas pa (“the ultimate within the domain of truth”). See Mvyut 6430: nam mkha’i dbyings kyi mtha’ gtugs pa, nam mkha’i khams kyi mthar gtugs for the Sanskrit ākāśadhātuparyavasānaḥ. Compare with Mvyut 371: nam mkha’i khams kyi mtha’ klas pa, nam mkha’i khams kyi mthas klas pa as Tibetan equivalents of ākāśadhātuparyavasānaḥ. In Mvyut 431, don gyi mthar gtugs pa and don gyi mthar thug pa are Tibetan translations of paryavasitārthaḥ.
nges par ’byung ba; niryāṇika (?). Powers (1995) and Cornu (2005) translate it as “renunciation.”
See Mvyut 7450: nges par rtog pa/nges par rtogs pa; nirūpaṇā. Translated by Lamotte with “pénétrante” and by Keenan with “penetrating,” while Powers and Cornu opted respectively for “certain realization” and “réalisation certaine.”
See Mvyut 1113: yon yongs su sbyong ba chen po; mahādakṣiṇāpariṣodhakaḥ. D, 4,5; K
Powers (1995) and Cornu (2005) read nges pa, but one should read here instead the graphically very similar des pa (“gentleness”) as in Mvyut 1115 where this expression is also found extensively: bzod pa dang des pa chen po dang ldan pa; mahākṣāntisauratyasamanvāgataḥ.
brjod du med pa dang / gnyis su med pa’i mtshan nyid. I read this compound as a bahuvrīhi. The full clause [brjod du med pa dang / gnyis su med pa’i mtshan nyid] + [don dam pa] is a karmadhāraya meaning literally “the ultimate that is that whose defining characteristic is inexpressible and absolute.” Powers’ suggestion is also possible here (“the ultimate whose defining characteristic is inexpressible and non-dual”). Lamotte leaves out mtshan nyid. Cornu somewhat mixes qualifiers and qualified terms in his rendering of this clause.
yongs su ma grub pa; apariniṣpanna (?). This paragraph establishes the opposition between the imaginary (parikalpita) and the actual (pariniṣpanna). These two aspects are found in the teaching on the three kinds of essencelessness: see Saṃdh. chapters 6–8.
shes pa dang mthong ba; jñānadarśana. D, folio 3.b: shes pa but F, folio 6.b; S, folio 5.a; VD, folio 44.b: ye shes. I emended the text in this way throughout the sūtra since this expression is repeated several times.
As noted by Tillemans (1997), Powers reads phyir in the sense of “because” here. Keenan and Cleary’s readings of Xuanzang’s translation (為慾令他現等覺故, Cbeta, Taishō 676) agree with Lamotte’s and Tillemans’ understanding of this passage.
rnam grangs; paryāya. The Dunhuang manuscript of the sūtra instead has gzhung du ’du shes (n°194 folio 62.a; see Hakayama 1984, p. 187).
VD, folio 45.b reads the demonstrative pronoun as a plural (i.e., de dag) throughout this paragraph.
Powers’ and Cornu’s translations are inaccurate here: “Subsequently they do not make the conventional designations: ‘This is true, the other is false.’ They make conventional designations because they completely understand the object in this way.” (Powers 1995, p. 17). “Comme ils connaissent parfaitement le sens réel de ces phénomènes…” (Cornu 2005, p. 32). Lamotte seems to have translated 1.4 on the basis of the Chinese. In addition, rjes su should be read as rjes su tha snyad for anuvyavahāra.
Lamotte’s rather free translation of 1.5 fails to render the opposition between what does not exist and what does according to the sūtra: ’di snyam du sems te/ ’dus byas dang / ’dus ma byas snang ba gang yin pa ’di ni med kyi/ gang la ’dus byas dang ’dus ma byas kyi ’du shes dang / ’dus byas dang / ’dus ma byas kyi rnam grangs kyi [F.5.a] ’du shes ’byung ba/ rnam par rtog pa las byung ba/ ’du byed kyi mtshan ma sgyu ma lta bu ’di ni yod/ blo rnam par rmongs par byed pa ’di ni yod do. The first chapter gives an introduction to central concepts, such as conditioned/unconditioned, existent/nonexistent, imaginary/actual. It prefigures the treatment of the two truths (bden pa gnyis; satyadvaya) in Saṃdh. chapter 3 as well as that of the three natures/essences and three kinds of nonexistence of nature/essence (ngo bo nyid (med pa) nyid; (niḥ)svabhāvatā) expounded in Saṃdh. (cf. chapters 6–8).
brtsams pa; ārabhya with the meaning of “referring to/having to do with,” a frequent occurrence in Saṃdh. See Edgerton 1953, p. 102.
rtog ge thams cad las yang dag par ’das pa; sarvatarkasamatikrānta. Regarding the translation of the term rtog ge (tarka), Powers 1995, p. 25 suggests “argumentation,” but the emphasis in the present context is not on logical reasoning. The term tarka denotes here any kind of assumption, presupposition, representation, or conjecture regarding the absolute that is the product of the intellect (manas).
The English translation of this passage should convey the paradox of the situation. Although the ultimate is inexpressible, the Buddha gave countless teachings. Syntactic connective particles between clauses about the inexpressible ultimate and the domain of expression and reasoning have therefore an adversative meaning in the present paragraph: ngas ni don dam pa rtog ge thams cad las yang dag par ’das pa’i mtshan nyid mngon par rdzogs par sangs rgyas te/ mngon par rdzogs par sangs rgyas nas kyang bsnyad cing gsal bar byas/ rnam par phye/ gdags par byas/ rab tu bstan to/ de ci’i phyir zhe na. Lamotte’s and Powers’ translation do not make this point clear.
so so(r) rang rig pa; pratyātmavedya/pratyātmavedanīya/pratyātmajñāna/prātyatmam (see Schmithausen 2014, p. 346), in the sense of realizing or understanding for oneself in an intuitive way, as personal experience. Powers’ translation does not reflect the meaning of this term: “I have explained that the ultimate is realized individually by the Aryas, while objects collectively known by ordinary beings [belong to] the realm of argumentation.” In the sūtra, so so(r) rang rig pa is a synonym or a qualifier of ye shes (jñāna).
Lamotte translates rtog ge’i spyod yul by “affaire de tradition”; see Lamotte 1935, p. 173. Beyond the fact that this is wrong, it is worth noting that the opposition here is between the intuitive and personal knowledge of the noble beings and the intellectual and transactional knowledge of ordinary beings, namely, between gnosis and mind. Powers 1995, p. 27 reflects the personal aspect of so sor rang gi rig but not its intuitive quality.
mtshan ma; nimitta. Although “notion” would fit well here, one should keep in mind that nimitta as a polysemic term denotes phenomenal appearance throughout the sūtra. However, it is clear that “phenomenal appearance” and “notion” are two terms that are joined at the hip from the perspective of the doctrine expounded in Saṃdh.
In 2.2, the Buddha mentions a paradox. He gives explanations about the ultimate in speculative terms, although the ultimate is inexpressible. This paradox is best rendered in English or French by reading the particle la in the statements in question as having an adversative meaning. For example: chos ’phags gzhan yang don dam pa ni tha snyad thams cad yang dag par chad pa yin par ngas bshad la/ rtog ge ni tha snyad kyi spyod yul yin te.
The Turfan Sanskrit fragment found by Matsuda reads paramārtha [dhar]mā vigatābhilāpaḥ at the end of chapter 2’s closing gāthā (cf. Sanskrit text in Matsuda 2013: p. 940 ad Lamotte VIII.41). In D, folio 6.b and F, folio 10.b, we have instead the Tibetan term rtsod dang bral ba. It is possible that brjod med in line 2 and rtsod dang bral ba were inverted metri causae.
Powers reads don dam pa and mtshan nyid as being in apposition in the sentence de [i.e., don dam pa] ni rtog ge kun las ’das mtshan nyid. Lamotte reads rtog ge kun las ’das mtshan nyid (sarvatarkasamatikrāntalakṣaṇa) as a bahuvrīhi, which is much better. See Powers 1995, p. 31 and Lamotte 1935, p. 174.
I am using the adjective “indistinct” here in the sense of the first definition given in the Oxford English Dictionary: “1. Not distinct or distinguished from each other, or from something else; not kept separate or apart in the mind or perception; not clearly defined or marked off.” Oxford English Dictionary Online, s.v. “indistinct,” accessed July 20, 2020, https://www-oed-com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2443/view/Entry/94602?redirectedFrom=indistinct#eid.
mos pa; praṇidhāna. See mos pa spyod pa’i sa. See Mvyut 897: mos pa spyod pa’i sa; adhimukticaryābhūmiḥ.
Schmithausen reads don dam pa’i mtshan nyid (paramārthalakṣaṇa) as “the defining characteristic that is the ultimate” in 3.5 (see Schmithausen 2014, p. 558, §512.3). However, Saṃdh. chapter 3 is about conditioned phenomena in relation to the ultimate when their respective defining characteristics are examined. The question here is not to determine whether the ultimate is the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena. Rather, it is to determine whether the conditioned and the ultimate are different by examining their defining characteristics. Therefore, I read don dam pa’i mtshan nyid as “the defining characteristic of the ultimate,” namely, as a genitive tatpuruṣa and not as a karmadhāraya.
I did not translate the phrase so so’i skye bo kho nar gyur bzhin du in an adversative mode (e.g., “though merely ordinary”) because the same phrase is found in the next paragraph in a parallel construction where the syntax in relation to the meaning cannot be interpreted to express contrast. Here bzhin du stands for yathā in the sense of “as” (i.e., “en tant que” in French).
grub pa dang bde ba; yogakṣema (see Edgerton 1953, p. 448a,b). Refer to Tillemans 1997, p. 157ff. for a discussion of Powers’ rendering of the term in his translation of Saṃdh. (Powers 1995). Lamotte translates this term with “de sécurité suprême.” See Lamotte 1935, p. 175.
I linked the two clauses with “and” because these two clauses are part of the logical argument on being “not different.” We have here a relative-correlative syntactic structure: gang gi phyir … de’i phyir (i.e., yasmāt … tasmāt). The first two clauses linked by “and” represent the hetu (“premise” or “reason”) posited by yasmāt. The logical structure of the paragraph is “since (a), (b), and (c), therefore (d)” (the conclusion that is stated in the very next sentence “For this reason…”): “Suviśuddhamati, ordinary beings (a) do not realize the truth and, as mere ordinary beings, (b) neither do they attain nirvāṇa, the unsurpassable good, (c) nor do they fully and completely awaken to the unsurpassable complete and perfect awakening. For these reasons (de’i phyir, referring to (a), (b), and (c)), it is not correct to say that the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate are indistinct.” D, folio 7.b: blo gros shin tu rnam dag gang gi phyir so so’i skye bo bden pa mthong ba ma yin/ so so’i skye bo kho nar gyur bzhin du grub pa dang / bde ba bla na med pa’i mya ngan las ’das pa ’thob par yang mi ’gyur/ bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa’i byang chub mngon par rdzogs par ’tshang rgya bar mi ’gyur ba de’i phyir ’du byed kyi mtshan nyid dang / don dam pa’i mtshan nyid tha dad pa ma yin zhes bya bar mi rung ste.
This entire paragraph is problematic in D: blo gros shin tu rnam dag gang gi phyir bden pa mthong ba rnams ’du byed kyi mtshan ma dang bral ba ma yin gyi/ bral ba kho na yin pa dang / bden pa mthong ba mtshan ma’i ’ching ba las rnam par grol ba ma yin gyi/ rnam par grol ba yin pa dang / bden pa mthong ba gnas ngan len gyi ’ching ba las rnam par grol ba ma yin gyi/ rnam par grol ba dang / ’ching ba de gnyi ga las rnam par grol na grub pa dang / bde pa bla na [F.8.a] med pa’i phyir mya ngan las ’das pa ’thob par ’gyur ba dang / bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa’i byang chub mngon par rdzogs par ’tshang rgya bar yang ’gyur ba. However, Lamotte, Keenan, and Cleary translate the phrases in bold with a double negation. If we look at the same paragraph in F, folio 10.a, we find an interesting textual variant in which the expected double negation is found: ma bral ba’ang ma yin te and ma grol ba’ang ma yin te, just like in Xuanzang’s translation (由此道理當知一切非如理行 不如正理善清淨慧。由於今時非見諦者。於諸行相不能除遣。然能除遣非見諦者。 Cbeta, Taishō 676). Powers chose to translate this passage without proceeding to any emendation, which makes little sense from the perspective of the argument expounded in this section of the text: “Suviśuddhamati, it is not the case that seers of truth are free from the signs of the compounded; they are simply free. Moreover, seers of truth are not liberated from the bondage of signs, but they are liberated. Seers of truth are not liberated from the bondage of errant tendencies, but they are liberated.” (Powers 1995, p. 41).
We have here again a complex relative-correlative syntactic structure: gang gi phyir … de’i phyir (i.e., yasmāt … tasmāt). All the clauses between gang gi phyir and de’i phyir represent the hetu (“premise” or “reason”) posited by yasmāt. The logical structure of the paragraph is “since (a), (b), (c), (d), therefore (e)” (the conclusion that is stated in the very next sentence, “For all these reasons,…”): “Suviśuddhamati, it is not the case that (a) those who realize the truth are not detached from the phenomenal appearance of conditioned phenomena, for they are indeed detached from it. (b) Neither are they not liberated from the bondage of phenomenal appearance, for they are indeed liberated from it. (c) Nor are they not liberated from the bondage of corruption, for they are indeed liberated from it. (d) Since they are liberated from these two kinds of bondage, [F.8.a] not only do they attain nirvāṇa, the unsurpassable good, but they will also fully and completely awaken to the unsurpassable complete and perfect awakening. (e) For all these reasons (de’i phyir referring to (a), (b), (c), and (d)), it is not correct to say that the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate are distinct.” D, folios 7.b–8.a: blo gros shin tu rnam dag gang gi phyir bden pa mthong ba rnams ’du byed kyi mtshan ma dang bral ba ma yin gyi/ bral ba kho na yin pa dang / bden pa mthong ba mtshan ma’i ’ching ba las rnam par grol ba ma yin gyi/ rnam par grol ba yin pa dang / bden pa mthong ba gnas ngan len gyi ’ching ba las rnam par grol ba ma yin gyi/ rnam par grol ba dang / ’ching ba de gnyi ga las rnam par grol na grub pa dang / bde ba bla na med pa’i phyir mya ngan las ’das pa ’thob par ’gyur ba dang / bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa’i byang chub mngon par rdzogs par ’tshang rgya bar yang ’gyur ba de’i phyir ’du byed kyi mtshan nyid dang / don dam pa’i mtshan nyid tha dad pa zhes byar mi rung ste.
gdags pa; prajñapti. Lamotte translates this term with “dire.” This does not convey the meaning of gdags pa, which implies the idea of imputation, intimation, conceptualization, or representation. Here, in the sense of “decide,” see Edgerton 1953, p. 359,1.
mi bzod; na kṣamate, na kṣamati (see Edgerton 1953, p. 199,1). Pāli: khamati (see The Pali–English Dictionary (Rhys-Davids 1921), p. 234).
D: blo gros shin tu rnam dag ngas ni de ltar don dam pa phra ba mchog tu phrag mchog tu zab pa/ rtogs par dka’ ba/ mchog tu dka’ ba/ tha dad pa dang / tha dad pa ma yin pa nyid las yang dag par ’das pa’i mtshan nyid mngon par rdzogs par sangs rgyas te. I read tha dad pa ma yin pa nyid las yang dag par ’das pa’i mtshan nyid as a bahuvrīhi, not a tatpuruṣa. The terms don dam pa and tshan nyid are not in apposition in chapter 3, since the two terms are repeatedly connected through a genitive particle: don dam pa’i mtshan nyid (which occurs 32 times in folios 5.a, 5.b, 6.b, 7.a, 7.b, 8.a, 8.b, and 9.a). I also understand similar constructions with don dam pa and tshan nyid in the following chapter as bahuvrīhis.
Powers translates mtshan nyid as singular (see Powers 1995, p. 49). But the question of the identity or difference in this chapter is evaluated from the perspective of two defining characteristics, namely, the defining characteristic of the conditioned and the defining characteristic of the unconditioned.
The last two lines are quoted in the Bhāvanākrama; see Tucci 1971, p. 1: nimittabandhanāj jantur atho dauṣṭhulabandhanāt/ vipaśyanāṃ bhāvayitvā śamathañ ca vimucyata iti.
dmigs pa; ālambana. I think it is important here to read dmigs pa as meaning “object” because in folio 11.a the Buddha contrasts these various objects (aggregates, sense sources, constituents, truths, etc.) with the “object conducive to purification” (rnam par dag pa’i dmigs pa, *viśuddhyālambana; see Schmithausen 2014, p. 362, §306.5 and n. 1644). Translating dmigs pa here as “observing” would weaken the central opposition between (a) the objects taken as a reference point for their practice by those who have not realized the defining characteristic of the ultimate and (b) the object conducive to purification, which is present within all phenomena. The purpose of this chapter is to introduce this fundamental point.
This paragraph deals with the thirty-seven branches of awakening (byang chub kyi yan lag; bodhyaṅgāni).
ro gcig pa; ekarasa. I read the compound thams cad du ro gcig pa’i mtshan nyid; *sarvatraikarasalakṣaṇa (?) as a bahuvrīhi; see D, folio 12.a: rab ’byor de bzhin du don dam pa yang mtshan nyid tha dad pa’i chos rnams la thams cad du ro gcig pa’i mtshan nyid yin par blta bar bya’o. I understand thams cad du ro gcig pa’i mtshan nyid to refer here to the defining characteristic of the ultimate since this definition presents dharma as having various lakṣaṇa. As a consequence, I read this sentence as stating that the ultimate is that whose defining characteristic is always of a single nature in all phenomena that have diverse defining characteristics. See also 4.8, which supports this interpretation.
rnam par dag pa’i dmigs pa; *viśuddhyālambana. Lamotte reads here rnam par dag pa’i dmigs pa with the meaning of viśuddhālambana (“objet pur”), but Schmithausen gives *viśuddhyālambana as the Sanskrit equivalent for the Tibetan (see Schmithausen 2014, p. 362, §306.5 and n. 1644). It is worth noting that this term is also found in chapter 7, where it is again equated with the ultimate (don dam pa). In this context, it is said that paratantra is not an object conducive to purification whereas the actual (pariniṣpanna) is. In this sense, one should make the distinction here between vastu and ālambana. The ultimate is conceived here as the referential object, or support object, of a purification that leads to awakening. The usage of ālambana in reference to the ultimate clearly refers to practice in the present chapter.
Compare D, folio 11.a: rab ’byor rnam grangs des na khyod kyis ’di ltar thams cad du ro gcig pa’i mtshan nyid gang yin pa de ni don dam pa yin par rig par bya’o with D, folio 12.a: rab ’byor de bzhin du don dam pa yang mtshan nyid tha dad pa’i chos rnams la thams cad du ro gcig pa’i mtshan nyid yin par blta bar bya’o (passim).
de bzhin nyid; tathatā. I translate tathatā with “true reality” (in the sense of the true state or nature of things) instead of the more usual “suchness” or “thusness.” However, when de bzhin nyid is qualified by an adjective such as don dam pa, I simply translate it with “reality” to improve readability. See Schmithausen 2014, p. 356, §303.1 (passim), in which tathatā is translated with “True Reality” or “Suchness.”
kho na; eva. For a comparison between Buescher’s and Schmithausen’s translations of this sentence, see Schmithausen 2014, p. 380, §324.
Mahāvyutpatti 1719.
The Sanskrit literally means “attainment,” and is used to refer specifically to meditative attainment and to particular meditative states. The Tibetan translators interpreted it as sama-āpatti, which suggests the idea of “equal” or “level”; however, they also parsed it as sam-āpatti, in which case it would have the sense of “concentration” or “absorption,” much like samādhi, but with the added sense of “attainment.”
See Mvyut 1500 and 1988.
cf. Sanskrit text in Matsuda 2013, p. 940 ad Lamotte VIII.40.
The bodhisattvas’ realization that all phenomena are unproduced and empty. It sustains them on the difficult path of benefiting all beings so that they do not succumb to the goal of personal liberation. Different sources link this realization to the first or eighth bodhisattva level (bhūmi).
Mahāvyutpatti 1290.
A term meaning defilement, impurity, and pollution, broadly referring to cognitive and emotional factors that disturb and obscure the mind. As the self-perpetuating process of affliction in the minds of beings, it is a synonym for saṃsāra. It is often paired with its opposite, vyavadāna, meaning “purification.”
The five skandhas (pañcaskandha) are: forms (rūpa), sensation (vedanā), conception (saṃjñā), formations (saṃskāra), consciousness (vijñāna).
See Har Dayal 2004, p. 260ff.
The term so sor rtog pa has two meanings in our text: (1) analysis (pratyavekṣa) and (2) comprehension, realization, awakening (pratibodha).
Technical term in Buddhist logic.
One of the three gates of liberation along with emptiness and wishlessness.
The four foundations of mindfulness refers to the application of mindfulness to: the body, sensations, the mind, phenomena.
See Edgerton 1953, p. 53. The term has various shades of meaning such as “to be attached to,” “to adhere to,” “to wrongly conceive,” “to hold fast to,” and “to believe in” with a negative connotation.
One of the “eight close sons of the Buddha,” he is also known as the bodhisattva who embodies compassion. In certain tantras, he is also the lord of the three families, where he embodies the compassion of the buddhas. In Tibet, he attained great significance as a special protector of Tibet, and in China, in female form, as Guanyin, the most important bodhisattva in all of East Asia.
Also mentioned in this text as Āryāvalokiteśvara, the noble Avalokiteśvara.
In the general Mahāyāna teachings the mind of awakening (bodhicitta) is the intention to attain the complete awakening of a perfect buddha for the sake of all beings. On the level of absolute truth, the mind of awakening is the realization of the awakened state itself.
Type of Sanskrit compound.
The four bases of supernatural powers (ṛddhipāda, rdzu ’phrul gyi rkang pa bzhi) are: (1) concentration through will (chanda, ’dun pa), (2) concentration through vigor (vīrya, brtson ’grus), (3) concentration through the mind (citta, bsam pa), and (4) concentration through investigation (mīmāṃsā, dpyod pa ). See Rahula 2001, p. 163.
Equal to a thousand universes of a thousand worlds (i.e., a universe of a million worlds).
In Buddhist literature, this is an epithet applied to buddhas, most often to Śākyamuni. The Sanskrit term generally means “possessing fortune,” but in specifically Buddhist contexts it implies that a buddha is in possession of six auspicious qualities (bhaga) associated with complete awakening. The Tibetan term—where bcom is said to refer to “subduing” the four māras, ldan to “possessing” the great qualities of buddhahood, and ’das to “going beyond” saṃsāra and nirvāṇa—possibly reflects the commentarial tradition where the Sanskrit bhagavat is interpreted, in addition, as “one who destroys the four māras.” This is achieved either by reading bhagavat as bhagnavat (“one who broke”), or by tracing the word bhaga to the root √bhañj (“to break”).
The seven branches of awakening are: (1) correct mindfulness, (2) correct discrimination of dharmas, (3) correct vigor, (4) correct joy, (5) correct flexibility, (6) correct concentration, and (7) correct equanimity.
Also translated as “buddha field.”
Also translated as “buddha realm.”
Also translated as “buddha field.”
Also translated as “buddha realm.”
’phags pa dgongs pa nges par ’grel pa zhes bya ba theg pa chen po’i mdo (Āryasaṃdhinirmocananāmamahāyānasūtra). Toh 106, Degé Kangyur vol. 49 (mdo sde, ca) folios 1.b–55.b.
’phags pa dgongs pa nges par ’grel pa zhes bya ba theg pa chen po’i mdo. bka’ ’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) [Comparative Edition of the Kangyur], krung go’i bod rig pa zhib ’jug ste gnas kyi bka’ bstan dpe sdur khang (The Tibetan Tripitaka Collation Bureau of the China Tibetology Research Center). 108 volumes. Beijing: krung go’i bod rig pa dpe skrun khang (China Tibetology Publishing House), 2006–9, vol. 49, pp. 3–131.
Asaṅga. rnal ’byor spyod pa’i sa (Yogācārabhūmi). Toh 4035, Degé Tengyur vol. 127 (sems tsam, tshi) folios 1.b–283.a
Asaṅga. rnal ’byor spyod pa’i sa rnam par gtan la dbab pa bsdu ba (Yogācārabhūmiviniścayasaṃgraha). Toh 4038, Degé Tengyur vol. 130 (sems tsam, zhi), folios 1.b–289.a; vol. 131 (sems tsam, zi), folios 1.b–127.a.
Buddhabhūmisūtra (sangs rgyas kyi sa’i mdo). Toh 275, Degé Kangyur vol. 68 (mdo sde, ya), folios 36.a–44.b.
Kamalaśila. bsgom pa’i rim pa (Bhāvanākrama). Toh 3915, Degé Tengyur vol. 110 (dbu ma, ki), folios 22.a–41.b; Toh 3916, Degé Tengyur vol. 110 (dbu ma, ki), folios 42.a–55.b; and Toh 3917, Degé Tengyur vol. 110 (dbu ma, ki), folios 55.b–68.b.
Mahāvyutpatti (bye brag tu rtogs par byed pa chen po). Toh 4346, Degé Tengyur vol. 204 (sna tshogs, co), folios 1.b–131.a.
Māyājāla (mdo chen sgyu ma’i dra ba). Toh 288, Degé Kangyur vol. 71 (mdo sde, sha), folios 230.a–244.a. English translation The Mahāsūtra “Illusion’s Net” 2025.
Tathāgataguṇajñānācintyaviṣayāvatāranirdeśasūtra (de bzhin gshegs pa’i yon tan dang ye shes bsam gyis mi khyab pa’i yul la ’jug pa bstan pa’i mdo). Toh 185, Degé Kangyur vol. 61 (mdo sde, tsa), folios 106.a–143.b.
Trisong Detsen (khri srong lde brtsan). bka’ yang dag pa’i tshad ma las mdo btus pa (Samyagvākpramāṇoddhṛtasūtra). Toh 4352, Degé Tengyur vol. 204 (sna tshogs, co), folios 173.b–203.a.
Vasubandhu. dbus dang mtha’ rnam par ’byed pa’i ’grel pa (Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya). Toh 4027, Degé Tengyur vol. 124 (sems tsam, bi), folios 1.b–27.a.
Wonch’uk. dgongs pa zab mo nges par ’grel pa’i mdo rgya cher ’grel pa (*Āryagambhīrasaṃdhinirmocanasūtraṭīkā) Toh 4016, Degé Tengyur vol. 118 (mdo ’grel, ti), folios 1.b–291.a; vol. 119 (mdo ’grel, thi), folios 1.b–175.a.
IOL Tib J 194. British Library, London. Accessed through The International Dunhuang Project: The Silk Road Online.
Bd3.7 vol. 3 (ta) pha, folios 1.b–84.a
C747 vol. 29 (mdo sde, ca), folios 1.b–71.a
Dd031-001 (mdo ca), folios 1.b–69.b
Dk034-001 (mdo na), folios 1.b–87.b
Do (mdo sde, da), folios 196.a–246.b
F156 vol. 68 (mdo sde, tsha), folios 1.b–72.a
Go19,01 vol. 19 (ka), folios 1.b–36.a
Gt028-001 (mdo na), folios 1.b–72.b
H109 vol. 51 (mdo sde, ca), folios 1.b–87.b
He64.6 (mdo, wa), folios 62.b–125.b
J51 vol. 44 (mdo sde, ca), folios 1.b–59.b
Kq774 vol. 29 (mdo sna tshogs, ngu), folios 1.b–60.b
L82 vol. 42 (mdo sde, na), folios 1.b–80.b
N94 vol. 51 (mdo sde, ca) folios 1.a–81.a.
Np012-001 (mdo na), folios 1.b–87.a
Pj043-001 (mdo ca), folios 1.b–62.b
Pz045-001 (mdo ca), folios 1.b–61.a
R106 vol. 49 (mdo sde, ca), folios 1.b–55.b
S106 vol. 63 (mdo sde, na), folios 1.b–80.b
U106 vol. 49 (mdo sde, ca), folios 1.b–55.b
X (mdo sde, wa), folios 66.a–132.a
Z137 vol. 59 (mdo, na), folios 1.b–93.a
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Bd Bardan (Zanskar) canonical collection
C Choné xylograph Kangyur
Cbeta Chinese Electronic Buddhist Association, (www.cbeta.org)
Cz Chizhi Kangyur
D Degé xylograph Kangyur
Dd Dodedrak Kangyur
Dk Dongkarla Kangyur
Do Dolpo canonical collection
F Phukdrak manuscript Kangyur
Go Gondhla (Lahaul) canonical collection
Gt Gangteng Kangyur
H Lhasa xylograph Kangyur
He Hemis I Kangyur
J’jang sa tham/Lithang xylograph Kangyur
Kʙ Berlin manuscript Kangyur
Kǫ 774 Peking 1737 xylograph Kangyur
L London (Shelkar) manuscript Kangyur
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Mvyut Mahāvyutpatti
N Narthang xylograph Kangyur
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Saṃdh. Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra
Saṃdhdh Dunhuang manuscript: Stein Tib. n°194 (49 folios) and Stein Tib. n°683 (1 folio) (Hakamaya 1984–1987)
T Tokyo manuscript Kangyur
Taishō 676 解深密經, translated by Xuanzang (596–664
TrBh Sthiramati’s Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣyam
U Urga xylograph Kangyur
V Ulaanbaatar manuscript Kangyur
VD Degé; xylograph of the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī of the Yogācārabhūmi from the Tengyur
VG Golden; xylograph of the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī of the Yogācārabhūmi from the Tengyur
VP Peking; xylograph of the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī of the Yogācārabhūmi from the Tengyur
VinSg Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī of the Yogācārabhūmi
X Basgo manuscript Kangyur
YBht P ’i Tibetan translation of Acarya Asanga’s Yogācārabhūmi from the Peking Tengyur (n°. 5540, sems-tsam, ’i 143aI-382a5 (vol. I l l : 121-217)
Z Shey Palace manuscript Kangyur
In Unraveling the Intent, the Buddha gives a systematic overview of his three great cycles of teachings, which he refers to in this text as the “three Dharma wheels” (tridharmacakra). In the process of delineating the meaning of these doctrines, the Buddha unravels several difficult points regarding the ultimate and relative truths, the nature of reality, and the contemplative methods conducive to the attainment of complete and perfect awakening, and he also explains what his intent was when he imparted teachings belonging to each of the three Dharma wheels. In unambiguous terms, the third wheel is proclaimed to be of definitive meaning. Through a series of dialogues with hearers and bodhisattvas, the Buddha thus offers a complete and systematic teaching on the Great Vehicle, which he refers to here as the Single Vehicle.
Translation by the Buddhavacana Translation Group.
The text was translated by Gregory Forgues and edited by Casey Kemp. With special thanks to Harunaga Isaacson, Matthew Kapstein, Klaus-Dieter Mathes, Jonathan Silk, Lambert Schmithausen, Tom Tillemans, and William Waldron for their helpful comments and advice.
The translation was completed under the patronage and supervision of 84000: Translating the Words of the Buddha.
The generous sponsorship of Qiang Li (李强) and Ya Wen (文雅), which helped make the work on this translation possible, is most gratefully acknowledged.
In Unraveling the Intent, the Buddha gives a systematic overview of his three great cycles of teachings, which he refers to in this text as the “three Dharma wheels” (tridharmacakra). In the process of delineating the meaning of these doctrines, the Buddha unravels several difficult points regarding the ultimate and relative truths, the nature of reality, and the contemplative methods conducive to the attainment of complete and perfect awakening, and he also explains what his intent was when he imparted teachings belonging to each of the three Dharma wheels. Through a series of dialogues with hearers and bodhisattvas, the Buddha thus offers a complete and systematic teaching on the Great Vehicle, which he refers to here as the Single Vehicle .
The sūtra is set in an unfathomable palace displayed by the Buddha’s powers and attended by countless beings. The three gates of liberation (emptiness, appearancelessness, and wishlessness) are the entrance to this abode of the tathāgatas, the inconceivable nondual state of a buddha who, possessed of the gnosis (jñāna) of the Tathāgata’s liberation, is dwelling in the domain of truth (dharmadhātu), together with an immeasurable retinue of hearers and a retinue of bodhisattvas including Gambhīrārthasaṃdhinirmocana, Vidhivatparipṛcchaka, Dharmodgata, Suviśuddhamati, Viśālamati, Guṇākara, Paramārthasamudgata, Avalokiteśvara, Maitreya, and Mañjuśrī.
The sūtra is structured in the form of a series of dialogues between the Buddha and advanced bodhisattvas or hearers, as well as between bodhisattvas (see chapter 1). These dialogues deal with both the theory and practice of the entire bodhisattva path. Narrative elements are extremely limited in this teaching. However, a narrative pattern can be found in chapter 2 and 3, which begin, respectively, with a story about a group of non-Buddhists (tīrthikas) and some followers of the Buddha who have gathered to discuss a difficult point regarding the nature of reality and cannot agree on anything. The main protagonists then beg the Buddha to provide an explanation for the quandary these assemblies cannot not resolve, or alternatively to explain his underlying intent when he expounded the teachings that gave rise to conflicting interpretations.
Each chapter starts with a question on a topic requiring further elucidation: In the first chapter, the bodhisattva Vidhivatparipṛcchaka questions the bodhisattva Gambhīrārthasaṃdhinirmocana on the inexpressible (anabhilāpya) and nondual (advaya) ultimate. In the second chapter, the bodhisattva Dharmodgata questions the Buddha on the ultimate beyond speculation (sarvatarkasamatikrānta). In the third chapter, the bodhisattva Suviśuddhamati questions the Buddha on the ultimate that is beyond being distinct or indistinct (bhedābhedasamatikrānta) from conditioned phenomena. In the fourth chapter, Subhūti questions the Buddha on the ultimate that is of a single nature (ekarasa) within all phenomena. In the fifth chapter, the bodhisattva Viśālamati questions the Buddha on the secrets of mind (citta), thought (manas), and cognition (vijñāna). In the sixth chapter, the bodhisattva Guṇākara questions the Buddha on the three defining characteristics (lakṣaṇa) of phenomena. In the seventh chapter, the bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata questions the Buddha on the three kinds of essencelessness (niḥsvabhāvatā) as well as on the Buddha’s three turnings of the Dharma wheel. In the eighth chapter, the bodhisattva Maitreya questions the Buddha on the practice of mental stillness (śamatha) and insight (vipaśyanā). In the ninth chapter, the bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara questions the Buddha on the stages of the bodhisattva path and the Single Vehicle (ekayāna). In the tenth chapter, the bodhisattva Mañjuśrī questions the Buddha on the bodies (kāya) and activity of the tathāgatas.
From a broader perspective, it is possible to consider that the teaching imparted in this sūtra is structured in terms of the basis (āśraya), the path (mārga), and the result (phala). The first four chapters on the five characteristics of the ultimate as defined in the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras represent a teaching on the abovementioned basis, namely, true reality (tathatā) as it is; chapters 5–9, a teaching on the path in terms of practices and stages to attain awakening; and chapter 10, a teaching on the result through the doctrine of the tathāgatas’ bodies and activity to awaken beings. All major Tibetan traditions consider chapter 3, focusing on the relation between the two truths, and chapter 8, focusing on meditative practice, to be authoritative. These are among the scriptures most quoted on their respective topics by Tibetan authors regardless of lineage.
The first four chapters point out the nature of reality by distinguishing the unconditioned from the conditioned, the pure from the afflicted, the ultimate from the conventional, nondual gnosis from mind’s elaborations, inexpressible reality from conventional expressions, and the actual from the imaginary. The first chapter thus starts with the distinction between conditioned and unconditioned phenomena, which became a prevalent theme in the various Abhidharmas. Through this distinction, the point is made that the ultimate is inexpressible and nondual. The realization of this inexpressible ultimate is achieved through gnosis alone. Conceptions in terms of conditioned and unconditioned merely exist in the way of a magical illusion. Yet, in order to lead beings to awakening, buddhas have to use such labels. The second chapter elaborates on this very point. Although the ultimate is beyond speculation, the Buddha taught liberation by means of verbal expressions and conventions belonging to the domain of phenomenal appearances and notions.
As a consequence, the first two chapters delineate two domains corresponding to the two truths (satyadvaya): (1) the pure domain of the ultimate, which, being inexpressible, nondual, and beyond speculation, is the realm of nonconceptual gnosis free from conventional appearance and notions, and (2) the afflicted domain of dualistic conventional expressions and notions, which is the realm of mental elaborations. These domains are respectively labeled by the buddhas as “the unconditioned” and “the conditioned” only for the sake of instructing beings, for the Buddha explains that this distinction between unconditioned and conditioned is only made on the level of the conditioned, namely, from the perspective of dualistic conventions. Within the realm of these conventional expressions, in the context of the path, it follows that these two domains are apparently mutually exclusive, although the Buddha hints at the fact that, from the perspective of the ultimate, the conditioned is not the conditioned and the unconditioned is not the unconditioned.
Chapter 3 explains how the relation between the ultimate and conditioned phenomena seen from this higher perspective should be communicated on the level of conventions. From this standpoint, one cannot say whether the ultimate is distinct or indistinct from conditioned phenomena. The Buddha shows that positing these two domains as distinct or indistinct is wrong. Since conditioned phenomena are characterized by the fact of being produced by causes and conditions, it is inappropriate to conceive (a) the conditioned and (b) the emptiness of an inherent nature as either identical or different. On the one hand, being conditioned (i.e., dependent on something other) is identical with being empty of an intrinsic nature; on the other hand, the domain of the conditioned is defined as the realm of afflictions, while the domain of the unconditioned is understood as the pure realm. Some might therefore think that phenomena and the nature of phenomena are distinct, but the Buddha teaches in the fourth chapter that the empty nature of conditioned phenomena, the ultimate, cannot be said to be distinct from those phenomena. As such, this subtle and profound ultimate is indeed of a single character within phenomena whose defining characteristic appears to be diverse. To realize this nature of phenomena, which is unconditioned selflessness, one should only rely on nondual gnosis, not mind.
Chapter 5 is a presentation of the “secrets of mind, thought, and cognition.” Here the Buddha introduces the concept of “appropriating cognition” (ādānavijñāna), also called “subliminal cognition” (ālayavijñāna), “mind” (citta), or “mind containing all the seeds” (sarvabījaṃ cittam). This mind, in which mental events manifest, acts is like a mirror in which reflections appear. It is the basis of previous mental imprints resulting from volitions and actions that create predispositions (i.e., latent dispositions) to experience reality in conventional terms. However, once bodhisattvas cognize in an intuitive and personal way the ultimate by means of gnosis, they no longer perceive this mind. In the closing verses of this chapter, the Buddha explains that this mind is without a self, since it is conditioned and composed by seeds. Through these definitions, the Buddha de facto delineates two realms: the domain of dualistic mind and the domain of nondual gnosis.
Chapter 6 is a teaching on the three defining characteristics (lakṣaṇa) of phenomena: the imaginary defining characteristic (parikalpitalakṣaṇa), the other-dependent defining characteristic (paratantralakṣaṇa), and the actual defining characteristic (pariniṣpannalakṣaṇa): (1) The imaginary defining characteristic is the superimposition onto phenomena of an essence or a defining characteristic existing from its own side, by means of designations or conventional expressions. This imaginary characteristic is utterly false in the way of a visual aberration, since phenomena are ultimately devoid of any defining characteristic that makes them what they are. (2) The other-dependent defining characteristic corresponds to the dependent arising of phenomena. It refers to phenomenal appearances upon which an imaginary defining characteristic is superimposed. This point is grasped once the imaginary defining characteristic of phenomena is understood to be a wrong conception. It is worth noting that the other-dependent defining characteristic delineates the domain of conditioned cognitions, namely, the mind as presented in chapter 5 (this point is made clear in 7.10 with regard to karma and rebirth), and as such, represents the domain of affliction (see 6.11). (3) The actual defining characteristic is the permanent and immutable reality of phenomena. It is the ultimate unerring object that is manifest once the selflessness of phenomena, the nonexistence of any fictive defining characteristic in phenomena arising dependently, has been realized. Only the actual defining characteristic constitutes the domain of purification, since the other-dependent defines the domain of affliction, namely, the realm of the conditioned. In the closing verses of this chapter, the Buddha gives a quintessential presentation of the path: one should first recognize that phenomena are devoid of imaginary defining characteristics by seeing them as mere designations superimposed on conditioned cognitions. At that time, one will abandon phenomena characterized by affliction, namely, conditioned phenomena in the form of conditioned cognitions, and turn toward phenomena characterized by purification that are in harmony with ultimate reality.
Chapter 7 begins with Paramārthasamudgata’s question: why did the Buddha first teach the defining characteristic of phenomena, their arising, their cessation, and so forth through the notions of the five aggregates, the twelve sense domains, and so on, when he later explained that all phenomena are without an essence? The Buddha answers by teaching the three kinds of essencelessness, namely, essencelessness regarding defining characteristics, essencelessness regarding arising, and essencelessness regarding the ultimate: (1) Essencelessness regarding defining characteristics refers to the imaginary defining characteristic of phenomena. It is the essencelessness of what is utterly nonexistent (i.e., the defining characteristic), which is like a sky flower. (2) Essencelessness regarding arising refers to the other-dependent defining characteristic of phenomena arising from causes other than themselves. It is presented as the magic illusion of dependent arising, in the context of this teaching the magic illusion of mind. (3) Essencelessness regarding the ultimate has two aspects. The first is the essencelessness of all conditioned phenomena with regard to the ultimate. As a corollary of dependent arising, those phenomena are in fact not born as anything, being dependent on causes and conditions for their arising and therefore impermanent. The second aspect of essencelessness with regard to the ultimate refers to the only unconditioned object of purification, the actual defining characteristic of phenomena, the ultimate selflessness of phenomena, which is like space, itself also unconditioned. This permanent and immutable nature of phenomena is the primordial state of peace of that which, being without a defining characteristic, is unborn and unceasing, by nature in the state of nirvāṇa.
In 7.10, the Buddha describes the entire process leading to confusion: beings reify the other-dependent and the actual defining characteristics in terms of the imaginary defining characteristic. Failing to understand that conventional expressions do not refer to actual things, they superimpose an essence on conditioned cognitions and imagine reality to be just as it is described by their linguistic conventions. Figments of imagination become causes and conditions for their mental activities, which will lead them to the afflictions of action and rebirth. The process described here is akin to a world of virtual reality where even the projector, the conditioned mind, is imaginary. As one takes the projected phenomena as real and reifies them, one acts, suffers, dies, and is endlessly “respawned” within this virtual reality. Although this pseudo-reality projected by mind is nonexistent, it will condition one’s mind and one’s future existence as one will act in accordance with one’s state of mind within this virtual reality. In 7.10, the other-dependent is therefore equated with the appropriating mind, the basis of the imaginary defining characteristic of phenomena, the object of dreamlike conceptualizations (see also 7.25).
Next, the Buddha explains how various beings relate to this process and how he has helped them with teachings corresponding to their circumstances and capacities. For example, some can understand on a dualistic level that defining characteristics (i.e., the virtual reality of phenomena) lack an essence, and thus slowly develop repulsion toward conditioned phenomena, even if they are not able to realize the ultimate nature of phenomena, their nondual primordial selflessness which is the domain of gnosis. In accordance with this model of reality, the Buddha declares that there is only the path and journey toward liberation and thus a Single Vehicle for both hearers and bodhisattvas because there is only a single purification.
In 7.30, Paramārthasamudgata defines the three turnings of the wheel of Dharma. Because this doctrine is included in this specific chapter, it seems logical to interpret the three turnings of the wheel of Dharma in relation to the three kinds of essencelessness: (1) The first turning used the notion that phenomena have a defining characteristic to teach the essencelessness of these defining characteristics in a series of teachings such as the five aggregates, the twelve sense domains, and so on (see also 4.1–6). In our metaphor on virtual reality, one could see these teachings as being expounded on the basis of the very imaginary phenomena conceptualized as truly existing. When children experience a nightmare, their parents show that the monster does not exist by implicitly, i.e. provisionally, accepting its existence, saying, “Look! It is not there.” (2) The second turning of the wheel teaches the first aspect of essencelessness with regard to the ultimate, stating that phenomena are unborn. From this perspective, the primordial selflessness of phenomena is still taught in relation to dualistic phenomena. As a consequence, Paramārthasamudgata considers this cycle of teachings as provisional. (3) The third turning of the wheel aims at teaching the second aspect of essencelessness with regard to the ultimate in a way that is not limited to the domain of dualistic phenomena. To pursue our metaphor, this third cycle of teachings gives a complete overview of the three defining characteristics of phenomena: the completely imaginary experience of a virtual reality, the magic illusion of the projecting mind, and the primordial domain of gnosis. Paramārthasamudgata declares the third turning to be of definitive meaning.
It is worth noting that the doctrine of the three defining characteristics can be seen as delineating three great categories of soteriological approaches found in Indo-Tibetan Buddhist traditions: (1) the deconstruction of putative notions of an individual self through mereological and relational strategies; (2) the deconstruction of notions of a self regarding conditioned phenomena through the impossibility of their ultimate arising, since these conditioned phenomena merely exist in dependence; and (3) the pointing out of the nondual ultimate nature of phenomena, which altogether bypasses imaginary mental constructions.
In the eighth chapter, the famous Maitreya chapter on meditation, the Buddha first gives a series of definitions followed by the description of a process, a pattern frequently used in this sūtra. First, the objects of the practices of mental stillness (śamatha) and insight (vipaśyanā) are defined as, respectively, an image without and with conceptualization, while their objects, when both practices are combined, are the point where things end (vastvanta) and the accomplishment of the goal (kṛtyānuṣṭhāna, i.e., the attainment of the path). Mental stillness consists in directing one’s attention (manasikāra) inward toward the mind that is directing attention (see 8.3). It follows a state of inner absorption produced by concentrating on a referential object. The practice of insight consists in analyzing, discerning, and differentiating the various cognitive aspects of the image (pratibimba) that is the object of concentration. These two practices are neither different nor identical. They are not different in that they take mind as a referential object, but they are not identical because insight takes a conceptual image as its referential object. The Buddha thus explains in an often-cited passage that this image taken as an object of concentration is not different from mind insofar as cognition is constituted by the mere representation (vijñaptimātra) that is the object of this cognition. The mind and the image, which is its object manifesting as a mental event, appear as different, although they are not. All mental images, whether in the context of practice or not, are mere representations. Once one has realized this, directing one’s attention toward true reality is the one-pointedness of mind in which mental stillness and insight are unified. A superior way to practice this path is therefore to focus on that which is universal in all the various specific teachings imparted by the Buddha. This approach, which is based on a practice devoid of mental engagement (vitarka) and investigation (vicāra), directly focuses on the element that converges toward true reality. The ensuing shift in one’s basis of existence (āśrayaparivṛtti) mentioned in this sūtra does not here refer to a transformation of the subliminal cognition (ālayavijñāna). According to 10.2, this shift, once all corruption has been eliminated, consists in nothing other than the bodhisattva’s attainment of the truth body (dharmakāya).
The Buddha then explains how one attends to phenomenal appearances in an increasingly nonconceptual way. He also gives an elucidation of the analytical knowledge of designations (dharmapratisaṃvid) and their objects (arthapratisaṃvid) attained through the practice of mental stillness and insight. In this context, a few key definitions are given; for example, the true reality of representations is that all conditioned phenomena are mere representations (see 8.20.2.iii). When presented in four aspects, the analytical knowledge of designations and their objects encapsulate the entire path through the four stages of mental appropriation, experience, affliction, and purification. When asked about the nature of gnosis, the Buddha answers that it “consists in the mental stillness and insight that take a universal teaching as a referential object” while “perception consists in the mental stillness and insight that take a specific teaching as a referential object” (see 8.25). Practically, bodhisattvas direct their attention to true reality, discarding the phenomenal appearances of designations and objects of designation. Without taking any essential characteristic as a referential object, they do not pay attention to phenomenal appearances. Their attention is focused on that which is of a single character within all phenomena. The Buddha then gives a list of all the phenomenal appearances eliminated by emptiness, from the emptiness of all phenomena up to the emptiness of emptiness. By letting go of their object of concentration, the phenomenal appearance corresponding to a mental image, bodhisattvas free themselves from the bonds of conditioned phenomenal appearances (nimitta). Connecting these instructions on meditative practice with his teaching on the three defining characteristics, the Buddha explains that he taught the defining characteristic of emptiness in the Great Vehicle as the nonexistence and nonperception of an imaginary defining characteristic with regard to both affliction and purification in the other-dependent and actual defining characteristics of phenomena.
Practical instructions are also given to overcome obstacles and distractions to the practice of mental stillness and insight. On the ultimate stage of the path, these practices eliminate extremely subtle obstructions resulting in the complete purification of the truth body. The gnosis and vision utterly free from attachment and hindrance are attained. Finally, the Buddha explains how bodhisattvas obtain their great powers by being skillful in the following six points: (1) the arising of the mind, (2) the underlying condition of the mind, (3) the emergence from the mind, (4) the increase of the mind, (5) the decrease of the mind, and (6) skillful means. In this section of the Maitreya chapter, an overview of the vijñaptimātra doctrine is given through the notion of cognition, which includes the appropriating cognition as well as the arising cognitions taking various phenomenal appearances as their object. In this context, it is explained that the supramundane mind of the buddhas does not have any phenomenal appearance as its object.
In chapter 9, the Buddha is questioned on the stages (bhūmi) of a bodhisattva and a buddha, the names of these stages, and their adverse factors and specific arising, as well as on the ten perfections (pāramitā). A final instruction is imparted regarding the Single Vehicle. As mentioned in previous chapters, the Buddha explains that he taught the essence of phenomena in the vehicle of hearers in terms of the aggregates, the sense domains, and so on, and that he presented these phenomena in the light of a single principle in the Great Vehicle, the domain of truth (dharmadhātu). Those who conceptualize these teachings by taking them literally do not understand his underlying intention, which is that both vehicles are in fact teachings based on a single principle.
In the tenth chapter, Mañjuśrī questions the Buddha on the defining characteristic of the truth body of the tathāgatas. The Buddha explains the truth body in the sense of a result attained through the practice of the stages and perfections. This attainment consists in a shift in one’s basis of existence. From the perspective of beings belonging to the domain of mental elaborations and conditioned phenomena, the truth body is therefore inconceivable, being utterly beyond mental elaborations,. Here again the Buddha delineates two distinct realms.
The tathāgatas, who appear as emanation bodies (nirmāṇakāya), are said to be like a manifestation, an apparition. Through their skillful means and sovereign power (adhiṣṭhāna), they liberate beings by imparting three kinds of teaching: the sūtras, the Vinaya, and the mātṛkās (generally taken as more or less equivalent to the Abhidharma and related literature): (1) The sūtras teach what was heard, how to take refuge, the training, and the awakening. (2) The Vinaya teaches the precepts and prātimokṣa vows to hearers and bodhisattvas. (3) The mātṛkās are systematic teachings on important doctrinal points, such as the defining characteristic of the conventional and the ultimate, the defining characteristic of referential objects consisting of the awakening factors and their features, and so forth. In the section of the mātṛkā pertaining to the ascertainment of the qualities of cognitive objects, the Buddha goes into a lengthy discussion on logical analysis according to the four principles of reason (yukti): (1) the principle of reason based on dependence (apekṣāyukti), (2) the principle of reason based on cause and effect (kāryakāraṇayukti), (3) the principle of reason based on logical proof (upapattisādhanayukti), and (4) the principle of reason based on the nature of phenomena itself (dharmatāyukti). The explanation given by the Buddha on the third yukti of this list (cf. 10.7.4.vii.c) is very extensive and resembles a short treatise on epistemology in which the notion of means of knowledge or valid cognition (pramāṇa) is meticulously investigated. In this section, the Buddha explains the characteristics of valid and invalid reasonings. He concludes by stating that three types of valid cognition should be accepted: direct cognition (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), and authoritative scriptures (āptāgama).
The Buddha next elucidates “the meaning of the dhāraṇī through which bodhisattvas comply with the underlying intention of the profound Dharma expounded by the tathāgatas, the complete meaning of the sūtras, the Vinaya, and the mātṛkās.” This quintessential teaching encapsulating the meaning of the entire Dharma states that beings are in truth beyond activity and beyond being afflicted or purified. It is only because of their reification of illusory phenomena in terms of identity and essence that they conceive their reality in the way they do, which leads them to suffering. Abandoning this “body afflicted by corruption” (dauṣṭhulyakāya), they obtain the truth body that is inconceivable and unconditioned (i.e., the dharmakāya). In this context, the Buddha concludes by explaining that the tathāgatas are not characterized by mind, thought, and cognition. Their mind arises without effort in the way of an emanation (nirmāṇa). In their case, one cannot say whether their mind exists or not, their domain consisting of pure realms. It follows that the tathāgatas are characterized by nonduality: “They are neither completely and perfectly awakened nor not completely and perfectly awakened; they neither turn the wheel of Dharma nor do not turn the wheel of Dharma; they neither attain the great parinirvāṇa nor do not attain the great parinirvāṇa. This is because the truth body is utterly pure and the emanation body constantly manifests.” Once the truth body has been purified through the practice focusing on the domain of truth (dharmadhātu), “the great light of gnosis manifests in beings, and innumerable emanated reflections arise.” One should keep in mind, though, the teachings imparted in Chapter 3 on the conventional and ultimate truths. From the perspective of the ultimate, nothing has ever been purified by anybody, as the concluding verses of the formula in Chapter 10 make clear:
- “The possessors of qualities resulting from affliction and purification
- Are all without movement and without a person;
- Therefore, I declare them to be without activity,
- As they are neither purified nor afflicted, be it in the past or the future.
- “Relying on views resulting from their latent dispositions,
- On account of which they wrongly conceive the body afflicted by corruption,
- They reify [the ego through concepts such as] ‘I’ and ‘mine.’
- As a consequence, notions arise, such as ‘I see,’ ‘I eat,’ ‘I do,’ ‘I am afflicted,’ and ‘I am purified.’
- “Thus, those who understand this fact as it really is
- Abandon the body afflicted by corruption and instead
- Will obtain a body that is not a support for any defilement,
- Being free from mental elaborations and unconditioned.”
The only complete extant versions of the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra (Saṃdh.) are Chinese and Tibetan translations produced from Sanskrit manuscripts. All the recensions of the sūtra in Tibetan include a prologue followed by ten chapters. In addition to the various Kangyur editions, the sūtra is also quoted in full in the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī of the Yogācārabhūmi. The list of the available recensions of the text across Sanskrit, Chinese, and Tibetan include:
1. Sanskrit (including Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit)
• Buescher 2007: 102–104 (quotations in TrBh, 33.25–34.4 drawn from Saṃdh. 5.5 and 5.7; see also Lévi 1925: 33–34)
• Matsuda 1995 (complete reconstruction from manuscript of Saṃdh. 9.1–6)
• Matsuda 2013 (fragments of Saṃdh. 2.4 and 3.1, fragments of 8.39–40, complete reconstruction from manuscript of 8.41)
• Nagao 1964: 43 (gives the list of the seven kinds of tattva mentioned in Saṃdh. 8.20.2 and quoted in the Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya)
• Nagao 1982–1987: I.4, I.7.
• Tucci 1971: 1 (two verses from Saṃdh. 3.7 that are quoted in Kamalaśīla’s Bhāvanākrama: nimittabandhanāj jantur atho dauṣṭhulabandhanāt / vipaśyanāṃ bhāvayitvā śamathañ ca vimucyata iti) and ibid., p. 22 (a sentence drawn from 7.15 also quoted in the Bhāvanākrama: ekāntasattvārthavimukhasya ekāntasaṃsārābhisaṃskāravimukhasya [nā] uttarā samyaksaṃbodhir uktā mayeti)
2. Chinese
• 相續解脫地波羅蜜了義經 (Taishō 678) and 相續解脫如來所作隨順處了義經 (Taishō 679) translated by Guṇabhadra (394–468
• 深密解脫經 (Taishō 675) translated by Bodhiruci (fl. 508–535
• 佛說解節經 (Taishō 677) translated by Paramārtha (498–569
• 解深密經 (Taishō 676) translated by Xuanzang (596–664
3. Tibetan
a. Tshalpa group
•
• C747 mdo sde, ca 1b1–71a7 (vol. 29)
• D106 mdo sde, ca 1b1–55b7 (vol. 49)
• J51 mdo sde, ca 1b1–59b8 (vol. 44)
• K
• R106 mdo sde, ca 1b1–55b7 (vol. 49)
• U106 mdo sde, ca 1b1–55b7 (vol. 49)
• VD D4038 mdo ’grel (sems tsam), zi 44a–97b
• VG GT3542 mdo ’grel (sems tsam), ’i 59b–136a
• VP K
b. Thempangma group
• L82 mdo sde, na 1b1–80b1 (vol. 42)
• S106 mdo sde, na 1b1–80b1 (vol. 63)
• T107 mdo sde, na 1b1–70b1 (vol. 68)
• V156 mdo sde, na 1b1–69b6 (vol. 65)
• Z137 mdo, na 1b1–93a6 (vol. 59)
c. Mustang group
• X mdo sde, wa 66a–132a
• He64.6 mdo, wa 62b5–125b8
d. Bhutan group
• Cz082-001 mdo, na 1b1–82a5
• Dd031-001 mdo, ca 1b1–69b2
• Dk034-001 mdo, na 1b1–87b1
• Gt028-001 mdo, na 1b1–72b3
• Np012-001 mdo, na 1b1–87a7
• Pj043-001 mdo, ca 1b1–62b4
• Pz045-001 mdo ca 1b1–61a5
e. Mixed/Independent editions
• F156 mdo sde, ba (tsha) 1b1–72a7 (vol. 68)
• H109 mdo sde, ca 1b1–87b7 (vol. 51)
• Lg11.8 mdo, da-L74 224b5–276a2
• N94 mdo sde, ca 1–81a7 (vol. 51)
• Ng13.07 mdo pa dgongs 111b3–162a8
• O23 mdo sde, cha
f. Other canonical collections
• Ablaikit collection IOM, RAS Tib.979/117
• Go19,01 ka 1b–36a6 (vol. 19)
• Bd3.7 vol. 3 (ta) pha 1b1–84a6
• Do mdo sde, da 196a–246b
g. Dunhuang manuscripts
• SaṃdhDH: Stein Tib. n°194 (49 folios); Stein Tib. n°683 (1 folio) (these folios cover ca. 40% of the sūtra; see Hakayama 1984–1987)
In addition, five commentaries have been composed on the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra:
• Asaṅga’s Āryasaṃdhinirmocanabhāṣya (dgongs pa nges par ’grel pa’i rnam par bshad pa) D3981 mdo ’grel (mdo), ngi 1b–11b
• Wonch’uk’s *Āryagambhīrasaṃdhinirmocanasūtraṭīkā (dgongs pa zab mo nges par ’grel pa’i mdo rgya cher ’grel pa) D4016 mdo ’grel (mdo), ti 1b–di 175a
• Jñāṇagarbha’s Āryasaṃdhinirmocanasūtre āryamaitreyakevalaparivartabhāṣya (dgongs pa nges par ’grel pa’i mdo las ’phags pa byams pa’i le’u nyi tshe bshad pa) D4033 mdo ’grel (sems tsam), bi 318b–345a
• Changchup Dzutrül (byang chub rdzu ’phrul)’s *Āryasaṃdhinirmocanasūtravyākhyāna (bstan bcos sna tshogs), D4358 mdo ’grel, co 1b–jo 183b
• Trisong Detsen (khri srong lde brtsan)’s *Samyagvākpramāṇoddhṛtasūtra (bka’ yang dag pa’i tshad ma las mdo btus pa) D4352 mdo ’grel (bstan bcos sna tshogs), co 173a–205b
I applied various methods and followed a series of steps during the process of translating the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra from the Tibetan:
I first collated all the available Tibetan editions of Saṃdhinirmocana: Bd, C, D, Dunhuang (Hakayama 1984–87), Do, F, H, L, N, S, K
The Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra is a major text of Indian Buddhism that has early on attracted the attention of Buddhist Studies scholars. It has been translated into French, English, and German (partially). Lamotte (1935) provided a critical edition of Saṃdhinirmocana and a translation from Tibetan (N) and Chinese (Taishō 676) into French. He also attempted to reconstruct or identify technical terms in Sanskrit, which have for the most part been confirmed by subsequent finds of Sanskrit fragments. Lamotte’s work is a major resource for the study of Saṃdhinirmocana. It has been until now the standard edition and translation of this text on account of its accuracy and methodological academic approach. As a side note, I followed Lamotte’s segmentation of the text into paragraphs. His French translation is generally reliable, although some technical passages can be significantly improved, particularly in the case of chapter 8 on meditation and chapter 10 on the result of the path. Frauwallner (1969) gives a partial translation of Saṃdhinirmocana (i.e., chapters 6 and 7) from Tibetan into German. As one would expect, Frauwallner’s academic translation of these two chapters aims at accuracy over readability. Kawasaki 1976 is also a partial translation of chapter 8 into English (§6.1–9). This translation does not improve Lamotte’s. Powers’ (1995) translation from Tibetan (D) into English, in spite of its merit, could be widely improved upon in terms of methodology, accuracy, and readability. Brunnhölzl 2018 offers a partial translation of chapter 7, as well as a few key passages from chapter 5.
Translations by Cleary (1999) and Keenan (2000) are from the Chinese (Taishō 676) into English. I used Keenan’s work to get a sense of the Chinese text while translating the Degé edition but only referred to Cleary occasionally. Keenan’s work seems to me more accurate than Cleary’s, although the latter was useful for unraveling difficult passages, since his style is more free and primarily intends to communicate the meaning of the text. Cornu (2005) has provided a translation of the text from Tibetan (D) into French that mainly follows Powers 1995, a somewhat regrettable fact since Lamotte’s (1935) is more accurate. Schmithausen’s (2014) work contains numerous difficult passages of Saṃdhinirmocana translated from various Tibetan and Chinese editions into English. It is an invaluable resource for the study of Saṃdhinirmocana. In addition, it offers useful Sanskrit reconstructions of important technical terms. Together with Lamotte’s translation, it has been a constant companion while translating the text.
The Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra is part of a larger network of texts, both in the Kangyur and the Tengyur:
1. The nidāna of Saṃdhinirmocana almost exactly matches those of the Buddhabhūmisūtra (D275) and the Tathāgataguṇajñānācintyaviṣayāvatāranirdeśasūtra (D185). The Buddhabhūmisūtra is a very short text that was also translated into Chinese by Xuanzang in 646 (see Keenan 1980, p. 336ff.). Textual parallelisms of this kind are useful to double checking some passages or gathering more background information about the source text.
2. As mentioned above, Saṃdhinirmocana is also found in extenso in the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī of the Yogācārabhūmi and is therefore part of a tradition of texts sharing common ideas. This point should be kept in mind while translating, particularly when one has to evaluate the potential impact of terminological choices from the perspective of a more philosophical approach to the text, which, in the case of Saṃdhinirmocana, should be a major concern. For example, one should pay attention to the fact that interpreting “representation-only” (vijñaptimātra) as a strong form of idealism essentializing mind could be misleading from the perspective of a cultural translation of the worldview propounded in Saṃdhinirmocana since mind, just as much as the external object, is explicitly declared to be empty of any own-being, essence, or intrinsic nature (see chapter 8 on the three kinds of niḥsvabhāvatā) in this text.
3. Another important point is the presence of the aforementioned five commentaries on Saṃdhinirmocana found in the Tengyur (D). I occasionally referred to these works while finalizing the final draft of the translation. However, I first focused on the available editions of Saṃdhinirmocana itself as I did not want to be influenced by the interpretations of later authors. Instead, I attempted to go through all possible logically meaningful readings according to the Tibetan and Sanskrit sources without any preconceptions resulting from my reading of later commentarial traditions.
4. In the same vein, one should note that Saṃdhinirmocana has played a major role in Tibetan hermeneutical debates. For centuries, it has been considered a central scripture referred to extensively in the writings of Tibet’s great luminaries, such as Jé Tsongkhapa (rje tsong kha pa, 1357–1419) or Jamgön Mipham Gyatso (’jam mgon mi pham rgya mtsho, 1846–1912). While it would certainly be fascinating to study the impact of Saṃdhinirmocana in the context of Tibetan Madhyamaka, I chose not to take into account Indian or Tibetan commentaries or exegeses of the sūtra in order to focus on the source text itself.
I proceeded to search all articles and monographs referring to Saṃdhinirmocana I could find at the very beginning of this translation project. In this quest for relevant academic research, I benefited from the excellent bibliography found in Delhey 2013 regarding research done on the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī of the Yogācārabhūmi, which I expanded with a list of complementary reference works (see the bibliography). Among the existing academic literature on Saṃdhinirmocana, Schmithausen 2014 stands out and, unsurprisingly, proved to be a major resource for this translation project.
1. The translation of the title of the text became the object of several discussions among scholars regarding the meaning of the Sanskrit words saṃdhi and nirmocana as a consequence of Lamotte’s first complete translation of the text. Among the various available options, I opted for simplicity and translated the Sanskrit Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra with “The Sūtra Unraveling the Intent,” which I believe renders accurately the meaning and structure of the text. Various interlocutors indeed ask the Buddha repeatedly to explain difficult points in order to clarify the purpose of his seemingly contradictory or complex doctrines on the nature of reality.
2. Regarding the content of the sūtra itself, I proceeded to organize secondary sources by chapter and referenced this research in the notes accompanying my translation. The last chapter of Saṃdhinirmocana includes a very technical passage on valid cognition (pramāṇa) whose definitions predate Dignāga’s system of logic. Translating Trisong Detsen’s *Samyagvākpramāṇoddhṛtasūtra, which is a commentary on the teaching on the four principles of reason (rigs pa bzhi), would help us better understand pre-Dignāgean Buddhist logic.
In this stage of the overall process, I followed Jean-François Billeter’s pragmatic approach to the translation of classical Chinese texts. This approach consists in five operations:
1. The first stage of the translation process is purely analytical. A passage is translated on the basis of lexicographical resources (e.g., dictionaries) and syntactic rules (e.g., grammars). During this operation, it is important to distinguish what is understood and what still remains problematic. All options should be kept open. Interpretations or eisegetical readings should be rejected. From a practical perspective, I systematically used the Mahāvyutpatti to find the Sanskrit terms behind general Tibetan expressions. For technical terms, I relied on Schmithausen (2014) and the academic research mentioned above.
Our Tibetan text is itself a translation. This somewhat complicates our task since we have to decipher the Sanskrit behind the Tibetan in order to make sense of some difficult sentences or passages. However, this approach is necessary on a lexicographical and syntactic level as can be seen in the following examples: One should read the Tibetan brtsams pa as ārabhya, a Buddhist hybrid Sanskrit expression that has the meaning of “referring to/having to do with” and not “beginning with.” Likewise, rab tu phye ba stands for prabhāvita, which in the Saṃdhinirmocana means “consisting in/characterized as/characterized by” and not “distinguished.” The problem is even more acute in the case of Sanskrit compounds that have been translated into Tibetan according to the way they were formulated in Sanskrit. As an illustration of this, compounds ending with lakṣaṇa (Tib. mtshan nyid) often make more sense in Saṃdhinirmocana as bahuvrīhi s than karmadhāraya s or tatpuruṣa s, not to mention dvandva s. Lamotte thus reads rtog ge kun las ’das mtshan nyid (sarvatarkasamatikrāntalakṣaṇa) as a bahuvrīhi, which I believe is appropriate in the context of the passage in question.
2. Once a “technically correct” translation of the source text has been produced, Billeter advises us to bring together the various elements of a sentence or a passage until we obtain a clear picture of what is said in the source text. This step therefore consists in understanding the meaning of the translated passage by literally seeing (or visualizing) its meaning. In a way, the first operation is about das Erklären (“explanation”), while the second concerns das Verstehen (“understanding”). In this sense, the latter uses the resources of one’s imagination and metalinguistic knowledge to establish connections with a web of meaning that is not restricted to the translated sentence or passage alone.
The second operation is therefore a synthesis, a recognition of relations between meaning units of various orders (one would think here of the idea conveyed by saṃjñā and similar terms in which the upasarga sam- plays a central role), whereas the first phase is analytical (in the sense of vicāra, vicāraṇa, and vijñāna, in which the upasarga vi- expresses the notion of taking apart). In fact, translators translate into the target language their comprehension of the source text. They actually never translate the text itself but their understanding or representation of ideas, situations, and emotions conveyed by a text. To illustrate this point, one could mention the problem, encountered by scholars, of translating terms related to meditative practice. The Maitreya chapter of Saṃdhinirmocana is probably the most difficult to understand if one is not familiar with Buddhist practice. Lamotte translates manasikāra with “réflection,” while Frauwallner uses “Beobachtung” (lit. “observation”). Both these translation choices obfuscate the meaning of what the term “directing one’s attention” actually denotes. This is not in itself a major issue, but if such inaccuracies proliferate in the same passage or chapter, the meaning of the translation becomes unclear, although it may well be technically correct on a syntactic level and lexicographical perspective (at least when it comes to correctly identifying Tibetan technical terms on the basis of the Sanskrit).
In the context of pre-Dignāgean Buddhist logic, chapter 10 represents another case in point. This chapter is indeed replete with abstruse concepts not belonging to the well-researched and documented later systems of Buddhist logic. In this case, translating the many occurrences of the connective particle kyi in long compounds with the English preposition “of” will not help the reader much, though it will certainly give the translators the peace of mind of having produced a “technically correct” translation. However, I believe that translators have only two options here: (a) take a risk and, for example, tell us if they actually understand the connective kyi in the sense of “belonging to,” “resulting from,” “consisting of,” and so on; or (b) admit that they do not understand the source text. In the case of the technical compounds found in chapter 10, I therefore tried to ask myself what these terms actually referred to, what could have been the system of logic presented in these pages. For example, I read gzhan gyi rigs kyi dpe nye bar sbyar ba’i mtshan nyid (anyajātīyadṛṣṭāntopasaṃhāralakṣaṇa) as rendering into Tibetan a Sanskrit bahuvrīhi. As a consequence, I translated this long compound with “[The logical proof] characterized by a demonstration through an instance belonging to a different class [of phenomena]”
It goes without saying that these translations are at this stage provisional, as further research on the subject matter is necessary. But in order to translate these technical terms, we cannot just give a technically correct translation of a succession of words. Beyond the first phase of the work, which is purely analytical, we still need to develop a mental representation of the situation presented in the text by establishing relations with a context that might go beyond the text.
3. In the third operation, Billeter insists on the necessity for translators to become writers. They should formulate in the target language their understanding of the source text as accurately and naturally as possible. At this stage, translators should focus on literary elements of the translation, such as idioms, voice, and figures of speech. According to Billeter, difficulties in writing accurately and naturally in the target language are often the direct consequence of not having performed the second operation. The translation might well be technically correct, but it still does not make sense, an experience all translators go through when they fail to understand the meaning (or visualize the situation) referred to by the source text.
4. In the fourth operation, translators should reflect on the role played by linguistic constraints and conventions in the formulation of the source text as well as those imposed by the target language. What options did the author of the text have in terms of expression? How would someone express the same ideas in the target language? As a consequence, the notion of form and pragmatics in the target language becomes central. To detail the various operations leading to an actual translation, Vinay and Darbelnet’s model is useful. Translators should first identify the units of translation in relation to the translation process: the lexicon (e.g., semantic values, objective and affective aspects, lexical associations and modulations), the syntactic structure (e.g., transpositions between word classes, supplementation of pronouns or conjunctions, modifications in terms of gender, number, characterization, tenses, voice, modality, and verbal aspects), and the message (e.g., meaning, stylistics, pragmatics, topicalization, figures of speech, metalinguistic aspects, specific segmentation of reality). Then, they should examine the descriptive, affective, and intellectual content of the units of translation in the source text to reconstitute the situation at the origin of the message. These two first steps correspond to Billeter’s two first operations. Finally, translators still have to formulate the message in the target language without omitting any relevant element from the source language.
To achieve this, Vinay and Darbelnet argue that translators have only two methods: direct and oblique translation. Direct translation includes three strategies:
• a. Borrowing: the term in the source language is used in the target language to overcome an insuperable metalinguistic lacuna, or it is used because the term is also commonly used in the target language. For instance, I use the Sanskrit bodhisattva and nirvāṇa in my English translation.
• b. Calque: I translated bodhicitta with “awakening mind,” which is both a lexical and structural calque.
• c. Literal translation: most lists and simple sentences are for instance relatively unproblematic direct translations of the source language.
When a Literal translation fails to render the message, is structurally impossible, or misleads the reader due to the lack of a corresponding expression belonging to the same register, one should turn to an oblique translation method among the following strategies:
• d. Transposition: one replaces a word class by another. For example, the frequent nominalizations of Sanskrit and Tibetan are turned into verb clauses. The highly technical nature of some terms makes it necessary to reflect the Sanskrit as much as possible while “unpacking” what is a condensed compound. As an illustration, I translated tadanyavairūpyopalabdhi with “a perception that does not conform with anything other than the [thing to establish],” in which vairūpya is translated as a verb. Our text is mostly written in the same way as a treatise (śāstra), reflecting what is referred to as the nominal style in Sanskrit, or scholastic Sanskrit, in which the nominalization of verbal clauses by means of compounds or suffixes is common. As is often the case in technical or hyperspecialized environments, processes or conceptual frameworks are encapsulated as technical terms (often nouns) implying a complex or recurring pattern. As an analogy, think of a medical term such as hemiglossectomy standing for a removal of a part of the tongue. The passive impersonal phrase “a hemiglossectomy was performed on the patient at 11 pm” includes the nominalization of an action through a compound (hemiglossectomy). It could be rewritten as “[the surgeon] removed a portion of the patient’s tongue at 11 pm.” As can be seen from the translations of Lamotte and Frauwallner, nominalization seems to be less of a problem in French and German than it is in modern (American) English in which readability is more of a concern. When translating the Saṃdhinirmocana, I therefore tried to turn nominal compounds common in scholastic Sanskrit into English verbal sentences by transposing these compounds into verbal sentences. However, since the text is very technical (particularly from Chapter 7 onward), I decided in some cases to keep nominal compounds that were indicative of a technical term and not just a nontechnical action or state of affairs. For example, the text mentions throughout a “concept” being referred to a “X” (see for instance 7.3–6). Just like the surgical term above, such complex nominal compounds stand for a specific action or concept and are part of a “specialist’s jargon.” Turning these compounds into verbal sentences might have the counterproductive effect of erasing an essential feature of this kind of literature consisting in endless lists of often technical terms. Therefore, in this particular case, it would probably be best to avoid transposition.
• e. Modulation: this strategy implies a change of perspective or standpoint made in order to avoid an awkward rendering of the source language. In its simplest form, translating sla ba ma yin (D, folio 25.b, 7.32) with “it is difficult” is an illustration of an optional modulation. Any change of syntactic subject for the sake of clarifying a sentence would be a modulation. Whether this decision is appropriate or not on the part of the translator is something that one should evaluate on a case-by-case basis. I would like to illustrate this point with issues related to the nidāna of the sūtra, in which topicalization plays an important role. The first paragraph of the prologue is a presentation of the place where the Buddha is dwelling. The topicalization of the temple (khang) is achieved through a succession of compounds, mainly bahuvrīhis. Lamotte’s translation reflects this thematization to perfection. In contrast, Powers fails to topicalize the palace to the same degree. In his translation, the logical subject of the several clauses describing this palace is sometimes ambiguous. In this case, one should consider the fact that the Sanskrit structure of this paragraph is built on a process of topicalization that we can easily render in English. In a word, we have no reason to alter this literary device by inducing a modulation of the translation through a change of perspective induced, for example, by a modification of the grammatical or logical subject in the target language.
• f. Equivalence: the same situation can be expressed both in the source language and the target language in completely different stylistic and structural ways due to the necessity to resort to idioms in order to convey the message of the source text. For example, I translated evam etat (de de bzhin te/no) literally with “so it is” in English, which is a slightly pompous and old-fashioned expression no one would probably use today. Instead, one would probably say in an actual dialogue something like “You are right, Dharmodgata” or “This is true, Dharmodgata.”
• g. Adaptation: this method aims at replacing altogether a reference to a situation in the source language if it is completely unknown in the target language. I generally try to avoid adaptations while translating, for the simple reason that one has to be certain that, for instance, two different metaphors or examples refer to the same situation or object. To conclude on this point, it seems to me that a number of fixed or technical expressions in the Kangyur could be translated in a systematic way following Vinay and Darbelnet’s approach. This research would establish a set of solid conventions that would improve accuracy and readability.
Returning to Billeter’s schema, in his fourth operation the translator should verify that what has been translated into the target language corresponds to the meaning of the source text. Do the two texts express the same idea? Do they produce the same effect on the reader? To answer these questions, Billeter recommends reading one’s text aloud. During this operation, translators should also check whether the translation fits within a specific cultural register in the target language. Discourses take place within a corpus of existing literature that is culturally determined by centuries of textual production. Some statements from a different cultural background resonate through a web of meaning, discursive practices, or literary figures of speech once expressed in the target language. In fact, the web of meaning of the target language within which the translation is received finds its parallel in the web of meaning within which the source text was produced. Within the source text and culture, concepts, ideas, and references resonate throughout sentences, paragraphs, chapters, works, and genres. For example, some philosophical definitions can represent intratextual and extratextual variations on a theme for which there is no metalinguistic context in the target language. Translators therefore need to understand the text not only as a whole and in relation to its various components, but also in connection with both the source and the target cultures. This is of course particularly true of more “philosophical” texts for which it is essential to evaluate how the translation interacts with the webs of meaning of the source and target cultures. Practically, it is important to cross check the consistency (or lack thereof) of meaning units across the text while keeping in mind that the translation is also obviously culturally situated. This process is fundamental because it facilitates the validation (or invalidation) of translation hypotheses resulting from the two first steps of the translation process.
In the context of Saṃdhinirmocana, the problem is compounded by the fact that the sūtra can be read as a collection of independent texts that would have been put together during the third or fourth century
It is undeniable that the various recensions in Tibetan and Chinese refer to texts that are quite different in structure. For instance, Paramārtha’s translation includes only the first four chapters, which, according to Lamotte, might have originally formed an independent sūtra. In addition, it is obvious that the ten chapters of Saṃdhinirmocana do not follow a consistent textual pattern. The first six have no title. They are concluded by a few summarizing gāthā s and a standard formula indicating the name of the person who questioned the Buddha and the number of the chapter (e.g., “This was the chapter of Guṇākara—the sixth chapter”). Chapter 7 has a whole summary of the chapter in the form of a supplement right after the concluding gāthās, while in chapter 10 the Buddha is questioned on complementary topics once the concluded gāthās have been proclaimed. Chapters 7, 8, 9, and 10 each come to an end with a nītārthanirdeśa (instruction of definitive meaning) on the chapter topic. This nītārthanirdeśa is referred to as a Saṃdhinirmocana and used as the chapter title. On account of this, Lamotte surmises that there might have originally been several independent Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra s that came to be grouped together as the text we know today.
One should also note that the dialogue structure of chapters 1 through 7 differs from that of chapters 8 through 10. In the first group, the Buddha elaborates on a topic in the form of a monologue once his interlocutor has questioned him on a specific topic, whereas in the second group a dialogue takes place through short questions and answers. As a consequence of all these philological divergences, one has to conclude that the text is rather composite in nature and probably the result of a succession of additions and adjustments. In a word, I agree with Schmithausen that Saṃdhinirmocana is not an organic whole that would have been composed from the onset in its present form and that its chapters are not mutually dependent. However, this hypothesis should ideally be the object of further research by a team following an approach similar to that of Professor Jonathan Silk’s European Research Council project “Open Philology — The Composition of Buddhist Scriptures” at the University of Leiden, to which I have had the good fortune to take part. The multiformity and intertextuality of Mahāyāna sūtras are not the result of a linear development from an Ur-text but the expression of oral-formulaic processes of composition and transmission. For our research program focusing on the Ratnakūṭa collection of sūtras, we have been developing digital and philological tools to identify, analyze, and map the fluidity and modularity of Mahāyāna texts. By using these tools, we could better understand the historical development of the complex textual environment of the Saṃdhinirmocana, which includes several translations and many witnesses of this work.
From the perspective of the narrative and doctrinal content of the Tibetan translation, a somewhat different picture emerges. Even if each chapter does not depend on all others in terms of meaning, there is definitely a progression with regard to the flow of thought in Saṃdhinirmocana insofar as later chapters do depend on the definitions and lines of thinking posited in the former chapters, a central fact for translators of this complex text. We can perceive this continuity in the intratextual cross-references that create a terminological resonance echoing throughout the text. Unraveling these cross-references is as important during the translation process as noting the textual variations indicating a deviation from a specific literary pattern. While translating I thus tried to evaluate the text in terms of regularities and discontinuities in the use of definitions and the flow of meaning unfolding throughout the text. One should therefore temper the impression that the text has been “patched” together on the basis of loosely related texts on the basis of philological arguments whose significance is difficult to assess. For example, the fact that chapter 1 is the only chapter in which a dialogue occurs between two bodhisattvas has never been mentioned by any researcher as a textual inconsistency preventing them from considering the first four chapters as a coherent whole. Minor divergences should therefore not deter us from asking ourselves why these chapters were taught or put together in the first place. I would like to illustrate with a few concrete examples the doctrinal coherence of the text. The term ādānavijñāna in 5.3 is also found in 8.37.1.i; the model of the three kinds of essencelessness (niḥsvabhāvatā) of chapter 7 corresponds to the model of the three defining characteristics (lakṣaṇa) of chapter 6, of which two are foreshadowed in 1.2 through the terms parikalpa (kun tu rtog pa) and *apariniṣpanna (yongs su ma grub pa); the other-dependent defining characteristic (paratantralakṣaṇa) introduced in chapter 6 is mentioned in 7.10; chapter 8 presupposes chapters 5 and 6; the concluding paragraphs of 7.33 and 8.41 are almost identical; as noted by Schmithausen, saṃskāranimitta is referred to in similar ways in both 1.5 and 7.25–27; *viśuddhyālambana is mentioned with the same function in 4.8, 7.6, 7.25–27, and 8.20; 10.7.2 refers to the seven aspects of true reality (tathatā) defined in 8.20.2; 8.21 and 10.7.4.ii contain the same formulation; the famous quote “Whether tathāgatas…” is found in 4.10, 7.9, and 10.7.4.vii.d; 10.9 mentions the enumeration citta, manas, and vijñāna exactly in the way it is expressed in 5.1–6; 10.9 enumerates the domains as in 8.23.
On account of the elements adduced above and with Davidson’s principle of charity in mind, I would like to formulate the hypothesis that there is a good reason why these chapters are found in this order: the structure of the text as we know it today is necessary to provide Mahāyāna practitioners with a systematic teaching on (1) ultimate reality qua basis, which is the nondual inexpressible domain of gnosis (chapters 1 through 4), (2) the path to awakening from the domain of mind to the domain of gnosis (chapters 5 through 9), and (3) ultimate reality qua result of the path, which represents a shift in one’s basis of existence as one attains the domain of gnosis (chapter 10).
Indeed, it seems impossible to deny that, considered as a single text (and not as a succession of independent texts), the Saṃdhinirmocana aims at providing a systematic teaching on the Single Vehicle through the three aspects of basis, path, and result in order to solve seeming contradictions and quandaries in doctrines that were of primary importance for followers of the Great Vehicle (e.g., the two truths in chapter 3 and meditative practice in chapter 8). Now, if we read the Saṃdhinirmocana as a single text, we have to confront the web of meaning found in this text in its entirety with the web of meaning of the target culture in order to avoid potential misunderstandings.
This operation has a major impact on the translation of some key terms, such as vijñaptimātra. Since idealism (in the sense that mind is an unchanging essence) is not an option given the teaching imparted in this sūtra, I tried to avoid any potential confusion resulting from an unfortunate choice of terminology. In a word, I would rather stay on the safe side than insert in my translation a potentially misleading term. As a consequence, I decided to translate vijñaptimātra as “a mere representation” instead of using nominalizations such as “cognition-only.” The first expression is relatively unambiguous in the target culture as it minimizes the risk of misunderstanding the message of the text. Another option would be “just a representation.” These formulations mitigate the risk of superimposing an essence on what is meant by vijñapti. The formulation “cognition-only” in the sense of “pure cognition” is in contrast ambivalent. It could also (but not necessarily) signify that only cognition truly exists and by extension, that only mind exists as an essence.
In the last step of the translation process, Billeter recommends that translators perform various operations aiming at polishing the translation, such as replicating the possible effects of semantic resonance throughout the text, improving the connection between sentences and paragraphs, modifying the order of clauses, solving problems of euphony, or editing the translation to make it clearer and simpler by chunking long sentences or eliminating repetitions. To illustrate one of these various tasks in the context of the present project, I decided to review all the terminology pertaining to the semantic field of insight (vipaśyanā) after I had finished translating the entire text. I took as a starting point 8.4, in which vipaśyanā is defined by means of a series of technical terms, such as pratyavekṣaṇa, vibhājanā, pravicaya, paritarka, parimīmāṃsā, nitīraṇa, and vitarka. I first tried to find the best translation for each term in the context of this chapter. Next, I checked the usage of all these terms and other related concepts (e.g., pratisaṃkhyā) throughout the text to standardize the corresponding English terminology. I also tried to minimize the use of square brackets indicating additions to the text when these additions were logically implied by the source text. A typology of such situations would include various operations, such as breaking down a compound, clarifying an abbreviated form corresponding to a well-attested collocation, stating a logical subject, object, or verb that is elided in the source text, mentioning the number of a technical term that usually comes as a list of individual items.
Through all these operations, my aim has been to maximize both accuracy and readability while maintaining the consistency of the very systematic presentation of the Great Vehicle developed in the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra. This text is important in this spiritual tradition since it condenses all aspects of Mahāyāna. I hope that this translation will contribute to improve our understanding of the interplay between liberation as a path and primordial freedom as the ground of being.
Homage to all buddhas and bodhisattvas!
Thus did I hear at one time. The Blessed One was dwelling in an unfathomable palace, built with the blazing seven precious substances, that emitted great light rays suffusing countless universes. Each of its rooms was well arranged and its design was infinite. It was the undivided maṇḍala, the domain transcending the three worlds. Arising from the supreme roots of virtue of the one who transcends the world, it was characterized by the perfectly pure cognition of the one who has achieved complete mastery. Abode of the Tathāgata where the assembly of innumerable bodhisattvas gathered, it was attended by countless gods, nāgas, yakṣas, gandharvas, demigods, garuḍas, kinnaras, mahoragas, humans, and nonhumans. Supported by the great joy and bliss of savoring the Dharma and designed to accomplish the complete welfare of all beings, it was free of any harm caused by the stains of afflictions and clear of any demon. Surpassing all manifestations, this unfathomable palace was displayed by the sovereign power of the Tathāgata. Mindfulness, intelligence, and realization were its pathway; mental stillness and insight were the vehicle leading to it; the great gates of liberation—emptiness, appearancelessness, and wishlessness—were its entrance. It was set on foundations adorned with an infinite accumulation of excellent qualities, which were like great kings of jeweled lotuses.
The Blessed One had a perfectly realized mind and was free from dualistic behavior. Absorbed in the Dharma of the nonexistence of defining characteristics, he was residing in the domain of the buddhas. He had attained equality with all buddhas. His realization was unobstructed and his qualities were irreversible. He could not be overcome by objects of experience. His abode was inconceivable. Perfectly skilled in the sameness of the three times, his five bodies were present in all worlds. His knowledge of all phenomena was free from doubt. He understood all practices. His knowledge of phenomena was without uncertainty. His body was unimaginable. He possessed the gnosis bodhisattvas vow to accomplish. He had attained the nondual abode of the buddhas, the sublime perfection, the supreme indivisible gnosis of the Tathāgata’s liberation. He had realized the sameness [of all phenomena], the state of a buddha in which there is neither a center nor a periphery, and reached the ultimate within the domain of truth, the point where the sphere of space ends.
The Blessed One was accompanied by the entire immeasurable assembly of hearers. Children of noble family, they were the heirs of the Buddha. Their minds were liberated, their wisdom was emancipated, and their discipline was completely pure. They happily gathered with those who longed for the Dharma. They had heard much, kept in mind what they had heard, and accumulated [merit from] what they had heard. They excelled in thought, speech, and deeds. Their wisdom was swift, quick, sharp, emancipating, discerning, vast, extensive, profound, and unequaled. They possessed the jewel of wisdom and the three forms of knowledge. They had attained the supreme state of happiness in this life. The purity of their merit, the excellence of their peaceful conduct, their patience, and their gentleness were vast. They were fully engaged in the teaching of the Tathāgata.
The Blessed One was also accompanied by all the innumerable bodhisattvas assembled from various buddha realms. Firmly settled and engaged in a vast state, they had gone forth through the Dharma of the Great Vehicle. Impartial toward all beings, they were free from all conceptions, conceptualizations, and fabrications. Victorious over all demons and opposition, they were not involved with the considerations of the hearers and solitary realizers. Steadfast through the great joy and happiness of savoring the Dharma, they were free from the five great fears. Solely progressing toward the stages from which there is no regression, they had perfectly actualized the stage in which one pacifies the torment of beings. Among them were thus the bodhisattva mahāsattvas Gambhīrārthasaṃdhinirmocana, Vidhivatparipṛcchaka, Dharmodgata, Suviśuddhamati, Viśālamati, Guṇākara, Paramārthasamudgata, Āryāvalokiteśvara, Maitreya, and Mañjuśrī.
At that time, the bodhisattva Vidhivatparipṛcchaka questioned the bodhisattva Gambhīrārthasaṃdhinirmocana on the ultimate whose defining characteristic is inexpressible and nondual: “O son of the Victorious One, when it is said that all phenomena are nondual, what are these phenomena? In what way are they nondual?”
Gambhīrārthasaṃdhinirmocana replied, “Noble son, all phenomena, what we refer to as all phenomena, are of just two kinds: conditioned and unconditioned. With respect to these, the conditioned is neither conditioned nor unconditioned. The unconditioned is neither unconditioned nor conditioned.”
Vidhivatparipṛcchaka inquired, “O son of the Victorious One, why is the conditioned neither conditioned nor unconditioned and the unconditioned neither unconditioned nor conditioned?”
Gambhīrārthasaṃdhinirmocana answered, “Noble son, the term conditioned is a word, a label used by the Teacher. Words that are labels used by the Teacher are conventional expressions arising from imagination. These conventional expressions arising from imagination are always unreal conventional expressions arising from imagination in its diversity. Therefore, the term conditioned is not the conditioned. Noble son, the term unconditioned is also included within conventions, just as expressions other than conditioned and unconditioned are and will [always] be. One might object that there is, however, no expression in the absence of the object [to which it refers]. What is then this object? It is the complete and perfect awakening to inexpressible [reality] through the sublime gnosis and vision of the noble ones. But in order to lead [others] to the perfect realization of this very inexpressible nature of phenomena, the Teacher labels this object with the term conditioned.
“Noble son, the term unconditioned is also a word, a label used by the Teacher. Words that are labels used by the Teacher are conventional expressions arising from imagination. These conventional expressions arising from imagination are always conventional expressions deprived of any actuality that arise from imagination in its diversity. Therefore, the term unconditioned is not the unconditioned. Noble son, the term conditioned is also included within conventions, just as expressions other than conditioned and unconditioned are and will [always] be. One might object that there is, however, no expression in the absence of the object [to which it refers]. What is then this object? It is the complete and perfect awakening to inexpressible [reality] through the sublime gnosis and vision of the noble ones. But in order to lead [others] to the perfect realization of this very inexpressible nature of phenomena, the Teacher labels this object with the term unconditioned.”
Vidhivatparipṛcchaka asked, “O son of the Victorious One, as the noble ones completely and perfectly awaken to inexpressible [reality] through their sublime gnosis and perception, why do they label this object with the terms conditioned and unconditioned in order to lead [others] to the perfect realization of this very inexpressible nature of phenomena?”
Gambhīrārthasaṃdhinirmocana replied, “Noble son, it is like the following example: A magician or his skillful apprentice, finding himself at the juncture of four great roads, assembles grass, leaves, twigs, pebbles, or stones and produces all kinds of magic illusions, such as regiments of elephants, horses, chariots, and soldiers or collections of jewels, pearls, beryl, seashells, crystal, and coral, as well as an abundance of wealth and grain in treasuries and granaries. At that time, in the presence of these illusions, those who are naive, slow-witted, or confused, not perceiving the grass, leaves, twigs, pebbles, or stones, see and hear those magical tricks and think that whatever appears exists—that these regiments of elephants, horses, chariots, and soldiers or collections of jewels, pearls, beryl, seashells, crystal, and coral, as well as this abundance of wealth and grain, treasuries and granaries, exist. Clinging to these magical illusions according to the way they see and hear things and strongly believing in them, they express themselves through conventions, such as ‘This one is true but the other is false.’ They still need to examine these illusions.
“Those who are not naive or confused but have wisdom perceive the grass, leaves, twigs, pebbles, or stones. They see and hear those magical tricks and understand that whatever appears does not exist—that these regiments of elephants, horses, chariots, and soldiers or collections of jewels, pearls, beryl, seashells, crystal, and coral, as well as this abundance of wealth and grain, treasuries and granaries, do not exist. Yet, they understand that the conception of an elephant regiment exists since its manifestation as a conception through an expedient exists, as do the manifestations as conceptions of regiments of horses, chariots, and soldiers or collections of jewels, pearls, beryl, seashells, crystal, and coral, as well as this abundance of wealth and grain, treasuries and granaries, together with other similar manifestations. So they understand that all those magical illusions, these magic illusions deceiving the eye, exist [in the way magical illusions do]. Thinking in this way, [these wise beings] do not express themselves through conventions, such as ‘This one is true but the other is false,’ on account of clinging to these magical illusions in the way they see and hear things and thus strongly believing in them. However, they do express themselves through conventions in order to convey the true nature [of these illusions to others], although they do not need to further examine these illusions.
Likewise, some childish or ordinary beings have not attained the transcendent sublime wisdom. They have not understood that the nature of all phenomena is inexpressible. When those beings perceive conditioned and unconditioned phenomena, they believe that whatever appears as a conditioned or unconditioned phenomenon exists, and they express themselves through conventions, such as ‘This one is true but the other is false,’ on account of clinging to these appearances according to the way they see and hear things and thus strongly believing in them. They still need to examine these appearances.
“With regard to this, some beings who are not childish and have seen the truth have attained the transcendent sublime wisdom. They have understood that the nature of all phenomena is inexpressible. When they perceive conditioned and unconditioned phenomena, they believe that whatever appears as a conditioned or unconditioned phenomenon does not exist. However, with respect to these appearances, they think that the conceptions in terms of conditioned and unconditioned, the manifestation of conceptions through an expedient in terms of conditioned and unconditioned, the occurrence of conceptualization, and the phenomenal appearance of conditioned phenomena exist in the way magical illusions do. That which deludes the mind exists [in the way magical illusions do]. Thinking in that way, they do not express themselves through conventions, such as ‘This one is true but the other is false,’ on account of clinging to these appearances according to the way they see and hear things and thus strongly believing in them. However, they do express themselves through conventions in order to convey the true nature [of these appearances to others], although they do not need to further examine these appearances.
“Noble son, the noble ones are thus completely and perfectly awakened to inexpressible [reality] through their sublime gnosis and vision of this object, but in order to lead [others] to the perfect realization of this very inexpressible nature of phenomena, they label this object with the terms conditioned and unconditioned.”
At that time, the bodhisattva Gambhīrārthasaṃdhinirmocana recited these verses:
This was the chapter of the bodhisattva Gambhīrārthasaṃdhinirmocana—the first chapter.
Then the bodhisattva Dharmodgata spoke these words: “Blessed One, very long ago in ancient times, beyond as many universes as there are grains of sand in seventy-seven Ganges rivers, I was residing in the world Kīrtimat of the tathāgata Viśālakīrti. There I saw 7,700,000 non-Buddhists, together with their teachers, who had gathered in one place to consider the ultimate defining characteristic of phenomena. Although they had examined, analyzed, investigated, and considered in detail the ultimate defining characteristic of phenomena, they did not understand it. They had changing opinions, lacked certainty, and were slow-witted as well as argumentative. Insulting one another with harsh words, they became abusive, agitated, unprincipled, and violent. Then, Blessed One, I thought to myself, ‘This is so sad, and yet, how marvelous, how wonderful are the manifestations of the tathāgatas in the world and, through their manifestations, the realization and actualization of the ultimate whose defining characteristic is beyond all speculation!’ ”
The Blessed One answered to the bodhisattva Dharmodgata: “So it is, Dharmodgata. So it is. I have completely and perfectly awakened to the ultimate characterized as being beyond all speculation. Yet, after I attained complete and perfect awakening, I communicated through words, gave explanations, established distinctions, expressed myself through conventions, and imparted teachings. One might ask why I did this. I have explained that the ultimate is what is cognized by noble beings in a personal and intuitive way, whereas ordinary beings’ knowledge [resulting from interacting] with one another belongs to the domain of speculation. Therefore, Dharmodgata, you should know in this way through this approach that the ultimate is what is characterized as transcending all speculation. Moreover, Dharmodgata, I have explained that the ultimate represents the domain in which there is no phenomenal appearance, whereas speculation is the domain of phenomenal appearance. Therefore, Dharmodgata, you should know in this way through this approach that the ultimate is what is characterized as transcending all speculation. Moreover, Dharmodgata, I have explained that the ultimate is inexpressible, whereas speculation is the domain of verbalization. Therefore, Dharmodgata, you should know in this way through this approach that the ultimate is what is characterized as transcending all speculation. Moreover, Dharmodgata, I have explained that the ultimate is free from all conventions, whereas speculation is the domain of conventions. Therefore, Dharmodgata, you should know in this way through this approach that the ultimate is what is characterized as transcending all speculation. Moreover, Dharmodgata, I have explained that the ultimate is devoid of argumentative disputation, whereas speculation is the domain of argumentative disputation. Therefore, Dharmodgata, you should know in this way through this approach that the ultimate is what is characterized as transcending all speculation.
“Dharmodgata, it is like this: beings who have only tasted pungent or bitter flavors their entire lives cannot imagine, infer, or appreciate the taste of honey and sugar. Those who have indulged in desire and have been burnt by the torment of desire for a long time cannot imagine, infer, or appreciate the inner happiness of the recluse, which is independent from all phenomenal appearances related to form, sound, smell, taste, and contact. Those who have indulged and taken delight in conversations for a long time cannot imagine, infer, or appreciate the inner happiness of the noble beings who remain silent. Those who have indulged and taken delight in conventions for a long time through seeing, hearing, discriminating, and cognizing cannot imagine, infer, or appreciate the cessation of all conventions, the nirvāṇa that is the extinction of transitory aggregates. Dharmodgata, it is like this: Those who have indulged and taken delight in argumentative disputations for a long time on account of their attachment to the self cannot imagine, infer, or appreciate that there is no attachment to the self and no argumentative disputations in Uttarakuru.
“Dharmodgata, likewise, those who [have indulged for a long time in] speculation cannot imagine, infer, or appreciate the ultimate whose defining characteristic transcends all speculation.”
Then, at that moment, the Blessed One spoke these verses:
This was the chapter of the bodhisattva Dharmodgata—the second chapter.
Then the bodhisattva Suviśuddhamati addressed the Blessed One, “Blessed One, at an earlier time, you spoke these words: ‘The ultimate is subtle and profound. Characterized as transcending what is distinct or indistinct [from conditioned phenomena], it is difficult to understand.’ How wonderful indeed are these words of yours! Blessed One, regarding this point, I once saw many bodhisattvas who, having attained the stage of engagement through aspiration, assembled in one place to discuss in the following way whether conditioned phenomena and the ultimate are distinct or indistinct. Among them, some declared, ‘The defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate are indistinct.’ Others replied, ‘It is not the case that the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate are indistinct, for they are distinct indeed.’ Some others, who were perplexed and lacked certainty, said, ‘Some pretend that the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate are distinct. Some pretend that they are indistinct. Which bodhisattvas speak the truth? Which speak falsity? Which are mistaken? Which are not?’ Blessed One, I thought to myself, ‘So, none of these noble sons understands the ultimate whose subtle defining characteristic transcends whether it is distinct or indistinct from conditioned phenomena. These bodhisattvas are truly naive, confused, dull, unskilled, and mistaken.’ ”
The Blessed One replied to the bodhisattva Suviśuddhamati, “So it is, Suviśuddhamati. So it is. Indeed, none of these noble sons understands the ultimate whose subtle defining characteristic transcends whether it is distinct or indistinct from conditioned phenomena. These [bodhisattvas] are truly naive, confused, dull, unskilled, and mistaken. Why is this so? Suviśuddhamati, it is because those who analyze conditioned phenomena in this way neither realize nor actualize the ultimate.
“Why? Suviśuddhamati, if the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate were indistinct, [even] spiritually immature people—all ordinary beings—would, as a consequence, realize the truth. As mere ordinary beings, not only would they attain nirvāṇa, the unsurpassable good, but they would also fully and completely awaken to unsurpassable complete and perfect awakening.
“If the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate were distinct, even those who realize the truth would, as a consequence, not be detached from the phenomenal appearances of conditioned phenomena. Since they would not be detached from the phenomenal appearances of conditioned phenomena, they would also not be liberated from the bondage of phenomenal appearances. If they were not liberated from the bondage of phenomenal appearances, they would not be liberated from the bondage of corruption. If they were not liberated from these two kinds of bondage, those who realize the truth would neither attain nirvāṇa, the unsurpassable good, nor fully and completely awaken to the unsurpassable complete and perfect awakening.
“Suviśuddhamati, ordinary beings do not realize the truth and, as mere ordinary beings, neither do they attain nirvāṇa, the unsurpassable good, nor do they fully and completely awaken to the unsurpassable complete and perfect awakening. For these reasons, it is not correct to say that the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate are indistinct. Regarding this point, you should know through this approach that those who consider the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate to be indistinct are not right but wrong.
“Suviśuddhamati, it is not the case that those who realize the truth are not detached from the phenomenal appearance of conditioned phenomena, for they are indeed detached from it. Neither are they not liberated from the bondage of phenomenal appearance, for they are indeed liberated from it. Nor are they not liberated from the bondage of corruption, for they are indeed liberated from it. Since they are liberated from these two kinds of bondage, not only do they attain nirvāṇa, the unsurpassable good, but they will also fully and completely awaken to the unsurpassable complete and perfect awakening. For all these reasons, it is not correct to say that the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate are distinct. Regarding this point, you should know through this approach that those who consider the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate to be distinct are not right but wrong.
“Moreover, Suviśuddhamati, if the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate were indistinct, then, just as the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena is encompassed by the defining characteristic of affliction, so too would the defining characteristic of the ultimate be included in the defining characteristic of affliction.
“However, Suviśuddhamati, if the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate were distinct, then the defining characteristic of the ultimate could not be the universal defining characteristic within all the defining characteristics of conditioned phenomena.
“Suviśuddhamati, the defining characteristic of the ultimate is not encompassed by the defining characteristic of affliction, and the defining characteristic of the ultimate is the universal defining characteristic within all the defining characteristics of conditioned phenomena. For these reasons, it is not correct to say that the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate are either indistinct or distinct. Regarding this point, you should know through this approach that those pretending that the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate are indistinct or distinct are not right but wrong.
“Moreover, Suviśuddhamati, if the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate were not distinct, then, just as the defining characteristic of the ultimate is not specific to any defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena, so too would all defining characteristics of conditioned phenomena not be specific to any conditioned phenomenon, and yogis would also not look for the ultimate beyond whatever they see, hear, distinguish, or know with regard to conditioned phenomena.
“However, Suviśuddhamati, if the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate were distinct, then, the mere selflessness and essencelessness of conditioned phenomena would not be the defining characteristic of the ultimate. The defining characteristic of affliction and the defining characteristic of purity themselves would be simultaneously established as distinct defining characteristics of conditioned phenomena.
“Suviśuddhamati, the defining characteristics of conditioned phenomena are specific and not unspecific to conditioned phenomena; yogis do look for the ultimate beyond whatever they see, hear, distinguish, or know with regard to conditioned phenomena; the ultimate is indeed characterized by the mere selflessness and essencelessness of conditioned phenomena; and the defining characteristic of affliction and the defining characteristic of purity also are not simultaneously established as distinct defining characteristics of conditioned phenomena. For all these reasons, it is not correct to say that the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate are neither indistinct nor distinct. Regarding this point, you should know through these approaches that those pretending that the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate are indistinct or distinct are not right but wrong.
“Suviśuddhamati, it is like this: It is not easy to decide whether the whiteness of the conch is distinct or indistinct from the defining characteristic of the conch, likewise with the yellowness of gold. It is not easy to decide whether the quality of the sound produced by a vīṇā is distinct or indistinct from the defining characteristic of sound, likewise with aloe and its fragrance, pepper and its heat, myrobalan and its astringency, cotton and its softness, and clarified butter and butter. Thus it is not easy to decide whether the impermanence of all conditioned phenomena is distinct or indistinct from the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena, likewise with the suffering of all beings with outflows and the defining characteristic of beings with outflows, as well as the selflessness of all phenomena and the defining characteristic of phenomena.
“Suviśuddhamati, it is like this: It is not easy to decide whether the defining characteristic of restless desire and the defining characteristic of afflictions are distinct or indistinct from the defining characteristic of desire. You should know it is just like this with anger and delusion too. Likewise, Suviśuddhamati, you should not see anything good in deciding whether the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate are distinct or indistinct. In this way, Suviśuddhamati, I have completely and fully awakened to the ultimate that is subtle, extremely subtle, [profound], extremely profound, difficult to understand, extremely difficult to understand, and characterized as transcending being distinct or indistinct from conditioned phenomena. Yet, after I attained complete and perfect awakening, I communicated through words, gave explanations, established distinctions, expressed myself through conventions, and imparted teachings.”
Then, at that moment, the Blessed One spoke these verses:
This was the chapter of the bodhisattva Suviśuddhamati—the third chapter.
Then the Blessed One spoke these words to Subhūti: “Subhūti, do you know how many beings in the world display their knowledge under the influence of conceit? Do you know how many beings in the world display their knowledge without conceit?”
Subhūti answered, “Blessed One, according to my knowledge, there are only a few in the world of beings who present their knowledge without conceit, but countless, innumerable, and inexpressible in number are those who do so under its influence. Blessed One, at one time I was staying in a hermitage set in a great forest. There were many monks living in the vicinity who had also established themselves there. At sunrise, I saw them gather together. They showed their knowledge and revealed their understanding by taking various aspects of phenomena as referential objects.
“Some showed their knowledge by taking the five aggregates as referential objects: their phenomenal appearance, their arising, their disintegration, their cessation, and the acknowledgment of their cessation. In the same way, some showed their knowledge by taking the twelve sense domains as referential objects, some by taking dependent arising as a referential object. Some showed their knowledge by taking the four kinds of sustenance as referential objects: their phenomenal appearance, their arising, their disintegration, their cessation, and the acknowledgment of their cessation.
“Some showed their knowledge by taking the four noble truths as referential objects: their defining characteristic, the comprehension of suffering, the abandoning of the cause of suffering, the actualization of the cessation of suffering, and the practice of the path.
“Some showed their knowledge by taking the eighteen constituents as referential objects: their phenomenal appearance, their varieties, their manifoldness, their cessation, and the actualization of their cessation.
“Some showed their knowledge by taking the four applications of mindfulness as referential objects: their phenomenal appearance, their adverse factors, their antidotes, their practice, their arising from having been non-arisen, their remaining after they arose, and their maintaining, resuming, or increasing. In the same way, some showed their knowledge by taking as referential objects the four correct self-restraints, as well as the four bases of supernatural powers, the five faculties, the five forces, and the seven branches of awakening. Some showed their knowledge by taking as referential objects the eight branches of the noble path: their phenomenal appearance, the antidotes to their adverse factors, their practice, their arising from having been non-arisen, their remaining after they arose, and their maintaining, resuming, or increasing.
“Then I thought to myself, ‘These venerable monks displayed their knowledge by revealing their understanding by taking various aspects of phenomena as referential objects, but they have not perceived the ultimate, whose defining characteristic is of a single nature everywhere.’ These venerable persons have conceit and, without doubt, display their knowledge under the influence of conceit. Blessed One, at an earlier time, you spoke these words: ‘The ultimate is subtle, profound, difficult to understand, extremely difficult to understand, and characterized as being of a single nature everywhere.’ How wonderful indeed are these very words of yours! Blessed One, if even those who practice your teaching, such as these beings who became monks, find it difficult to understand in this way the ultimate whose defining characteristic is of a single nature everywhere, what need is there to mention how difficult it is for those outsiders who do not follow your teaching?”
The Blessed One replied, “So it is, Subhūti. So it is. I have completely and fully awakened to the ultimate that, being characterized as being of a single nature everywhere, is subtle, extremely subtle, profound, extremely profound, difficult to understand, and extremely difficult to understand. Yet, after I attained complete and perfect awakening, I communicated through words, gave explanations, established distinctions, expressed myself through conventions, and imparted teachings. One might ask why I did this.
“Subhūti, it is because I teach that the ultimate is the referential object conducive to purification within the aggregates, as well as within the sense domains, dependent arising, the sustenances, the truths, the constituents, the applications of mindfulness, the self-restraints, the bases of supernatural powers, the faculties, the forces, the branches of awakening, and, Subhūti, the eightfold path. This referential object conducive to purification within the aggregates is of a single nature everywhere and its defining characteristic is not different from theirs. It is just the same from the sense domains up to the eightfold path: the referential object conducive to purification within these various referential objects is of a single nature everywhere and its defining characteristic is not different from theirs. Subhūti, through this approach, you should thus know that what is characterized as being of a single nature everywhere is the ultimate.
“Moreover, Subhūti, once renunciants who practice yoga have realized in reference to a single aggregate the selflessness of phenomena, which is the ultimate reality, they do not look for this ultimate reality, this selflessness, individually within the other aggregates or in the sense domains, dependent arising, the sustenances, the truths, the constituents, the applications of mindfulness, the self-restraints, the bases of supernatural powers, the faculties, the forces, the branches of awakening, and the eightfold path. Instead, they rely upon the nondual gnosis that is in accordance with true reality. Through this alone, they infallibly ascertain and realize the ultimate, characterized as being of a single nature everywhere. Subhūti, through this approach, you should thus know that what is characterized as being of a single nature everywhere is the ultimate.
“Moreover, Subhūti, if ultimate reality itself, the selflessness of phenomena, had a defining characteristic distinct [from the defining characteristics of phenomena] in the way the aggregates, the sense domains, dependent arising, the sustenances, the truths, the constituents, the applications of mindfulness, the self-restraints, the bases of supernatural powers, the faculties, the forces, the branches of awakening, and the eightfold path have defining characteristics distinct from one another, then, on account of this, ultimate reality itself, the selflessness of phenomena, would have causes and arise from causes. If it arose from causes, it would be conditioned. If it were the conditioned, it would not be the ultimate. If it were not the ultimate, one would need to look for some other ultimate. Subhūti, this ultimate, the selflessness of phenomena, does not arise from causes. It is not conditioned. Neither is it the case that it is not the ultimate. One must [therefore] not look for an ultimate other than that ultimate. Thus, whether tathāgatas manifest or not, because it is the case that it permanently and immutably abides within phenomena, only this nature of phenomena, this constituent abiding in phenomena, is constant. Subhūti, for all these reasons, you should know through this approach that the ultimate is characterized as being of a single nature everywhere.
“Subhūti, it is like this: although there are many varieties of forms with distinct defining characteristics within space, since space itself is free from phenomenal appearances, devoid of conceptions, and without change, its defining characteristic is of a single nature everywhere. Likewise, Subhūti, you should know that the ultimate is characterized as being of a single nature everywhere, within all phenomena whose defining characteristics are distinct from one another.”
Then, at that moment, the Blessed One spoke these verses:
This was the chapter of Subhūti—the fourth chapter.
Then, the bodhisattva Viśālamati asked the Blessed One, “Blessed One, when bodhisattvas who are skilled in the secrets of mind, thought, and cognition are called ‘skilled in the secrets of mind, thought, and cognition,’ what does it mean? When they are designated in this way, what does it refer to?”
The Blessed One answered, “Viśālamati, you are asking this for the benefit and happiness of many beings, out of compassion for the world, and for the welfare, benefit, and happiness of all beings, including gods and humans. Your intention is excellent when questioning the Tathāgata on this specific point. Therefore, listen, Viśālamati. I will explain to you in which way bodhisattvas are skilled in the secrets of mind, thought, and cognition.
“Viśālamati, when such and such beings are reborn and manifest in this saṃsāra comprised of six destinies, in any class of beings or state of birth, be it egg-born, womb-born, moisture-born, or spontaneously generated, there is first a twofold appropriation: the appropriation of the physical sense faculties together with their supports, and the appropriation of mental imprints producing the elaboration of conventional expressions with regard to phenomenal appearances, names, and conceptualizations. In dependence upon this twofold appropriation, the mind containing all the seeds matures, merges [with the embryo], grows, increases, and expands. This twofold appropriation occurs in the realm of form but it does not appear in the realm of the formless.
“Viśālamati, this cognition is also called ‘appropriating cognition’ because it grasps and appropriates the body. It is also called ‘subliminal cognition,’ because it dwells and lies hidden in this body, sharing a common destiny. It is also called ‘mind,’ because it is accumulated and developed by visual forms, sounds, smells, flavors, tangible objects, and phenomena.
“Viśālamati, taking this appropriating cognition as support and basis, the six kinds of cognition, that is, visual, auditive, olfactory, gustatory, tactile, and mental cognitions, arise. Among these, a visual cognition arises on the basis of the eye, which is connected with a visual cognition and a visual form. Simultaneously and in conformity with this visual cognition, a mental cognition that conceptualizes the object arises at the same time, having the same object. [Likewise,] Viśālamati, an auditive, olfactory, gustatory, or tactile cognition arises on the basis of a sense faculty connected to a cognition, such as the ear, nose, tongue, or body, and a sound, smell, flavor, or tangible object. Simultaneously and in conformity with this auditive, olfactory, gustatory, or tactile cognition, a mental cognition that conceptualizes the object arises at the same time, having the same object. If only one visual cognition arises at one time, then only one mental cognition that conceptualizes the object arises simultaneously, having the same object. If two, three, four, or five cognitions arise simultaneously, then also in that case, having the same object as the group of five cognitions, only one mental cognition that conceptualizes this object arises simultaneously.
“Viśālamati, it is like this: If the conditions for the arising of a single wave in a large stream of water are present, then only one wave arises. If the conditions for the arising of two or many waves are present, then two or many waves arise. However, the river [itself] neither stops as a stream of water nor becomes exhausted. If the conditions for the arising of a single reflection in a perfectly polished mirror are present, then only one reflection arises. If the conditions for the arising of two or many reflections are present, then two or many reflections arise. However, the mirror neither transforms itself into the object corresponding to the reflection nor manifests reflections by being in close contact [with the reflected objects]. Viśālamati, similarly, taking this appropriating cognition as support and basis, as in the examples of the river and the mirror, if the conditions for the arising of one visual cognition are present, then only one visual cognition arises. If the conditions for the simultaneous arising of up to five cognitions are present, then up to five cognitions simultaneously arise.
“Viśālamati, taking in this way the knowledge of this doctrine as a support and basis, bodhisattvas are skilled in the secrets of mind, thought, and cognition. Yet, when the Tathāgata designates the bodhisattvas as skilled in the secrets of mind, thought, and cognition, they are not designated as completely skilled merely on account of this. Viśālamati, I call bodhisattvas ‘skilled in the ultimate’ as soon as they, by themselves and in their own experience, neither perceive the appropriation nor the appropriating cognition but [instead perceive] in accordance with the truth; as soon as they neither perceive the subliminal nor the subliminal cognition; neither the accumulated nor the mind; neither the eye, nor the form, nor the visual cognition; neither the ear, nor the sound, nor the auditive cognition; neither the nose, nor the smell, nor the olfactory cognition; neither the tongue, nor the flavor, nor the gustatory cognition; and neither the body, nor the tangible object, nor the tactile cognition. Viśālamati, I call bodhisattvas ‘skilled in the ultimate’ as soon as they, by themselves and in their own experience, neither perceive thought, nor phenomena, nor mental cognition but instead perceive in accordance with the truth. Viśālamati, the Tathāgata designates as skilled in the secrets of mind, thought, and cognition the bodhisattvas who are skilled in the ultimate. Viśālamati, for this reason, bodhisattvas are skilled in the secrets of mind, thought, and cognition. Also, when the Tathāgata designates them as such, it is for this reason.”
Then, at that moment, the Blessed One spoke these verses:
This was the chapter of Viśālamati— the fifth chapter.
Then, the bodhisattva Guṇākara asked the Blessed One, “Blessed One, when bodhisattvas who are skilled in the defining characteristics of phenomena are called ‘skilled in the defining characteristics of phenomena,’ what does it mean? Moreover, when the Tathāgata designates them as such, what does it refer to?”
The Blessed One replied to the bodhisattva Guṇākara, “Guṇākara, for the benefit and happiness of many beings, out of compassion for the world, for the welfare, benefit, and happiness of all beings, including gods and humans, you are asking this. Your intention is excellent when questioning the Tathāgata on this specific point. Therefore, listen, Guṇākara, I will explain to you in which way bodhisattvas are skilled in the defining characteristics of phenomena.
“Guṇākara, the defining characteristics of phenomena are three. What are these three? They are the imaginary defining characteristic, the other-dependent defining characteristic, and the actual defining characteristic.
“Guṇākara, what is the imaginary defining characteristic [of phenomena]? It is what is nominally and conventionally posited as the essence or the distinctive [characteristic] of phenomena, even just in order to designate [them].
“Guṇākara, what is the other-dependent defining characteristic [of phenomena]? It is the dependent arising of phenomena. It is like this: ‘When this is, that arises; because this arises, that arises.’ It is also from ‘[in dependence upon ignorance as a condition,] conditioning mental factors [arise]’ up to ‘thus, the whole great mass of suffering comes to be.’
“Guṇākara, what is the actual defining characteristic [of phenomena]? It is their true reality, namely, the unsurpassable complete and perfect awakening that is finally attained by bodhisattvas as they realize this [true reality] through their diligence and correct application of mind and then become perfectly familiar with the realization of this [true reality].
“Guṇākara, it is like this: you should consider the imaginary defining characteristic to be just like the falsity of the visual aberrations [perceived] by someone suffering from the timira visual disorder.
“Guṇākara, it is like this: you should consider the other-dependent defining characteristic to be just like the phenomenal appearances manifesting to this very person suffering from the timira disease, such as [actually nonexistent] hairs, flies, sesame seeds, [or patches of] blue, yellow, red, or white [in their visual field].
“Guṇākara, it is like this: you should consider the actual defining characteristic to be just like the original and unerring visual object seen by the same person when their vision is healthy and free from the visual aberrations resulting from the timira disease.
“Guṇākara, it is like this: when a pure crystal is in contact with something blue, it appears to be a sapphire. Because people perceive it by mistake as a sapphire, they are deceived by it. When this pure crystal is in contact with something red, green, or yellow, it appears to be a ruby, an emerald, or gold. Because people perceive it by mistake as a ruby, an emerald, or gold, they are deceived by it.
“Guṇākara, it is like this: You should consider the mental imprint of conventions in terms of an imaginary defining characteristic upon the other-dependent defining characteristic to be just like the contact of colors with a pure crystal. Thus, you should consider the perception of an imaginary defining characteristic [superimposed] on the other-dependent defining characteristic to be just like the mistaken perception of a sapphire, ruby, emerald, or gold [superimposed] on the pure crystal.
Guṇākara, it is like this: You should consider the other-dependent defining characteristic to be just like this pure crystal itself. Thus, you should consider the actual defining characteristic as the permanent and immutable lack of any actuality or essence in the imaginary defining characteristic [superimposed] on the other-dependent defining characteristic, just as there is permanently and immutably no actuality or essence in the defining characteristic of a sapphire, ruby, emerald, or gold [superimposed] on a pure crystal.
Thus, Guṇākara, bodhisattvas distinctly perceive the imaginary defining characteristic on the basis of names denoting phenomenal appearances. They distinctly perceive the other-dependent defining characteristic on the basis of the erroneous conception [that superimposes] an imaginary defining characteristic on the other-dependent defining characteristic. They distinctly perceive the actual defining characteristic on the basis of the nonexistence of any erroneous conception [that superimposes] an imaginary defining characteristic on the other-dependent defining characteristic.
“Guṇākara, when bodhisattvas distinctly perceive the imaginary defining characteristic [superimposed] on the other-dependent defining characteristic of phenomena exactly as it is, they distinctly perceive the phenomena devoid of any defining characteristic exactly as they are. Guṇākara, when bodhisattvas distinctly perceive the other-dependent defining characteristic exactly as it is, they distinctly perceive the phenomena characterized by affliction exactly as they are. Guṇākara, when bodhisattvas distinctly perceive the actual defining characteristic exactly as it is, they distinctly perceive the phenomena characterized by purification exactly as they are. Guṇākara, when bodhisattvas distinctly perceive the phenomena devoid of a defining characteristic [superimposed] on the other-dependent defining characteristic exactly as they are, they abandon the phenomena characterized by affliction. Once they have abandoned the phenomena characterized by affliction, they will obtain the phenomena characterized by purification. Guṇākara, since bodhisattvas distinctly perceive in this way the imaginary, other-dependent, and actual defining characteristics of phenomena exactly as they are, they distinctly perceive the phenomena devoid of a defining characteristic, those characterized by affliction, and those characterized by purification exactly as they are. Having distinctly perceived the phenomena devoid of a defining characteristic exactly as they are, they abandon the phenomena characterized by affliction. Once they have abandoned the phenomena characterized by affliction, they will obtain the phenomena characterized by purification. For all these reasons, bodhisattvas are skilled in the defining characteristics of phenomena. Moreover, when the Tathāgata designates the bodhisattvas as ‘skilled in the defining characteristics of phenomena,’ it is for these reasons.”
Then, at that moment, the Blessed One spoke these verses:
This was the chapter of Guṇākara —the sixth chapter.
At that time, the bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata asked the Blessed One, “Blessed One, when I was alone in a secluded place, I had the following thought: ‘The Blessed One also spoke in many ways of the defining characteristic specific to the five aggregates, mentioning the defining characteristic of their arising, disintegration, abandonment, and comprehension. In the same way, he spoke of the twelve sense domains, dependent arising, and the four kinds of sustenance. The Blessed One also spoke in many ways of the defining characteristic of the four noble truths, mentioning the comprehension of suffering, the abandoning of the cause of suffering, the actualization of the cessation of suffering, and the practice of the path. The Blessed One also spoke in many ways of the defining characteristic specific to the eighteen constituents, mentioning their varieties, manifoldness, abandonment, and comprehension. The Blessed One also spoke in many ways of the defining characteristic specific to the four applications of mindfulness, mentioning their adverse factors, antidotes, practice, their arising from being non-arisen, their remaining after they arose, and their maintaining, resuming, or increasing. Similarly, he also spoke in many ways of the defining characteristic specific to the four correct self-restraints, the four bases of supernatural powers, the five faculties, the five forces, and the seven branches of awakening. The Blessed One also spoke in many ways of the defining characteristic specific to the eight branches of the path, mentioning their adverse factors, antidotes, and practices, their arising from being non-arisen and remaining after they arose, and their maintaining, resuming, or increasing.’
“When the Blessed One further said, ‘All phenomena are without an essence, unborn, unceasing, primordially in the state of peace, and naturally in the state of nirvāṇa,’ what was the underlying intent of the Blessed One? I would like to ask the Blessed One about this point: what was the Blessed One thinking when he said, ‘All phenomena are without an essence, unborn, unceasing, primordially in the state of peace, and naturally in the state of nirvāṇa’?”
The Blessed One replied to the bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata, “Paramārthasamudgata, this reflection of yours arose virtuously and appropriately. It is excellent indeed. You are asking this for the benefit and happiness of many beings, out of compassion for the world, and for the welfare, benefit, and happiness of all beings, including gods and humans. Your intention is excellent when questioning the Tathāgata on this specific point. Therefore, listen, Paramārthasamudgata. I will explain to you what my underlying intent was when I declared, ‘All phenomena are without an essence, unborn, unceasing, primordially in the state of peace, and naturally in the state of nirvāṇa.’
“Paramārthasamudgata, the essencelessness of all phenomena has three aspects. Having in mind essencelessness regarding defining characteristics, essencelessness regarding arising, and essencelessness regarding the ultimate, I thus taught what is called the essencelessness of all phenomena.
“Paramārthasamudgata, what is the essencelessness of all phenomena with regard to defining characteristics? It is the imaginary defining characteristic [of phenomena]. Why? Because as much as this defining characteristic is nominally and conventionally posited, it is not posited on the basis of an essence or a distinctive [characteristic]. Therefore, it is called the essencelessness of all phenomena with regard to defining characteristics.
“Paramārthasamudgata, what is the essencelessness of all phenomena with regard to arising? It is the other-dependent defining characteristic of phenomena. Why? Because this is [the defining characteristic] arising on account of causes other [than itself] and not by itself. Therefore, it is called essencelessness with regard to arising.
“Paramārthasamudgata, what is the essencelessness of all phenomena with regard to the ultimate? Phenomena arising in dependence upon causes, which lack an essence on account of lacking an essence in terms of arising and also lack an essence on account of lacking an ultimate essence. Why? Because, Paramārthasamudgata, I showed that the referential object conducive to purification within phenomena is the ultimate, but the other-dependent defining characteristic is not the referential object conducive to purification. Therefore, this essencelessness is called essencelessness with regard to the ultimate.
“Moreover, Paramārthasamudgata, the actual defining characteristic of phenomena should also be referred to as essencelessness with regard to the ultimate. Why? Because, Paramārthasamudgata, the selflessness of phenomena is called the essencelessness of phenomena, which is the ultimate, but the ultimate is characterized by the essencelessness of all phenomena. Therefore, it is called essencelessness with regard to the ultimate.
“Paramārthasamudgata, it is like this: consider essencelessness with regard to defining characteristics to be exactly like a [nonexistent] sky flower; consider essencelessness with regard to arising, as well as essencelessness with regard to the ultimate in one of its aspects, to be exactly like a magic illusion; consider essencelessness with regard to the ultimate in its other aspect, which consists in the selflessness of phenomena and pervades everything, to be exactly like space, which consists in the essencelessness of form and pervades everything.
“Paramārthasamudgata, with this threefold essencelessness in mind, I taught what is called the essencelessness of all phenomena. Paramārthasamudgata, having in mind essencelessness with regard to defining characteristics, I taught, ‘All phenomena are without an essence, unborn, unceasing, primordially in the state of peace, and naturally in the state of nirvāṇa.’ Why? Because, Paramārthasamudgata, what lacks a specific defining characteristic is unborn. What is unborn is unceasing. What is unborn and unceasing is primordially in the state of peace. What is primordially in the state of peace is naturally in the state of nirvāṇa. For what is naturally in the state of nirvāṇa, there is nothing in the slightest that passes into the state of nirvāṇa. Therefore, having in mind essencelessness with regard to defining characteristics, I taught, ‘All phenomena are without an essence, unborn, unceasing, primordially in the state of peace, and naturally in the state of nirvāṇa.’
“Paramārthasamudgata, having in mind essencelessness with regard to the ultimate, which is characterized by selflessness, I taught, ‘All phenomena are without an essence, unborn, unceasing, primordially in the state of peace, and naturally in the state of nirvāṇa.’ Why? Because essencelessness with regard to the ultimate, which is characterized by selflessness, indeed abides permanently and immutably. As the nature of phenomena, it is unconditioned and free from all afflictions. What permanently and immutably abides as the very nature of phenomena, being unconditioned, is unborn and unceasing due to being unconditioned. Because it is free from all afflictions, it is primordially in the state of peace and naturally in the state of nirvāṇa. Therefore, having in mind essencelessness with regard to the ultimate, which is characterized by selflessness, I taught, ‘All phenomena are without an essence, unborn, unceasing, primordially in the state of peace, and naturally in the state of nirvāṇa.’
“Paramārthasamudgata, I did not designate three kinds of essencelessness because those in the world of beings consider that the imaginary essence and the other-dependent essence, as well as the actual essence, are different by nature. Rather, I did so because they superimpose an imaginary essence on the other-dependent essence and the actual essence and because they designate the other-dependent essence and the actual essence as the defining characteristics of an imaginary essence. While they designate them in this way, their minds, which are saturated with designations, become confined to such designations and predisposed toward them. On this basis, they wrongly conceive the other-dependent essence and the actual essence as the defining characteristics of an imaginary essence. Wrongly conceiving them in this way, with their wrong conception of the other-dependent essence as the defining characteristic of an imaginary essence acting as a cause and condition, they will give rise in the future to an other-dependent essence. As a result of this, they will be afflicted by the afflictions of defilements, karma, and birth. Because they will not pass beyond saṃsāra, they will transmigrate and wander among hell beings, animals, hungry ghosts, gods, demigods, and humans for a very long time.
“Among these beings, Paramārthasamudgata, some do not produce roots of virtue from the very beginning. They do not clear obstructions or bring their mental continuums to maturity. Their confidence in my teaching is limited and they have not accomplished the accumulations of merit and gnosis. I impart to those beings the teaching on essencelessness with regard to arising. Once they have heard this teaching, they understand that conditioned phenomena arising in dependence on causes are of an impermanent, unstable, and unreliable nature. They develop aversion and repulsion towards conditioned phenomena. Once they have done this, they turn away from wrongdoing. Not committing any wrongdoing, they establish themselves in virtue. With this as a cause, they produce the roots of virtue that were yet to be produced. They clear obstructions that were yet to be cleared. They bring their mental continuums, which were not yet mature, to maturity. As a result, their confidence in my teaching becomes vast, and they will accomplish the accumulations of merit and gnosis.
“Although such beings have produced in this way roots of virtue up to the accomplishment of the accumulation of merit and gnosis, they do not understand essencelessness with regard to arising just as it is, as the essencelessness with regard to defining characteristics and the essencelessness with regard to the ultimate in its two aspects. For this reason, they will not be completely repulsed by all conditioned phenomena, completely free from desire, or completely liberated. They will not be completely liberated from all the afflictions of defilements, karma, and birth. It is therefore for them that the Tathāgata imparts the teaching on the essencelessness with regard to defining characteristics and the essencelessness with regard to the ultimate. He does so in order to make them feel repulsion towards all conditioned phenomena, as well as to free them from desire, to completely liberate them, and to take them perfectly beyond the afflictions of defilements, karma, and birth.
“Once they have heard this teaching, they do not wrongly conceive the other-dependent essence as the defining characteristic of an imaginary essence. As a result, they accept the essencelessness with regard to arising as the essencelessness with regard to defining characteristics and the essencelessness with regard to the ultimate in its two aspects. They discern and understand it exactly as it is. It is like this: Their minds, which are no longer saturated with designations, are not confined to these designations or predisposed toward them. As a result, by attaining the powers of wisdom in this life and perfectly cutting off the continuity [of the aggregates] into a future existence, they will put an end to the other-dependent defining characteristic. On this basis, they will be completely repulsed by all conditioned phenomena, completely free from desire, and completely liberated. They will be completely liberated from all the afflictions of defilements, karma, and birth.
“Moreover, Paramārthasamudgata, even those belonging to the lineage of the hearers’ vehicle attain nirvāṇa, the unsurpassable happiness, through this very path and journey, as do those belonging to the lineage of the solitary realizers’ vehicle and the lineage of the tathāgatas. This is why it is the single path of purification for hearers, solitary realizers, and bodhisattvas. Since there is only a single purification, there is no other. Therefore, with this in mind, I taught the Single Vehicle. Yet, it is not the case that those in the world of beings are not of various types corresponding to their capacities, be they weak, average, or sharp in accordance with their nature.
“Paramārthasamudgata, even if they were to exert themselves as all buddhas did, individuals belonging to the hearers’ lineage with the state of peace as their sole journey could not reach the heart of awakening and attain the unsurpassable, complete and perfect awakening. Why? Because, having limited compassion and a great fear of suffering, they belong to a lineage that is by nature inferior. Thus, having limited compassion, they avoid striving for beings’ welfare. Being afraid of suffering, they stay clear from the conditioning process of the mental factors. However, I did not teach that avoiding striving for beings’ welfare and staying clear from the conditioning process of the mental factors was the unsurpassable, complete and perfect awakening. Therefore, these individuals are called those who have the state of peace as their sole journey.
“I taught that hearers who evolve toward awakening belong to the category of bodhisattvas because, liberated from the obscuration of defilements and inspired by the tathāgatas, they liberate their minds from the obscuration of cognitive objects. It is [only] because they first liberated themselves from the obscuration of defilements for their own sake that the Tathāgata designated them as the lineage of hearers.
“Thus, Paramārthasamudgata, there are beings with various degrees of confidence in my Dharma and my Vinaya, which are well proclaimed, well imparted, pure in their intention, and well communicated. In this teaching, Paramārthasamudgata, the Tathāgata, having in mind the three kinds of essencelessness, teaches through a discourse of provisional meaning: ‘All phenomena are without an essence, unborn, unceasing, primordially in the state of peace, and naturally in the state of nirvāṇa.’
“Among such beings, Paramārthasamudgata, some have produced roots of virtue, purified their obscurations, and brought their mental continuum to maturity. They have much confidence in my teaching and have accomplished the accumulations of merit and gnosis. Once they have heard my teaching, they understand my explanations in accordance with my underlying intent exactly as it is. Moreover, they recognize that this teaching is the truth. Through their wisdom, they realize its meaning exactly as it is. By also engaging in the practice of this realization, they will very quickly attain the ultimate state. They will develop faith in these teachings, and think, ‘Amazing! The Blessed One is completely and perfectly awakened. Through him, one becomes perfectly awakened with respect to all phenomena.’
“Among such beings, some have not produced roots of virtue, purified their obscurations, and brought their mental continuums to maturity. Their confidence in my teaching is limited and they have not accomplished the accumulations of merit and gnosis. They are honest and sincere. Unable to evaluate and refute [others’ views], they do not consider their own as supreme. Once they have heard my teaching, although they do not understand my explanations in accordance with my underlying intent exactly as it is, they still develop confidence and faith in these teachings: ‘The Tathāgata’s discourse is profound and has the appearance of profundity. [Because] emptiness is the topic of this discourse, it is difficult to perceive and difficult to understand. Being beyond judgment, it does not belong to the domain of speculation. It can [only] be known by intelligent scholars well versed in the subtle.’ They think, ‘We do not understand the meaning of this sūtra and these teachings that were taught by the Blessed One. Profound is the awakening of the Buddha and the nature of phenomena. Only the Tathāgata understands them. We, however, do not. The Dharma taught by the tathāgatas arises according to the various inclinations of beings. Their gnosis and perception are infinite, whereas ours are merely like the [shallow] hoofprints left by a cow.’ Filled with devotion for these discourses, they also write them down. Having written them down, they also keep them in mind, read them, propagate them, venerate them, expound them, recite them, and chant them aloud. However, because they do not understand these profound teachings in accordance with my underlying intent, they are unable to engage themselves in the various aspects of practice. As a consequence of this, they will further develop their accumulation of merit and gnosis, and those whose mental continuums are still immature will bring them to maturity.
“Other beings have not perfectly completed these stages up to the great accumulation of merit and gnosis. They are dishonest and insincere. Capable of evaluating and refuting [others’ views], they consider their own as supreme. Once they have heard my teaching, they do not understand my profound explanations in accordance with my underlying intent exactly as it is. Although they have confidence in this teaching, they wrongly conceive it according to its literal meaning: ‘All phenomena are only without an essence, only unborn, only unceasing, only primordially in the state of peace, and only naturally in the state of nirvāṇa.’ As a consequence of this, they acquire the view that all phenomena are inexistent and the view that they are without defining characteristics. Then, once they have acquired these views, they negate all phenomena by [negating] all defining characteristics, thereby negating the imaginary defining characteristic as well as the other-dependent and actual defining characteristics. Why is it said that they negate all three defining characteristics? Because, Paramārthasamudgata, if the other-dependent and actual defining characteristics are accepted, then the imaginary defining characteristic also will be distinctly perceived. Now, those who consider the other-dependent and actual defining characteristics as inexistent have already negated the imaginary defining characteristic. This is why they are called those who negate all three defining characteristics. They consider my teaching to be the truth while considering some nonsense to be its meaning. Those who consider my teaching to be the truth while considering some nonsense to be its meaning cling to my teaching as the truth while at the same time clinging to some nonsense as its meaning. Since they have confidence in my teaching, they will progress by developing virtuous qualities. However, because they wrongly conceive some nonsense to be the meaning of my teaching, they will stray from wisdom. Straying from wisdom, they will stray from the vast and immeasurable virtuous qualities.
“Others hear from those beings that my teaching is the truth while some nonsense is its meaning. Then, delighted by this view, they accept that my teaching is the truth and some nonsense is its meaning. Thus, they wrongly conceive my teaching as the truth with some nonsense as its meaning. As a consequence of this, you should know that they will likewise stray from virtuous qualities.
“Others who take no delight in this view are overcome by fear and anxiety when they hear that all phenomena are without an essence, unborn, unceasing, primordially in the state of peace, and naturally in the state of nirvāṇa. They then say, ‘These are not the words of the Buddha but the words of Māra!’ Thinking in this way, they reject this discourse, disparage it, denigrate it, and criticize it. As a consequence of this, they will obtain the great misfortune as well as the great karmic obscuration [of rejecting the truth]. This is precisely why I said, ‘Those who mislead the multitude of beings into obtaining the great karmic obscuration, who consider all defining characteristics as inexistent and teach some nonsense as the meaning of my teaching, are burdened with great karmic obscuration [of rejecting the truth].
“Paramārthasamudgata, among such beings, some have not produced roots of virtue, purified their obscurations, and brought their mental continuum to maturity. Their confidence in my teaching is limited, and they have not accomplished the accumulations of merit and gnosis. They are dishonest and insincere. Although they are unable to evaluate and refute [others’ views], they consider their own as supreme. When they hear my teaching, they neither understand my explanations in accordance with my underlying intent exactly as it is, nor do they develop confidence in this teaching. They accept that my teaching is not the truth and its meaning is some nonsense. They say, ‘These are not the words of the Buddha but the words of Māra!’ Thinking in this way, they reject this discourse, disparage it, denigrate it, criticize it, and distort [its meaning]. In many ways, they apply themselves to discarding, undermining, and subverting this discourse, considering as enemies those who are devoted to it. From the very beginning, they are affected by the karmic obscuration [of rejecting the truth]. As a consequence of this, they also cause [others] to be obscured by this karmic obscuration. Although it is easy to determine the beginning of this karmic obscuration, it is difficult to know how many myriad eons it will last.
“Thus, Paramārthasamudgata, those are the various degrees of confidence in my Dharma and my Vinaya, which are well proclaimed, well imparted, pure in their intention, and well communicated.”
Then, at that moment, the Blessed One spoke these verses:
Then, the bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata said to the Blessed One, “Blessed One, the speech expounding the underlying intent of the buddhas is subtle, extremely subtle, profound, extremely profound, difficult to understand, and extremely difficult to understand. How marvelous, how wonderful it is!
“This is how I understand the meaning of the words spoken by the Blessed One: The phenomenal appearance of conditioned phenomena, namely, the basis of the imaginary defining characteristic, the object of conceptualization, is nominally and conventionally posited as an essential characteristic or a distinctive characteristic, for example as the aggregate of form, its arising, its cessation, its abandonment, or the comprehension of this aggregate. What is posited in this way is the imaginary defining characteristic. For this reason, Blessed One, you referred to essencelessness with regard to the defining characteristics of phenomena. The phenomenal appearance of conditioned phenomena, namely, the basis of the imaginary defining characteristic, the object of conceptualization, is the other-dependent defining characteristic. For this reason, Blessed One, you referred to essencelessness with regard to both the arising of phenomena and the ultimate in one of its aspects.
“This is how I understand the meaning of the words spoken by the Blessed One: this very phenomenal appearance of conditioned phenomena, namely, the basis of the imaginary defining characteristic, the object of conceptualization, is devoid of any actuality or essence as that which has an imaginary defining characteristic. On account of this, this essencelessness or selflessness of phenomena, true reality, the referential object conducive to purification, is the actual defining characteristic. For this reason, Blessed One, you referred to the essencelessness of phenomena with regard to the ultimate in its other aspect.
“One should proceed in exactly the same way with the remaining aggregates as well as with each of the twelve sense domains, the twelve factors of conditioned existence, the four kinds of sustenance, and the six and eighteen constituents.
“This is how I understand the meaning of the words spoken by the Blessed One: The phenomenal appearance of conditioned phenomena, namely, the basis of the imaginary defining characteristic, the object of conceptualization, is nominally and conventionally posited as an essential characteristic or a distinctive characteristic, for example as the noble truth of suffering or the comprehension of suffering. For this reason, Blessed One, you referred to essencelessness with regard to the defining characteristics of phenomena. The phenomenal appearance of conditioned phenomena, namely, the basis of the imaginary defining characteristic, the object of conceptualization, is the other-dependent defining characteristic. For this reason, Blessed One, you referred to essencelessness with regard to both the arising of phenomena and the ultimate in one of its aspects.
“This is how I understand the meaning of the words spoken by the Blessed One: This very phenomenal appearance of conditioned phenomena, namely, the basis of the imaginary defining characteristic, the object of conceptualization, is devoid of any actuality or essence as that which has an imaginary defining characteristic. On account of this, this essencelessness or selflessness of phenomena, true reality, the referential object conducive to purification, is the actual defining characteristic. For this reason, Blessed One, you referred to the essencelessness of phenomena with regard to the ultimate in its other aspect.
“As with the noble truth of suffering, one should proceed in exactly the same way with the other truths. As with the truths, so one should proceed in exactly the same way with each of the applications of mindfulness, the self-restraints, the bases of supernatural powers, the faculties, the forces, the branches of awakening, and the branches of the path.
“This is how I understand the meaning of the words spoken by the Blessed One: The phenomenal appearance of conditioned phenomena, namely, the basis of the imaginary defining characteristic, the object of conceptualization, is nominally and conventionally posited as an essential characteristic or a distinctive characteristic, for example as correct concentration, its adverse factors and antidotes, its practice, its arising from being non-arisen, its remaining after it arose, and its maintaining, resuming, increasing, or expanding. For this reason, Blessed One, you referred to essencelessness with regard to the defining characteristics of phenomena. The phenomenal appearance of conditioned phenomena, namely, the basis of the imaginary defining characteristic, the object of conceptualization, is the other-dependent defining characteristic. For this reason, Blessed One, you referred to essencelessness with regard to both the arising of phenomena and the ultimate in one of its aspects.
“This is how I understand the meaning of the words spoken by the Blessed One: This very phenomenal appearance of conditioned phenomena, namely, the basis of the imaginary defining characteristic, the object of conceptualization, is devoid of any actuality or essence as that which has an imaginary defining characteristic. On account of this, this essencelessness or selflessness of phenomena, true reality, the referential object conducive to purification, is the actual defining characteristic. For this reason, Blessed One, you referred to the essencelessness of phenomena with regard to the ultimate in its other aspect.
“Blessed One, thus it is said, for example, that dried ginger should be added to all medicinal powders and elixirs. Likewise, this teaching of definitive meaning expounded by the Blessed One in reference to the statement, ‘All phenomena are without an essence, unborn, unceasing, primordially in the state of peace, and naturally in the state of nirvāṇa,’ should also be added to all the discourses of provisional meaning.
“Blessed One, it is like this: for example, the canvas for a painting, whether blue, yellow, red, or white, is identical for all painted figures and thus perfectly clarifies their contours. Likewise, this teaching of definitive meaning expounded by the Blessed One in reference to the statement, ‘All phenomena are without an essence, unborn, unceasing, primordially in the state of peace, and naturally in the state of nirvāṇa,’ is identical in all discourses of provisional meaning and thus perfectly clarifies their interpretable intent.
“Blessed One, it is like this: for example, adding clarified butter to all sorts of stews, meat dishes, and porridge is delicious. Likewise, it is delightful to add to all discourses of provisional meaning this teaching of definitive meaning expounded by the Blessed One in reference to the statement, ‘All phenomena are without an essence, unborn, unceasing, primordially in the state of peace, and naturally in the state of nirvāṇa.’
“Blessed One, it is like this: for example, space is identical everywhere and, [being empty and free from all obstruction,] does not hinder any endeavor. Likewise, this teaching of definitive meaning expounded by the Blessed One in reference to the statement, ‘All phenomena are without an essence, unborn, unceasing, primordially in the state of peace, and naturally in the state of nirvāṇa,’ is identical in all discourses of provisional meaning and does not hinder any endeavor in the course of the hearers’, solitary realizers’, or bodhisattvas’ vehicle.”
Following these words, the Blessed One complimented the bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata: “Excellent, Paramārthasamudgata, this is excellent! You have understood my explanation in accordance with the Tathāgata’s underlying intent. Your examples of the dried ginger, painting, clarified butter, and space perfectly illustrated its point. Paramārthasamudgata, so it is, and not otherwise. Therefore, keep in mind this teaching in this way.”
Then, the bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata spoke again to the Blessed One: “In the deer park of Ṛṣivadana in Vārāṇasī, the Blessed One first set in motion the wonderful wheel of Dharma by teaching the four noble truths to those who were engaged in the hearers’ vehicle. Not a single god or human in the world had previously ever turned such a wheel of Dharma. However, this turning of the Dharma wheel by the Blessed One was surpassable and adapted to the circumstances. Being of provisional meaning, it became a topic of dispute. Then, for those who were engaged in the Great Vehicle, you turned the second, even more wonderful, wheel of Dharma in the form of a teaching on emptiness: ‘All phenomena are without an essence, unborn, unceasing, primordially in the state of peace, and naturally in the state of nirvāṇa.’ However, this turning of the Dharma wheel by the Blessed One was surpassable and adapted to the circumstances. Being of provisional meaning, it became a topic of dispute. Then, for those who were engaged in all vehicles, you turned the third wonderful Dharma wheel of excellent discernment in reference to the statement, ‘All phenomena are without an essence, unborn, unceasing, primordially in the state of peace, and by nature in the state of nirvāṇa.’ This turning of the Dharma wheel by the Blessed One was unsurpassable and not limited to the circumstances. Being of definitive meaning, it did not become a topic of dispute.
“Blessed One, when sons or daughters of noble family have heard the teaching of definitive meaning taught by the Blessed One in reference to the statement, ‘All phenomena are without an essence, unborn, unceasing, primordially in the state of peace, and naturally in the state of nirvāṇa,’ they develop devotion for this teaching and commission its transcription into writing. Once it has been put into writing, they keep it in mind, read it, venerate it, propagate it, expound it, chant it aloud, contemplate it, and apply it in their practice. As they do so, how much merit will they produce?”
The Blessed One answered, “Paramārthasamudgata, these sons and daughters of noble family will produce immeasurable and incalculable merit. Although it is difficult to illustrate this with examples, I will briefly explain it to you. Paramārthasamudgata, it is like this: Compared to the amount of earth, the amount of dirt at the tip of a fingernail does not come close to a hundredth, a thousandth, a one hundred thousandth of it, or anything implying calculation, partition, numeration, analogy, or comparison. Compared to the amount of water contained in the four great oceans, the amount of water contained in the hoofprint of an ox does not come close to a hundredth, a thousandth, a one hundred thousandth of it, or anything implying calculation, partition, numeration, analogy, or comparison. Likewise, Paramārthasamudgata, compared to the amount of merit accumulated by developing confidence in my teaching of definitive meaning up to applying it in one’s practice, the amount of merit accumulated by developing confidence in my teaching of provisional meaning … up to applying it in one’s practice does not come close to a hundredth, a thousandth, a one hundred thousandth of it, or anything implying calculation, partition, numeration, analogy, or comparison.”
The bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata inquired, “Blessed One, what is the name of this teaching as a Dharma discourse that unravels the Tathāgata’s intent? How should I keep it in mind?”
The Blessed One answered: “Paramārthasamudgata, this is a teaching of definitive meaning on the ultimate. Therefore, keep it in mind as The Teaching of Definitive Meaning on the Ultimate.”
As the Blessed One expounded this teaching of definitive meaning on the ultimate, six hundred thousand beings produced the mind directed at the unsurpassable, complete and perfect awakening; three hundred thousand hearers purified the Dharma eye from impurities and contaminations; one hundred and fifty hearers who were without attachment liberated their minds from all outflows; and seventy-five thousand bodhisattvas attained the acceptance that phenomena are non-arisen.
This was the chapter of the bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata—the seventh chapter.
Then, the bodhisattva Maitreya asked a question to the Blessed One, “Blessed One, when bodhisattvas practice mental stillness and insight in the Great Vehicle, what is their support and basis?”
The Blessed One answered, “Maitreya, their support and basis are the discourses teaching Dharma and the constant aspiration to attain the unsurpassable, complete and perfect awakening.
“The Blessed One taught that four things are the referential objects of mental stillness and insight: the image with conceptualization; the image without conceptualization; the point where phenomena end; and the accomplishment of the goal.”
“Blessed One, how many referential objects of mental stillness are there?”
“There is [only] one, namely, the image without conceptualization.”
“How many are the referential objects of insight?”
“There is only one, namely, the image with conceptualization.”
“How many are the referential objects of both combined?”
“There are two, namely, the point where phenomena end and the accomplishment of the goal.”
“Blessed One, once bodhisattvas have taken as a support and basis these four things that are the referential objects of mental stillness and insight, how do they dedicate themselves to mental stillness? How do they become skilled in the practice of insight?”
“Maitreya, I have given to the bodhisattvas discourses teaching Dharma in the following twelve collections of teachings: sūtras, discourses in prose and verse, prophecies, poetic discourses, aphorisms, discourses for specific beings, narratives, parables, discourses on previous lives, extensive discourses, teachings on miracles, and instructions. Once bodhisattvas have properly heard these explanations, once they have memorized them well, recited them, examined them, and understood them by means of discernment, they remain alone in seclusion and settle themselves in a state of inner absorption. Then, they direct their attention in that (1) they direct their attention toward the teachings they have properly contemplated and (2) continuously direct their attention inwardly toward the mind that is directing attention. As they repeatedly engage themselves in this way, their bodies and minds become flexible. The occurrence of this physical and mental flexibility is what is called mental stillness. This is how bodhisattvas dedicate themselves to mental stillness.
“Once they have obtained this physical and mental flexibility, they settle in this very state and abandon some aspects of mind [corresponding to mental stillness]. Then, they apply themselves to analyzing the image that is the object of their concentration according to the teachings they have properly contemplated. Differentiating, discerning, considering, and examining in this way the cognitive aspects of the image that is the object of their concentration, accepting and wishing to do so, and distinguishing, scrutinizing, and investigating [this discerning mind in the same way] is what is called [the practice of] insight. This is how bodhisattvas are skilled in insight.”
In Unraveling the Intent, the Buddha gives a systematic overview of his three great cycles of teachings, which he refers to in this text as the “three Dharma wheels” (tridharmacakra). In the process of delineating the meaning of these doctrines, the Buddha unravels several difficult points regarding the ultimate and relative truths, the nature of reality, and the contemplative methods conducive to the attainment of complete and perfect awakening, and he also explains what his intent was when he imparted teachings belonging to each of the three Dharma wheels. In unambiguous terms, the third wheel is proclaimed to be of definitive meaning. Through a series of dialogues with hearers and bodhisattvas, the Buddha thus offers a complete and systematic teaching on the Great Vehicle, which he refers to here as the Single Vehicle.
Translation by the Buddhavacana Translation Group.
The text was translated by Gregory Forgues and edited by Casey Kemp. With special thanks to Harunaga Isaacson, Matthew Kapstein, Klaus-Dieter Mathes, Jonathan Silk, Lambert Schmithausen, Tom Tillemans, and William Waldron for their helpful comments and advice.
The translation was completed under the patronage and supervision of 84000: Translating the Words of the Buddha.
The generous sponsorship of Qiang Li (李强) and Ya Wen (文雅), which helped make the work on this translation possible, is most gratefully acknowledged.
In Unraveling the Intent, the Buddha gives a systematic overview of his three great cycles of teachings, which he refers to in this text as the “three Dharma wheels” (tridharmacakra). In the process of delineating the meaning of these doctrines, the Buddha unravels several difficult points regarding the ultimate and relative truths, the nature of reality, and the contemplative methods conducive to the attainment of complete and perfect awakening, and he also explains what his intent was when he imparted teachings belonging to each of the three Dharma wheels. Through a series of dialogues with hearers and bodhisattvas, the Buddha thus offers a complete and systematic teaching on the Great Vehicle, which he refers to here as the Single Vehicle .
The sūtra is set in an unfathomable palace displayed by the Buddha’s powers and attended by countless beings. The three gates of liberation (emptiness, appearancelessness, and wishlessness) are the entrance to this abode of the tathāgatas, the inconceivable nondual state of a buddha who, possessed of the gnosis (jñāna) of the Tathāgata’s liberation, is dwelling in the domain of truth (dharmadhātu), together with an immeasurable retinue of hearers and a retinue of bodhisattvas including Gambhīrārthasaṃdhinirmocana, Vidhivatparipṛcchaka, Dharmodgata, Suviśuddhamati, Viśālamati, Guṇākara, Paramārthasamudgata, Avalokiteśvara, Maitreya, and Mañjuśrī.
The sūtra is structured in the form of a series of dialogues between the Buddha and advanced bodhisattvas or hearers, as well as between bodhisattvas (see chapter 1). These dialogues deal with both the theory and practice of the entire bodhisattva path. Narrative elements are extremely limited in this teaching. However, a narrative pattern can be found in chapter 2 and 3, which begin, respectively, with a story about a group of non-Buddhists (tīrthikas) and some followers of the Buddha who have gathered to discuss a difficult point regarding the nature of reality and cannot agree on anything. The main protagonists then beg the Buddha to provide an explanation for the quandary these assemblies cannot not resolve, or alternatively to explain his underlying intent when he expounded the teachings that gave rise to conflicting interpretations.
Each chapter starts with a question on a topic requiring further elucidation: In the first chapter, the bodhisattva Vidhivatparipṛcchaka questions the bodhisattva Gambhīrārthasaṃdhinirmocana on the inexpressible (anabhilāpya) and nondual (advaya) ultimate. In the second chapter, the bodhisattva Dharmodgata questions the Buddha on the ultimate beyond speculation (sarvatarkasamatikrānta). In the third chapter, the bodhisattva Suviśuddhamati questions the Buddha on the ultimate that is beyond being distinct or indistinct (bhedābhedasamatikrānta) from conditioned phenomena. In the fourth chapter, Subhūti questions the Buddha on the ultimate that is of a single nature (ekarasa) within all phenomena. In the fifth chapter, the bodhisattva Viśālamati questions the Buddha on the secrets of mind (citta), thought (manas), and cognition (vijñāna). In the sixth chapter, the bodhisattva Guṇākara questions the Buddha on the three defining characteristics (lakṣaṇa) of phenomena. In the seventh chapter, the bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata questions the Buddha on the three kinds of essencelessness (niḥsvabhāvatā) as well as on the Buddha’s three turnings of the Dharma wheel. In the eighth chapter, the bodhisattva Maitreya questions the Buddha on the practice of mental stillness (śamatha) and insight (vipaśyanā). In the ninth chapter, the bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara questions the Buddha on the stages of the bodhisattva path and the Single Vehicle (ekayāna). In the tenth chapter, the bodhisattva Mañjuśrī questions the Buddha on the bodies (kāya) and activity of the tathāgatas.
From a broader perspective, it is possible to consider that the teaching imparted in this sūtra is structured in terms of the basis (āśraya), the path (mārga), and the result (phala). The first four chapters on the five characteristics of the ultimate as defined in the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras represent a teaching on the abovementioned basis, namely, true reality (tathatā) as it is; chapters 5–9, a teaching on the path in terms of practices and stages to attain awakening; and chapter 10, a teaching on the result through the doctrine of the tathāgatas’ bodies and activity to awaken beings. All major Tibetan traditions consider chapter 3, focusing on the relation between the two truths, and chapter 8, focusing on meditative practice, to be authoritative. These are among the scriptures most quoted on their respective topics by Tibetan authors regardless of lineage.
The first four chapters point out the nature of reality by distinguishing the unconditioned from the conditioned, the pure from the afflicted, the ultimate from the conventional, nondual gnosis from mind’s elaborations, inexpressible reality from conventional expressions, and the actual from the imaginary. The first chapter thus starts with the distinction between conditioned and unconditioned phenomena, which became a prevalent theme in the various Abhidharmas. Through this distinction, the point is made that the ultimate is inexpressible and nondual. The realization of this inexpressible ultimate is achieved through gnosis alone. Conceptions in terms of conditioned and unconditioned merely exist in the way of a magical illusion. Yet, in order to lead beings to awakening, buddhas have to use such labels. The second chapter elaborates on this very point. Although the ultimate is beyond speculation, the Buddha taught liberation by means of verbal expressions and conventions belonging to the domain of phenomenal appearances and notions.
As a consequence, the first two chapters delineate two domains corresponding to the two truths (satyadvaya): (1) the pure domain of the ultimate, which, being inexpressible, nondual, and beyond speculation, is the realm of nonconceptual gnosis free from conventional appearance and notions, and (2) the afflicted domain of dualistic conventional expressions and notions, which is the realm of mental elaborations. These domains are respectively labeled by the buddhas as “the unconditioned” and “the conditioned” only for the sake of instructing beings, for the Buddha explains that this distinction between unconditioned and conditioned is only made on the level of the conditioned, namely, from the perspective of dualistic conventions. Within the realm of these conventional expressions, in the context of the path, it follows that these two domains are apparently mutually exclusive, although the Buddha hints at the fact that, from the perspective of the ultimate, the conditioned is not the conditioned and the unconditioned is not the unconditioned.
Chapter 3 explains how the relation between the ultimate and conditioned phenomena seen from this higher perspective should be communicated on the level of conventions. From this standpoint, one cannot say whether the ultimate is distinct or indistinct from conditioned phenomena. The Buddha shows that positing these two domains as distinct or indistinct is wrong. Since conditioned phenomena are characterized by the fact of being produced by causes and conditions, it is inappropriate to conceive (a) the conditioned and (b) the emptiness of an inherent nature as either identical or different. On the one hand, being conditioned (i.e., dependent on something other) is identical with being empty of an intrinsic nature; on the other hand, the domain of the conditioned is defined as the realm of afflictions, while the domain of the unconditioned is understood as the pure realm. Some might therefore think that phenomena and the nature of phenomena are distinct, but the Buddha teaches in the fourth chapter that the empty nature of conditioned phenomena, the ultimate, cannot be said to be distinct from those phenomena. As such, this subtle and profound ultimate is indeed of a single character within phenomena whose defining characteristic appears to be diverse. To realize this nature of phenomena, which is unconditioned selflessness, one should only rely on nondual gnosis, not mind.
Chapter 5 is a presentation of the “secrets of mind, thought, and cognition.” Here the Buddha introduces the concept of “appropriating cognition” (ādānavijñāna), also called “subliminal cognition” (ālayavijñāna), “mind” (citta), or “mind containing all the seeds” (sarvabījaṃ cittam). This mind, in which mental events manifest, acts is like a mirror in which reflections appear. It is the basis of previous mental imprints resulting from volitions and actions that create predispositions (i.e., latent dispositions) to experience reality in conventional terms. However, once bodhisattvas cognize in an intuitive and personal way the ultimate by means of gnosis, they no longer perceive this mind. In the closing verses of this chapter, the Buddha explains that this mind is without a self, since it is conditioned and composed by seeds. Through these definitions, the Buddha de facto delineates two realms: the domain of dualistic mind and the domain of nondual gnosis.
Chapter 6 is a teaching on the three defining characteristics (lakṣaṇa) of phenomena: the imaginary defining characteristic (parikalpitalakṣaṇa), the other-dependent defining characteristic (paratantralakṣaṇa), and the actual defining characteristic (pariniṣpannalakṣaṇa): (1) The imaginary defining characteristic is the superimposition onto phenomena of an essence or a defining characteristic existing from its own side, by means of designations or conventional expressions. This imaginary characteristic is utterly false in the way of a visual aberration, since phenomena are ultimately devoid of any defining characteristic that makes them what they are. (2) The other-dependent defining characteristic corresponds to the dependent arising of phenomena. It refers to phenomenal appearances upon which an imaginary defining characteristic is superimposed. This point is grasped once the imaginary defining characteristic of phenomena is understood to be a wrong conception. It is worth noting that the other-dependent defining characteristic delineates the domain of conditioned cognitions, namely, the mind as presented in chapter 5 (this point is made clear in 7.10 with regard to karma and rebirth), and as such, represents the domain of affliction (see 6.11). (3) The actual defining characteristic is the permanent and immutable reality of phenomena. It is the ultimate unerring object that is manifest once the selflessness of phenomena, the nonexistence of any fictive defining characteristic in phenomena arising dependently, has been realized. Only the actual defining characteristic constitutes the domain of purification, since the other-dependent defines the domain of affliction, namely, the realm of the conditioned. In the closing verses of this chapter, the Buddha gives a quintessential presentation of the path: one should first recognize that phenomena are devoid of imaginary defining characteristics by seeing them as mere designations superimposed on conditioned cognitions. At that time, one will abandon phenomena characterized by affliction, namely, conditioned phenomena in the form of conditioned cognitions, and turn toward phenomena characterized by purification that are in harmony with ultimate reality.
Chapter 7 begins with Paramārthasamudgata’s question: why did the Buddha first teach the defining characteristic of phenomena, their arising, their cessation, and so forth through the notions of the five aggregates, the twelve sense domains, and so on, when he later explained that all phenomena are without an essence? The Buddha answers by teaching the three kinds of essencelessness, namely, essencelessness regarding defining characteristics, essencelessness regarding arising, and essencelessness regarding the ultimate: (1) Essencelessness regarding defining characteristics refers to the imaginary defining characteristic of phenomena. It is the essencelessness of what is utterly nonexistent (i.e., the defining characteristic), which is like a sky flower. (2) Essencelessness regarding arising refers to the other-dependent defining characteristic of phenomena arising from causes other than themselves. It is presented as the magic illusion of dependent arising, in the context of this teaching the magic illusion of mind. (3) Essencelessness regarding the ultimate has two aspects. The first is the essencelessness of all conditioned phenomena with regard to the ultimate. As a corollary of dependent arising, those phenomena are in fact not born as anything, being dependent on causes and conditions for their arising and therefore impermanent. The second aspect of essencelessness with regard to the ultimate refers to the only unconditioned object of purification, the actual defining characteristic of phenomena, the ultimate selflessness of phenomena, which is like space, itself also unconditioned. This permanent and immutable nature of phenomena is the primordial state of peace of that which, being without a defining characteristic, is unborn and unceasing, by nature in the state of nirvāṇa.
In 7.10, the Buddha describes the entire process leading to confusion: beings reify the other-dependent and the actual defining characteristics in terms of the imaginary defining characteristic. Failing to understand that conventional expressions do not refer to actual things, they superimpose an essence on conditioned cognitions and imagine reality to be just as it is described by their linguistic conventions. Figments of imagination become causes and conditions for their mental activities, which will lead them to the afflictions of action and rebirth. The process described here is akin to a world of virtual reality where even the projector, the conditioned mind, is imaginary. As one takes the projected phenomena as real and reifies them, one acts, suffers, dies, and is endlessly “respawned” within this virtual reality. Although this pseudo-reality projected by mind is nonexistent, it will condition one’s mind and one’s future existence as one will act in accordance with one’s state of mind within this virtual reality. In 7.10, the other-dependent is therefore equated with the appropriating mind, the basis of the imaginary defining characteristic of phenomena, the object of dreamlike conceptualizations (see also 7.25).
Next, the Buddha explains how various beings relate to this process and how he has helped them with teachings corresponding to their circumstances and capacities. For example, some can understand on a dualistic level that defining characteristics (i.e., the virtual reality of phenomena) lack an essence, and thus slowly develop repulsion toward conditioned phenomena, even if they are not able to realize the ultimate nature of phenomena, their nondual primordial selflessness which is the domain of gnosis. In accordance with this model of reality, the Buddha declares that there is only the path and journey toward liberation and thus a Single Vehicle for both hearers and bodhisattvas because there is only a single purification.
In 7.30, Paramārthasamudgata defines the three turnings of the wheel of Dharma. Because this doctrine is included in this specific chapter, it seems logical to interpret the three turnings of the wheel of Dharma in relation to the three kinds of essencelessness: (1) The first turning used the notion that phenomena have a defining characteristic to teach the essencelessness of these defining characteristics in a series of teachings such as the five aggregates, the twelve sense domains, and so on (see also 4.1–6). In our metaphor on virtual reality, one could see these teachings as being expounded on the basis of the very imaginary phenomena conceptualized as truly existing. When children experience a nightmare, their parents show that the monster does not exist by implicitly, i.e. provisionally, accepting its existence, saying, “Look! It is not there.” (2) The second turning of the wheel teaches the first aspect of essencelessness with regard to the ultimate, stating that phenomena are unborn. From this perspective, the primordial selflessness of phenomena is still taught in relation to dualistic phenomena. As a consequence, Paramārthasamudgata considers this cycle of teachings as provisional. (3) The third turning of the wheel aims at teaching the second aspect of essencelessness with regard to the ultimate in a way that is not limited to the domain of dualistic phenomena. To pursue our metaphor, this third cycle of teachings gives a complete overview of the three defining characteristics of phenomena: the completely imaginary experience of a virtual reality, the magic illusion of the projecting mind, and the primordial domain of gnosis. Paramārthasamudgata declares the third turning to be of definitive meaning.
It is worth noting that the doctrine of the three defining characteristics can be seen as delineating three great categories of soteriological approaches found in Indo-Tibetan Buddhist traditions: (1) the deconstruction of putative notions of an individual self through mereological and relational strategies; (2) the deconstruction of notions of a self regarding conditioned phenomena through the impossibility of their ultimate arising, since these conditioned phenomena merely exist in dependence; and (3) the pointing out of the nondual ultimate nature of phenomena, which altogether bypasses imaginary mental constructions.
In the eighth chapter, the famous Maitreya chapter on meditation, the Buddha first gives a series of definitions followed by the description of a process, a pattern frequently used in this sūtra. First, the objects of the practices of mental stillness (śamatha) and insight (vipaśyanā) are defined as, respectively, an image without and with conceptualization, while their objects, when both practices are combined, are the point where things end (vastvanta) and the accomplishment of the goal (kṛtyānuṣṭhāna, i.e., the attainment of the path). Mental stillness consists in directing one’s attention (manasikāra) inward toward the mind that is directing attention (see 8.3). It follows a state of inner absorption produced by concentrating on a referential object. The practice of insight consists in analyzing, discerning, and differentiating the various cognitive aspects of the image (pratibimba) that is the object of concentration. These two practices are neither different nor identical. They are not different in that they take mind as a referential object, but they are not identical because insight takes a conceptual image as its referential object. The Buddha thus explains in an often-cited passage that this image taken as an object of concentration is not different from mind insofar as cognition is constituted by the mere representation (vijñaptimātra) that is the object of this cognition. The mind and the image, which is its object manifesting as a mental event, appear as different, although they are not. All mental images, whether in the context of practice or not, are mere representations. Once one has realized this, directing one’s attention toward true reality is the one-pointedness of mind in which mental stillness and insight are unified. A superior way to practice this path is therefore to focus on that which is universal in all the various specific teachings imparted by the Buddha. This approach, which is based on a practice devoid of mental engagement (vitarka) and investigation (vicāra), directly focuses on the element that converges toward true reality. The ensuing shift in one’s basis of existence (āśrayaparivṛtti) mentioned in this sūtra does not here refer to a transformation of the subliminal cognition (ālayavijñāna). According to 10.2, this shift, once all corruption has been eliminated, consists in nothing other than the bodhisattva’s attainment of the truth body (dharmakāya).
The Buddha then explains how one attends to phenomenal appearances in an increasingly nonconceptual way. He also gives an elucidation of the analytical knowledge of designations (dharmapratisaṃvid) and their objects (arthapratisaṃvid) attained through the practice of mental stillness and insight. In this context, a few key definitions are given; for example, the true reality of representations is that all conditioned phenomena are mere representations (see 8.20.2.iii). When presented in four aspects, the analytical knowledge of designations and their objects encapsulate the entire path through the four stages of mental appropriation, experience, affliction, and purification. When asked about the nature of gnosis, the Buddha answers that it “consists in the mental stillness and insight that take a universal teaching as a referential object” while “perception consists in the mental stillness and insight that take a specific teaching as a referential object” (see 8.25). Practically, bodhisattvas direct their attention to true reality, discarding the phenomenal appearances of designations and objects of designation. Without taking any essential characteristic as a referential object, they do not pay attention to phenomenal appearances. Their attention is focused on that which is of a single character within all phenomena. The Buddha then gives a list of all the phenomenal appearances eliminated by emptiness, from the emptiness of all phenomena up to the emptiness of emptiness. By letting go of their object of concentration, the phenomenal appearance corresponding to a mental image, bodhisattvas free themselves from the bonds of conditioned phenomenal appearances (nimitta). Connecting these instructions on meditative practice with his teaching on the three defining characteristics, the Buddha explains that he taught the defining characteristic of emptiness in the Great Vehicle as the nonexistence and nonperception of an imaginary defining characteristic with regard to both affliction and purification in the other-dependent and actual defining characteristics of phenomena.
Practical instructions are also given to overcome obstacles and distractions to the practice of mental stillness and insight. On the ultimate stage of the path, these practices eliminate extremely subtle obstructions resulting in the complete purification of the truth body. The gnosis and vision utterly free from attachment and hindrance are attained. Finally, the Buddha explains how bodhisattvas obtain their great powers by being skillful in the following six points: (1) the arising of the mind, (2) the underlying condition of the mind, (3) the emergence from the mind, (4) the increase of the mind, (5) the decrease of the mind, and (6) skillful means. In this section of the Maitreya chapter, an overview of the vijñaptimātra doctrine is given through the notion of cognition, which includes the appropriating cognition as well as the arising cognitions taking various phenomenal appearances as their object. In this context, it is explained that the supramundane mind of the buddhas does not have any phenomenal appearance as its object.
In chapter 9, the Buddha is questioned on the stages (bhūmi) of a bodhisattva and a buddha, the names of these stages, and their adverse factors and specific arising, as well as on the ten perfections (pāramitā). A final instruction is imparted regarding the Single Vehicle. As mentioned in previous chapters, the Buddha explains that he taught the essence of phenomena in the vehicle of hearers in terms of the aggregates, the sense domains, and so on, and that he presented these phenomena in the light of a single principle in the Great Vehicle, the domain of truth (dharmadhātu). Those who conceptualize these teachings by taking them literally do not understand his underlying intention, which is that both vehicles are in fact teachings based on a single principle.
In the tenth chapter, Mañjuśrī questions the Buddha on the defining characteristic of the truth body of the tathāgatas. The Buddha explains the truth body in the sense of a result attained through the practice of the stages and perfections. This attainment consists in a shift in one’s basis of existence. From the perspective of beings belonging to the domain of mental elaborations and conditioned phenomena, the truth body is therefore inconceivable, being utterly beyond mental elaborations,. Here again the Buddha delineates two distinct realms.
The tathāgatas, who appear as emanation bodies (nirmāṇakāya), are said to be like a manifestation, an apparition. Through their skillful means and sovereign power (adhiṣṭhāna), they liberate beings by imparting three kinds of teaching: the sūtras, the Vinaya, and the mātṛkās (generally taken as more or less equivalent to the Abhidharma and related literature): (1) The sūtras teach what was heard, how to take refuge, the training, and the awakening. (2) The Vinaya teaches the precepts and prātimokṣa vows to hearers and bodhisattvas. (3) The mātṛkās are systematic teachings on important doctrinal points, such as the defining characteristic of the conventional and the ultimate, the defining characteristic of referential objects consisting of the awakening factors and their features, and so forth. In the section of the mātṛkā pertaining to the ascertainment of the qualities of cognitive objects, the Buddha goes into a lengthy discussion on logical analysis according to the four principles of reason (yukti): (1) the principle of reason based on dependence (apekṣāyukti), (2) the principle of reason based on cause and effect (kāryakāraṇayukti), (3) the principle of reason based on logical proof (upapattisādhanayukti), and (4) the principle of reason based on the nature of phenomena itself (dharmatāyukti). The explanation given by the Buddha on the third yukti of this list (cf. 10.7.4.vii.c) is very extensive and resembles a short treatise on epistemology in which the notion of means of knowledge or valid cognition (pramāṇa) is meticulously investigated. In this section, the Buddha explains the characteristics of valid and invalid reasonings. He concludes by stating that three types of valid cognition should be accepted: direct cognition (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), and authoritative scriptures (āptāgama).
The Buddha next elucidates “the meaning of the dhāraṇī through which bodhisattvas comply with the underlying intention of the profound Dharma expounded by the tathāgatas, the complete meaning of the sūtras, the Vinaya, and the mātṛkās.” This quintessential teaching encapsulating the meaning of the entire Dharma states that beings are in truth beyond activity and beyond being afflicted or purified. It is only because of their reification of illusory phenomena in terms of identity and essence that they conceive their reality in the way they do, which leads them to suffering. Abandoning this “body afflicted by corruption” (dauṣṭhulyakāya), they obtain the truth body that is inconceivable and unconditioned (i.e., the dharmakāya). In this context, the Buddha concludes by explaining that the tathāgatas are not characterized by mind, thought, and cognition. Their mind arises without effort in the way of an emanation (nirmāṇa). In their case, one cannot say whether their mind exists or not, their domain consisting of pure realms. It follows that the tathāgatas are characterized by nonduality: “They are neither completely and perfectly awakened nor not completely and perfectly awakened; they neither turn the wheel of Dharma nor do not turn the wheel of Dharma; they neither attain the great parinirvāṇa nor do not attain the great parinirvāṇa. This is because the truth body is utterly pure and the emanation body constantly manifests.” Once the truth body has been purified through the practice focusing on the domain of truth (dharmadhātu), “the great light of gnosis manifests in beings, and innumerable emanated reflections arise.” One should keep in mind, though, the teachings imparted in Chapter 3 on the conventional and ultimate truths. From the perspective of the ultimate, nothing has ever been purified by anybody, as the concluding verses of the formula in Chapter 10 make clear:
- “The possessors of qualities resulting from affliction and purification
- Are all without movement and without a person;
- Therefore, I declare them to be without activity,
- As they are neither purified nor afflicted, be it in the past or the future.
- “Relying on views resulting from their latent dispositions,
- On account of which they wrongly conceive the body afflicted by corruption,
- They reify [the ego through concepts such as] ‘I’ and ‘mine.’
- As a consequence, notions arise, such as ‘I see,’ ‘I eat,’ ‘I do,’ ‘I am afflicted,’ and ‘I am purified.’
- “Thus, those who understand this fact as it really is
- Abandon the body afflicted by corruption and instead
- Will obtain a body that is not a support for any defilement,
- Being free from mental elaborations and unconditioned.”
The only complete extant versions of the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra (Saṃdh.) are Chinese and Tibetan translations produced from Sanskrit manuscripts. All the recensions of the sūtra in Tibetan include a prologue followed by ten chapters. In addition to the various Kangyur editions, the sūtra is also quoted in full in the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī of the Yogācārabhūmi. The list of the available recensions of the text across Sanskrit, Chinese, and Tibetan include:
1. Sanskrit (including Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit)
• Buescher 2007: 102–104 (quotations in TrBh, 33.25–34.4 drawn from Saṃdh. 5.5 and 5.7; see also Lévi 1925: 33–34)
• Matsuda 1995 (complete reconstruction from manuscript of Saṃdh. 9.1–6)
• Matsuda 2013 (fragments of Saṃdh. 2.4 and 3.1, fragments of 8.39–40, complete reconstruction from manuscript of 8.41)
• Nagao 1964: 43 (gives the list of the seven kinds of tattva mentioned in Saṃdh. 8.20.2 and quoted in the Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya)
• Nagao 1982–1987: I.4, I.7.
• Tucci 1971: 1 (two verses from Saṃdh. 3.7 that are quoted in Kamalaśīla’s Bhāvanākrama: nimittabandhanāj jantur atho dauṣṭhulabandhanāt / vipaśyanāṃ bhāvayitvā śamathañ ca vimucyata iti) and ibid., p. 22 (a sentence drawn from 7.15 also quoted in the Bhāvanākrama: ekāntasattvārthavimukhasya ekāntasaṃsārābhisaṃskāravimukhasya [nā] uttarā samyaksaṃbodhir uktā mayeti)
2. Chinese
• 相續解脫地波羅蜜了義經 (Taishō 678) and 相續解脫如來所作隨順處了義經 (Taishō 679) translated by Guṇabhadra (394–468
• 深密解脫經 (Taishō 675) translated by Bodhiruci (fl. 508–535
• 佛說解節經 (Taishō 677) translated by Paramārtha (498–569
• 解深密經 (Taishō 676) translated by Xuanzang (596–664
3. Tibetan
a. Tshalpa group
•
• C747 mdo sde, ca 1b1–71a7 (vol. 29)
• D106 mdo sde, ca 1b1–55b7 (vol. 49)
• J51 mdo sde, ca 1b1–59b8 (vol. 44)
• K
• R106 mdo sde, ca 1b1–55b7 (vol. 49)
• U106 mdo sde, ca 1b1–55b7 (vol. 49)
• VD D4038 mdo ’grel (sems tsam), zi 44a–97b
• VG GT3542 mdo ’grel (sems tsam), ’i 59b–136a
• VP K
b. Thempangma group
• L82 mdo sde, na 1b1–80b1 (vol. 42)
• S106 mdo sde, na 1b1–80b1 (vol. 63)
• T107 mdo sde, na 1b1–70b1 (vol. 68)
• V156 mdo sde, na 1b1–69b6 (vol. 65)
• Z137 mdo, na 1b1–93a6 (vol. 59)
c. Mustang group
• X mdo sde, wa 66a–132a
• He64.6 mdo, wa 62b5–125b8
d. Bhutan group
• Cz082-001 mdo, na 1b1–82a5
• Dd031-001 mdo, ca 1b1–69b2
• Dk034-001 mdo, na 1b1–87b1
• Gt028-001 mdo, na 1b1–72b3
• Np012-001 mdo, na 1b1–87a7
• Pj043-001 mdo, ca 1b1–62b4
• Pz045-001 mdo ca 1b1–61a5
e. Mixed/Independent editions
• F156 mdo sde, ba (tsha) 1b1–72a7 (vol. 68)
• H109 mdo sde, ca 1b1–87b7 (vol. 51)
• Lg11.8 mdo, da-L74 224b5–276a2
• N94 mdo sde, ca 1–81a7 (vol. 51)
• Ng13.07 mdo pa dgongs 111b3–162a8
• O23 mdo sde, cha
f. Other canonical collections
• Ablaikit collection IOM, RAS Tib.979/117
• Go19,01 ka 1b–36a6 (vol. 19)
• Bd3.7 vol. 3 (ta) pha 1b1–84a6
• Do mdo sde, da 196a–246b
g. Dunhuang manuscripts
• SaṃdhDH: Stein Tib. n°194 (49 folios); Stein Tib. n°683 (1 folio) (these folios cover ca. 40% of the sūtra; see Hakayama 1984–1987)
In addition, five commentaries have been composed on the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra:
• Asaṅga’s Āryasaṃdhinirmocanabhāṣya (dgongs pa nges par ’grel pa’i rnam par bshad pa) D3981 mdo ’grel (mdo), ngi 1b–11b
• Wonch’uk’s *Āryagambhīrasaṃdhinirmocanasūtraṭīkā (dgongs pa zab mo nges par ’grel pa’i mdo rgya cher ’grel pa) D4016 mdo ’grel (mdo), ti 1b–di 175a
• Jñāṇagarbha’s Āryasaṃdhinirmocanasūtre āryamaitreyakevalaparivartabhāṣya (dgongs pa nges par ’grel pa’i mdo las ’phags pa byams pa’i le’u nyi tshe bshad pa) D4033 mdo ’grel (sems tsam), bi 318b–345a
• Changchup Dzutrül (byang chub rdzu ’phrul)’s *Āryasaṃdhinirmocanasūtravyākhyāna (bstan bcos sna tshogs), D4358 mdo ’grel, co 1b–jo 183b
• Trisong Detsen (khri srong lde brtsan)’s *Samyagvākpramāṇoddhṛtasūtra (bka’ yang dag pa’i tshad ma las mdo btus pa) D4352 mdo ’grel (bstan bcos sna tshogs), co 173a–205b
I applied various methods and followed a series of steps during the process of translating the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra from the Tibetan:
I first collated all the available Tibetan editions of Saṃdhinirmocana: Bd, C, D, Dunhuang (Hakayama 1984–87), Do, F, H, L, N, S, K
The Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra is a major text of Indian Buddhism that has early on attracted the attention of Buddhist Studies scholars. It has been translated into French, English, and German (partially). Lamotte (1935) provided a critical edition of Saṃdhinirmocana and a translation from Tibetan (N) and Chinese (Taishō 676) into French. He also attempted to reconstruct or identify technical terms in Sanskrit, which have for the most part been confirmed by subsequent finds of Sanskrit fragments. Lamotte’s work is a major resource for the study of Saṃdhinirmocana. It has been until now the standard edition and translation of this text on account of its accuracy and methodological academic approach. As a side note, I followed Lamotte’s segmentation of the text into paragraphs. His French translation is generally reliable, although some technical passages can be significantly improved, particularly in the case of chapter 8 on meditation and chapter 10 on the result of the path. Frauwallner (1969) gives a partial translation of Saṃdhinirmocana (i.e., chapters 6 and 7) from Tibetan into German. As one would expect, Frauwallner’s academic translation of these two chapters aims at accuracy over readability. Kawasaki 1976 is also a partial translation of chapter 8 into English (§6.1–9). This translation does not improve Lamotte’s. Powers’ (1995) translation from Tibetan (D) into English, in spite of its merit, could be widely improved upon in terms of methodology, accuracy, and readability. Brunnhölzl 2018 offers a partial translation of chapter 7, as well as a few key passages from chapter 5.
Translations by Cleary (1999) and Keenan (2000) are from the Chinese (Taishō 676) into English. I used Keenan’s work to get a sense of the Chinese text while translating the Degé edition but only referred to Cleary occasionally. Keenan’s work seems to me more accurate than Cleary’s, although the latter was useful for unraveling difficult passages, since his style is more free and primarily intends to communicate the meaning of the text. Cornu (2005) has provided a translation of the text from Tibetan (D) into French that mainly follows Powers 1995, a somewhat regrettable fact since Lamotte’s (1935) is more accurate. Schmithausen’s (2014) work contains numerous difficult passages of Saṃdhinirmocana translated from various Tibetan and Chinese editions into English. It is an invaluable resource for the study of Saṃdhinirmocana. In addition, it offers useful Sanskrit reconstructions of important technical terms. Together with Lamotte’s translation, it has been a constant companion while translating the text.
The Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra is part of a larger network of texts, both in the Kangyur and the Tengyur:
1. The nidāna of Saṃdhinirmocana almost exactly matches those of the Buddhabhūmisūtra (D275) and the Tathāgataguṇajñānācintyaviṣayāvatāranirdeśasūtra (D185). The Buddhabhūmisūtra is a very short text that was also translated into Chinese by Xuanzang in 646 (see Keenan 1980, p. 336ff.). Textual parallelisms of this kind are useful to double checking some passages or gathering more background information about the source text.
2. As mentioned above, Saṃdhinirmocana is also found in extenso in the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī of the Yogācārabhūmi and is therefore part of a tradition of texts sharing common ideas. This point should be kept in mind while translating, particularly when one has to evaluate the potential impact of terminological choices from the perspective of a more philosophical approach to the text, which, in the case of Saṃdhinirmocana, should be a major concern. For example, one should pay attention to the fact that interpreting “representation-only” (vijñaptimātra) as a strong form of idealism essentializing mind could be misleading from the perspective of a cultural translation of the worldview propounded in Saṃdhinirmocana since mind, just as much as the external object, is explicitly declared to be empty of any own-being, essence, or intrinsic nature (see chapter 8 on the three kinds of niḥsvabhāvatā) in this text.
3. Another important point is the presence of the aforementioned five commentaries on Saṃdhinirmocana found in the Tengyur (D). I occasionally referred to these works while finalizing the final draft of the translation. However, I first focused on the available editions of Saṃdhinirmocana itself as I did not want to be influenced by the interpretations of later authors. Instead, I attempted to go through all possible logically meaningful readings according to the Tibetan and Sanskrit sources without any preconceptions resulting from my reading of later commentarial traditions.
4. In the same vein, one should note that Saṃdhinirmocana has played a major role in Tibetan hermeneutical debates. For centuries, it has been considered a central scripture referred to extensively in the writings of Tibet’s great luminaries, such as Jé Tsongkhapa (rje tsong kha pa, 1357–1419) or Jamgön Mipham Gyatso (’jam mgon mi pham rgya mtsho, 1846–1912). While it would certainly be fascinating to study the impact of Saṃdhinirmocana in the context of Tibetan Madhyamaka, I chose not to take into account Indian or Tibetan commentaries or exegeses of the sūtra in order to focus on the source text itself.
I proceeded to search all articles and monographs referring to Saṃdhinirmocana I could find at the very beginning of this translation project. In this quest for relevant academic research, I benefited from the excellent bibliography found in Delhey 2013 regarding research done on the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī of the Yogācārabhūmi, which I expanded with a list of complementary reference works (see the bibliography). Among the existing academic literature on Saṃdhinirmocana, Schmithausen 2014 stands out and, unsurprisingly, proved to be a major resource for this translation project.
1. The translation of the title of the text became the object of several discussions among scholars regarding the meaning of the Sanskrit words saṃdhi and nirmocana as a consequence of Lamotte’s first complete translation of the text. Among the various available options, I opted for simplicity and translated the Sanskrit Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra with “The Sūtra Unraveling the Intent,” which I believe renders accurately the meaning and structure of the text. Various interlocutors indeed ask the Buddha repeatedly to explain difficult points in order to clarify the purpose of his seemingly contradictory or complex doctrines on the nature of reality.
2. Regarding the content of the sūtra itself, I proceeded to organize secondary sources by chapter and referenced this research in the notes accompanying my translation. The last chapter of Saṃdhinirmocana includes a very technical passage on valid cognition (pramāṇa) whose definitions predate Dignāga’s system of logic. Translating Trisong Detsen’s *Samyagvākpramāṇoddhṛtasūtra, which is a commentary on the teaching on the four principles of reason (rigs pa bzhi), would help us better understand pre-Dignāgean Buddhist logic.
In this stage of the overall process, I followed Jean-François Billeter’s pragmatic approach to the translation of classical Chinese texts. This approach consists in five operations:
1. The first stage of the translation process is purely analytical. A passage is translated on the basis of lexicographical resources (e.g., dictionaries) and syntactic rules (e.g., grammars). During this operation, it is important to distinguish what is understood and what still remains problematic. All options should be kept open. Interpretations or eisegetical readings should be rejected. From a practical perspective, I systematically used the Mahāvyutpatti to find the Sanskrit terms behind general Tibetan expressions. For technical terms, I relied on Schmithausen (2014) and the academic research mentioned above.
Our Tibetan text is itself a translation. This somewhat complicates our task since we have to decipher the Sanskrit behind the Tibetan in order to make sense of some difficult sentences or passages. However, this approach is necessary on a lexicographical and syntactic level as can be seen in the following examples: One should read the Tibetan brtsams pa as ārabhya, a Buddhist hybrid Sanskrit expression that has the meaning of “referring to/having to do with” and not “beginning with.” Likewise, rab tu phye ba stands for prabhāvita, which in the Saṃdhinirmocana means “consisting in/characterized as/characterized by” and not “distinguished.” The problem is even more acute in the case of Sanskrit compounds that have been translated into Tibetan according to the way they were formulated in Sanskrit. As an illustration of this, compounds ending with lakṣaṇa (Tib. mtshan nyid) often make more sense in Saṃdhinirmocana as bahuvrīhi s than karmadhāraya s or tatpuruṣa s, not to mention dvandva s. Lamotte thus reads rtog ge kun las ’das mtshan nyid (sarvatarkasamatikrāntalakṣaṇa) as a bahuvrīhi, which I believe is appropriate in the context of the passage in question.
2. Once a “technically correct” translation of the source text has been produced, Billeter advises us to bring together the various elements of a sentence or a passage until we obtain a clear picture of what is said in the source text. This step therefore consists in understanding the meaning of the translated passage by literally seeing (or visualizing) its meaning. In a way, the first operation is about das Erklären (“explanation”), while the second concerns das Verstehen (“understanding”). In this sense, the latter uses the resources of one’s imagination and metalinguistic knowledge to establish connections with a web of meaning that is not restricted to the translated sentence or passage alone.
The second operation is therefore a synthesis, a recognition of relations between meaning units of various orders (one would think here of the idea conveyed by saṃjñā and similar terms in which the upasarga sam- plays a central role), whereas the first phase is analytical (in the sense of vicāra, vicāraṇa, and vijñāna, in which the upasarga vi- expresses the notion of taking apart). In fact, translators translate into the target language their comprehension of the source text. They actually never translate the text itself but their understanding or representation of ideas, situations, and emotions conveyed by a text. To illustrate this point, one could mention the problem, encountered by scholars, of translating terms related to meditative practice. The Maitreya chapter of Saṃdhinirmocana is probably the most difficult to understand if one is not familiar with Buddhist practice. Lamotte translates manasikāra with “réflection,” while Frauwallner uses “Beobachtung” (lit. “observation”). Both these translation choices obfuscate the meaning of what the term “directing one’s attention” actually denotes. This is not in itself a major issue, but if such inaccuracies proliferate in the same passage or chapter, the meaning of the translation becomes unclear, although it may well be technically correct on a syntactic level and lexicographical perspective (at least when it comes to correctly identifying Tibetan technical terms on the basis of the Sanskrit).
In the context of pre-Dignāgean Buddhist logic, chapter 10 represents another case in point. This chapter is indeed replete with abstruse concepts not belonging to the well-researched and documented later systems of Buddhist logic. In this case, translating the many occurrences of the connective particle kyi in long compounds with the English preposition “of” will not help the reader much, though it will certainly give the translators the peace of mind of having produced a “technically correct” translation. However, I believe that translators have only two options here: (a) take a risk and, for example, tell us if they actually understand the connective kyi in the sense of “belonging to,” “resulting from,” “consisting of,” and so on; or (b) admit that they do not understand the source text. In the case of the technical compounds found in chapter 10, I therefore tried to ask myself what these terms actually referred to, what could have been the system of logic presented in these pages. For example, I read gzhan gyi rigs kyi dpe nye bar sbyar ba’i mtshan nyid (anyajātīyadṛṣṭāntopasaṃhāralakṣaṇa) as rendering into Tibetan a Sanskrit bahuvrīhi. As a consequence, I translated this long compound with “[The logical proof] characterized by a demonstration through an instance belonging to a different class [of phenomena]”
It goes without saying that these translations are at this stage provisional, as further research on the subject matter is necessary. But in order to translate these technical terms, we cannot just give a technically correct translation of a succession of words. Beyond the first phase of the work, which is purely analytical, we still need to develop a mental representation of the situation presented in the text by establishing relations with a context that might go beyond the text.
3. In the third operation, Billeter insists on the necessity for translators to become writers. They should formulate in the target language their understanding of the source text as accurately and naturally as possible. At this stage, translators should focus on literary elements of the translation, such as idioms, voice, and figures of speech. According to Billeter, difficulties in writing accurately and naturally in the target language are often the direct consequence of not having performed the second operation. The translation might well be technically correct, but it still does not make sense, an experience all translators go through when they fail to understand the meaning (or visualize the situation) referred to by the source text.
4. In the fourth operation, translators should reflect on the role played by linguistic constraints and conventions in the formulation of the source text as well as those imposed by the target language. What options did the author of the text have in terms of expression? How would someone express the same ideas in the target language? As a consequence, the notion of form and pragmatics in the target language becomes central. To detail the various operations leading to an actual translation, Vinay and Darbelnet’s model is useful. Translators should first identify the units of translation in relation to the translation process: the lexicon (e.g., semantic values, objective and affective aspects, lexical associations and modulations), the syntactic structure (e.g., transpositions between word classes, supplementation of pronouns or conjunctions, modifications in terms of gender, number, characterization, tenses, voice, modality, and verbal aspects), and the message (e.g., meaning, stylistics, pragmatics, topicalization, figures of speech, metalinguistic aspects, specific segmentation of reality). Then, they should examine the descriptive, affective, and intellectual content of the units of translation in the source text to reconstitute the situation at the origin of the message. These two first steps correspond to Billeter’s two first operations. Finally, translators still have to formulate the message in the target language without omitting any relevant element from the source language.
To achieve this, Vinay and Darbelnet argue that translators have only two methods: direct and oblique translation. Direct translation includes three strategies:
• a. Borrowing: the term in the source language is used in the target language to overcome an insuperable metalinguistic lacuna, or it is used because the term is also commonly used in the target language. For instance, I use the Sanskrit bodhisattva and nirvāṇa in my English translation.
• b. Calque: I translated bodhicitta with “awakening mind,” which is both a lexical and structural calque.
• c. Literal translation: most lists and simple sentences are for instance relatively unproblematic direct translations of the source language.
When a Literal translation fails to render the message, is structurally impossible, or misleads the reader due to the lack of a corresponding expression belonging to the same register, one should turn to an oblique translation method among the following strategies:
• d. Transposition: one replaces a word class by another. For example, the frequent nominalizations of Sanskrit and Tibetan are turned into verb clauses. The highly technical nature of some terms makes it necessary to reflect the Sanskrit as much as possible while “unpacking” what is a condensed compound. As an illustration, I translated tadanyavairūpyopalabdhi with “a perception that does not conform with anything other than the [thing to establish],” in which vairūpya is translated as a verb. Our text is mostly written in the same way as a treatise (śāstra), reflecting what is referred to as the nominal style in Sanskrit, or scholastic Sanskrit, in which the nominalization of verbal clauses by means of compounds or suffixes is common. As is often the case in technical or hyperspecialized environments, processes or conceptual frameworks are encapsulated as technical terms (often nouns) implying a complex or recurring pattern. As an analogy, think of a medical term such as hemiglossectomy standing for a removal of a part of the tongue. The passive impersonal phrase “a hemiglossectomy was performed on the patient at 11 pm” includes the nominalization of an action through a compound (hemiglossectomy). It could be rewritten as “[the surgeon] removed a portion of the patient’s tongue at 11 pm.” As can be seen from the translations of Lamotte and Frauwallner, nominalization seems to be less of a problem in French and German than it is in modern (American) English in which readability is more of a concern. When translating the Saṃdhinirmocana, I therefore tried to turn nominal compounds common in scholastic Sanskrit into English verbal sentences by transposing these compounds into verbal sentences. However, since the text is very technical (particularly from Chapter 7 onward), I decided in some cases to keep nominal compounds that were indicative of a technical term and not just a nontechnical action or state of affairs. For example, the text mentions throughout a “concept” being referred to a “X” (see for instance 7.3–6). Just like the surgical term above, such complex nominal compounds stand for a specific action or concept and are part of a “specialist’s jargon.” Turning these compounds into verbal sentences might have the counterproductive effect of erasing an essential feature of this kind of literature consisting in endless lists of often technical terms. Therefore, in this particular case, it would probably be best to avoid transposition.
• e. Modulation: this strategy implies a change of perspective or standpoint made in order to avoid an awkward rendering of the source language. In its simplest form, translating sla ba ma yin (D, folio 25.b, 7.32) with “it is difficult” is an illustration of an optional modulation. Any change of syntactic subject for the sake of clarifying a sentence would be a modulation. Whether this decision is appropriate or not on the part of the translator is something that one should evaluate on a case-by-case basis. I would like to illustrate this point with issues related to the nidāna of the sūtra, in which topicalization plays an important role. The first paragraph of the prologue is a presentation of the place where the Buddha is dwelling. The topicalization of the temple (khang) is achieved through a succession of compounds, mainly bahuvrīhis. Lamotte’s translation reflects this thematization to perfection. In contrast, Powers fails to topicalize the palace to the same degree. In his translation, the logical subject of the several clauses describing this palace is sometimes ambiguous. In this case, one should consider the fact that the Sanskrit structure of this paragraph is built on a process of topicalization that we can easily render in English. In a word, we have no reason to alter this literary device by inducing a modulation of the translation through a change of perspective induced, for example, by a modification of the grammatical or logical subject in the target language.
• f. Equivalence: the same situation can be expressed both in the source language and the target language in completely different stylistic and structural ways due to the necessity to resort to idioms in order to convey the message of the source text. For example, I translated evam etat (de de bzhin te/no) literally with “so it is” in English, which is a slightly pompous and old-fashioned expression no one would probably use today. Instead, one would probably say in an actual dialogue something like “You are right, Dharmodgata” or “This is true, Dharmodgata.”
• g. Adaptation: this method aims at replacing altogether a reference to a situation in the source language if it is completely unknown in the target language. I generally try to avoid adaptations while translating, for the simple reason that one has to be certain that, for instance, two different metaphors or examples refer to the same situation or object. To conclude on this point, it seems to me that a number of fixed or technical expressions in the Kangyur could be translated in a systematic way following Vinay and Darbelnet’s approach. This research would establish a set of solid conventions that would improve accuracy and readability.
Returning to Billeter’s schema, in his fourth operation the translator should verify that what has been translated into the target language corresponds to the meaning of the source text. Do the two texts express the same idea? Do they produce the same effect on the reader? To answer these questions, Billeter recommends reading one’s text aloud. During this operation, translators should also check whether the translation fits within a specific cultural register in the target language. Discourses take place within a corpus of existing literature that is culturally determined by centuries of textual production. Some statements from a different cultural background resonate through a web of meaning, discursive practices, or literary figures of speech once expressed in the target language. In fact, the web of meaning of the target language within which the translation is received finds its parallel in the web of meaning within which the source text was produced. Within the source text and culture, concepts, ideas, and references resonate throughout sentences, paragraphs, chapters, works, and genres. For example, some philosophical definitions can represent intratextual and extratextual variations on a theme for which there is no metalinguistic context in the target language. Translators therefore need to understand the text not only as a whole and in relation to its various components, but also in connection with both the source and the target cultures. This is of course particularly true of more “philosophical” texts for which it is essential to evaluate how the translation interacts with the webs of meaning of the source and target cultures. Practically, it is important to cross check the consistency (or lack thereof) of meaning units across the text while keeping in mind that the translation is also obviously culturally situated. This process is fundamental because it facilitates the validation (or invalidation) of translation hypotheses resulting from the two first steps of the translation process.
In the context of Saṃdhinirmocana, the problem is compounded by the fact that the sūtra can be read as a collection of independent texts that would have been put together during the third or fourth century
It is undeniable that the various recensions in Tibetan and Chinese refer to texts that are quite different in structure. For instance, Paramārtha’s translation includes only the first four chapters, which, according to Lamotte, might have originally formed an independent sūtra. In addition, it is obvious that the ten chapters of Saṃdhinirmocana do not follow a consistent textual pattern. The first six have no title. They are concluded by a few summarizing gāthā s and a standard formula indicating the name of the person who questioned the Buddha and the number of the chapter (e.g., “This was the chapter of Guṇākara—the sixth chapter”). Chapter 7 has a whole summary of the chapter in the form of a supplement right after the concluding gāthās, while in chapter 10 the Buddha is questioned on complementary topics once the concluded gāthās have been proclaimed. Chapters 7, 8, 9, and 10 each come to an end with a nītārthanirdeśa (instruction of definitive meaning) on the chapter topic. This nītārthanirdeśa is referred to as a Saṃdhinirmocana and used as the chapter title. On account of this, Lamotte surmises that there might have originally been several independent Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra s that came to be grouped together as the text we know today.
One should also note that the dialogue structure of chapters 1 through 7 differs from that of chapters 8 through 10. In the first group, the Buddha elaborates on a topic in the form of a monologue once his interlocutor has questioned him on a specific topic, whereas in the second group a dialogue takes place through short questions and answers. As a consequence of all these philological divergences, one has to conclude that the text is rather composite in nature and probably the result of a succession of additions and adjustments. In a word, I agree with Schmithausen that Saṃdhinirmocana is not an organic whole that would have been composed from the onset in its present form and that its chapters are not mutually dependent. However, this hypothesis should ideally be the object of further research by a team following an approach similar to that of Professor Jonathan Silk’s European Research Council project “Open Philology — The Composition of Buddhist Scriptures” at the University of Leiden, to which I have had the good fortune to take part. The multiformity and intertextuality of Mahāyāna sūtras are not the result of a linear development from an Ur-text but the expression of oral-formulaic processes of composition and transmission. For our research program focusing on the Ratnakūṭa collection of sūtras, we have been developing digital and philological tools to identify, analyze, and map the fluidity and modularity of Mahāyāna texts. By using these tools, we could better understand the historical development of the complex textual environment of the Saṃdhinirmocana, which includes several translations and many witnesses of this work.
From the perspective of the narrative and doctrinal content of the Tibetan translation, a somewhat different picture emerges. Even if each chapter does not depend on all others in terms of meaning, there is definitely a progression with regard to the flow of thought in Saṃdhinirmocana insofar as later chapters do depend on the definitions and lines of thinking posited in the former chapters, a central fact for translators of this complex text. We can perceive this continuity in the intratextual cross-references that create a terminological resonance echoing throughout the text. Unraveling these cross-references is as important during the translation process as noting the textual variations indicating a deviation from a specific literary pattern. While translating I thus tried to evaluate the text in terms of regularities and discontinuities in the use of definitions and the flow of meaning unfolding throughout the text. One should therefore temper the impression that the text has been “patched” together on the basis of loosely related texts on the basis of philological arguments whose significance is difficult to assess. For example, the fact that chapter 1 is the only chapter in which a dialogue occurs between two bodhisattvas has never been mentioned by any researcher as a textual inconsistency preventing them from considering the first four chapters as a coherent whole. Minor divergences should therefore not deter us from asking ourselves why these chapters were taught or put together in the first place. I would like to illustrate with a few concrete examples the doctrinal coherence of the text. The term ādānavijñāna in 5.3 is also found in 8.37.1.i; the model of the three kinds of essencelessness (niḥsvabhāvatā) of chapter 7 corresponds to the model of the three defining characteristics (lakṣaṇa) of chapter 6, of which two are foreshadowed in 1.2 through the terms parikalpa (kun tu rtog pa) and *apariniṣpanna (yongs su ma grub pa); the other-dependent defining characteristic (paratantralakṣaṇa) introduced in chapter 6 is mentioned in 7.10; chapter 8 presupposes chapters 5 and 6; the concluding paragraphs of 7.33 and 8.41 are almost identical; as noted by Schmithausen, saṃskāranimitta is referred to in similar ways in both 1.5 and 7.25–27; *viśuddhyālambana is mentioned with the same function in 4.8, 7.6, 7.25–27, and 8.20; 10.7.2 refers to the seven aspects of true reality (tathatā) defined in 8.20.2; 8.21 and 10.7.4.ii contain the same formulation; the famous quote “Whether tathāgatas…” is found in 4.10, 7.9, and 10.7.4.vii.d; 10.9 mentions the enumeration citta, manas, and vijñāna exactly in the way it is expressed in 5.1–6; 10.9 enumerates the domains as in 8.23.
On account of the elements adduced above and with Davidson’s principle of charity in mind, I would like to formulate the hypothesis that there is a good reason why these chapters are found in this order: the structure of the text as we know it today is necessary to provide Mahāyāna practitioners with a systematic teaching on (1) ultimate reality qua basis, which is the nondual inexpressible domain of gnosis (chapters 1 through 4), (2) the path to awakening from the domain of mind to the domain of gnosis (chapters 5 through 9), and (3) ultimate reality qua result of the path, which represents a shift in one’s basis of existence as one attains the domain of gnosis (chapter 10).
Indeed, it seems impossible to deny that, considered as a single text (and not as a succession of independent texts), the Saṃdhinirmocana aims at providing a systematic teaching on the Single Vehicle through the three aspects of basis, path, and result in order to solve seeming contradictions and quandaries in doctrines that were of primary importance for followers of the Great Vehicle (e.g., the two truths in chapter 3 and meditative practice in chapter 8). Now, if we read the Saṃdhinirmocana as a single text, we have to confront the web of meaning found in this text in its entirety with the web of meaning of the target culture in order to avoid potential misunderstandings.
This operation has a major impact on the translation of some key terms, such as vijñaptimātra. Since idealism (in the sense that mind is an unchanging essence) is not an option given the teaching imparted in this sūtra, I tried to avoid any potential confusion resulting from an unfortunate choice of terminology. In a word, I would rather stay on the safe side than insert in my translation a potentially misleading term. As a consequence, I decided to translate vijñaptimātra as “a mere representation” instead of using nominalizations such as “cognition-only.” The first expression is relatively unambiguous in the target culture as it minimizes the risk of misunderstanding the message of the text. Another option would be “just a representation.” These formulations mitigate the risk of superimposing an essence on what is meant by vijñapti. The formulation “cognition-only” in the sense of “pure cognition” is in contrast ambivalent. It could also (but not necessarily) signify that only cognition truly exists and by extension, that only mind exists as an essence.
In the last step of the translation process, Billeter recommends that translators perform various operations aiming at polishing the translation, such as replicating the possible effects of semantic resonance throughout the text, improving the connection between sentences and paragraphs, modifying the order of clauses, solving problems of euphony, or editing the translation to make it clearer and simpler by chunking long sentences or eliminating repetitions. To illustrate one of these various tasks in the context of the present project, I decided to review all the terminology pertaining to the semantic field of insight (vipaśyanā) after I had finished translating the entire text. I took as a starting point 8.4, in which vipaśyanā is defined by means of a series of technical terms, such as pratyavekṣaṇa, vibhājanā, pravicaya, paritarka, parimīmāṃsā, nitīraṇa, and vitarka. I first tried to find the best translation for each term in the context of this chapter. Next, I checked the usage of all these terms and other related concepts (e.g., pratisaṃkhyā) throughout the text to standardize the corresponding English terminology. I also tried to minimize the use of square brackets indicating additions to the text when these additions were logically implied by the source text. A typology of such situations would include various operations, such as breaking down a compound, clarifying an abbreviated form corresponding to a well-attested collocation, stating a logical subject, object, or verb that is elided in the source text, mentioning the number of a technical term that usually comes as a list of individual items.
Through all these operations, my aim has been to maximize both accuracy and readability while maintaining the consistency of the very systematic presentation of the Great Vehicle developed in the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra. This text is important in this spiritual tradition since it condenses all aspects of Mahāyāna. I hope that this translation will contribute to improve our understanding of the interplay between liberation as a path and primordial freedom as the ground of being.
Homage to all buddhas and bodhisattvas!
Thus did I hear at one time. The Blessed One was dwelling in an unfathomable palace, built with the blazing seven precious substances, that emitted great light rays suffusing countless universes. Each of its rooms was well arranged and its design was infinite. It was the undivided maṇḍala, the domain transcending the three worlds. Arising from the supreme roots of virtue of the one who transcends the world, it was characterized by the perfectly pure cognition of the one who has achieved complete mastery. Abode of the Tathāgata where the assembly of innumerable bodhisattvas gathered, it was attended by countless gods, nāgas, yakṣas, gandharvas, demigods, garuḍas, kinnaras, mahoragas, humans, and nonhumans. Supported by the great joy and bliss of savoring the Dharma and designed to accomplish the complete welfare of all beings, it was free of any harm caused by the stains of afflictions and clear of any demon. Surpassing all manifestations, this unfathomable palace was displayed by the sovereign power of the Tathāgata. Mindfulness, intelligence, and realization were its pathway; mental stillness and insight were the vehicle leading to it; the great gates of liberation—emptiness, appearancelessness, and wishlessness—were its entrance. It was set on foundations adorned with an infinite accumulation of excellent qualities, which were like great kings of jeweled lotuses.
The Blessed One had a perfectly realized mind and was free from dualistic behavior. Absorbed in the Dharma of the nonexistence of defining characteristics, he was residing in the domain of the buddhas. He had attained equality with all buddhas. His realization was unobstructed and his qualities were irreversible. He could not be overcome by objects of experience. His abode was inconceivable. Perfectly skilled in the sameness of the three times, his five bodies were present in all worlds. His knowledge of all phenomena was free from doubt. He understood all practices. His knowledge of phenomena was without uncertainty. His body was unimaginable. He possessed the gnosis bodhisattvas vow to accomplish. He had attained the nondual abode of the buddhas, the sublime perfection, the supreme indivisible gnosis of the Tathāgata’s liberation. He had realized the sameness [of all phenomena], the state of a buddha in which there is neither a center nor a periphery, and reached the ultimate within the domain of truth, the point where the sphere of space ends.
The Blessed One was accompanied by the entire immeasurable assembly of hearers. Children of noble family, they were the heirs of the Buddha. Their minds were liberated, their wisdom was emancipated, and their discipline was completely pure. They happily gathered with those who longed for the Dharma. They had heard much, kept in mind what they had heard, and accumulated [merit from] what they had heard. They excelled in thought, speech, and deeds. Their wisdom was swift, quick, sharp, emancipating, discerning, vast, extensive, profound, and unequaled. They possessed the jewel of wisdom and the three forms of knowledge. They had attained the supreme state of happiness in this life. The purity of their merit, the excellence of their peaceful conduct, their patience, and their gentleness were vast. They were fully engaged in the teaching of the Tathāgata.
The Blessed One was also accompanied by all the innumerable bodhisattvas assembled from various buddha realms. Firmly settled and engaged in a vast state, they had gone forth through the Dharma of the Great Vehicle. Impartial toward all beings, they were free from all conceptions, conceptualizations, and fabrications. Victorious over all demons and opposition, they were not involved with the considerations of the hearers and solitary realizers. Steadfast through the great joy and happiness of savoring the Dharma, they were free from the five great fears. Solely progressing toward the stages from which there is no regression, they had perfectly actualized the stage in which one pacifies the torment of beings. Among them were thus the bodhisattva mahāsattvas Gambhīrārthasaṃdhinirmocana, Vidhivatparipṛcchaka, Dharmodgata, Suviśuddhamati, Viśālamati, Guṇākara, Paramārthasamudgata, Āryāvalokiteśvara, Maitreya, and Mañjuśrī.
At that time, the bodhisattva Vidhivatparipṛcchaka questioned the bodhisattva Gambhīrārthasaṃdhinirmocana on the ultimate whose defining characteristic is inexpressible and nondual: “O son of the Victorious One, when it is said that all phenomena are nondual, what are these phenomena? In what way are they nondual?”
Gambhīrārthasaṃdhinirmocana replied, “Noble son, all phenomena, what we refer to as all phenomena, are of just two kinds: conditioned and unconditioned. With respect to these, the conditioned is neither conditioned nor unconditioned. The unconditioned is neither unconditioned nor conditioned.”
Vidhivatparipṛcchaka inquired, “O son of the Victorious One, why is the conditioned neither conditioned nor unconditioned and the unconditioned neither unconditioned nor conditioned?”
Gambhīrārthasaṃdhinirmocana answered, “Noble son, the term conditioned is a word, a label used by the Teacher. Words that are labels used by the Teacher are conventional expressions arising from imagination. These conventional expressions arising from imagination are always unreal conventional expressions arising from imagination in its diversity. Therefore, the term conditioned is not the conditioned. Noble son, the term unconditioned is also included within conventions, just as expressions other than conditioned and unconditioned are and will [always] be. One might object that there is, however, no expression in the absence of the object [to which it refers]. What is then this object? It is the complete and perfect awakening to inexpressible [reality] through the sublime gnosis and vision of the noble ones. But in order to lead [others] to the perfect realization of this very inexpressible nature of phenomena, the Teacher labels this object with the term conditioned.
“Noble son, the term unconditioned is also a word, a label used by the Teacher. Words that are labels used by the Teacher are conventional expressions arising from imagination. These conventional expressions arising from imagination are always conventional expressions deprived of any actuality that arise from imagination in its diversity. Therefore, the term unconditioned is not the unconditioned. Noble son, the term conditioned is also included within conventions, just as expressions other than conditioned and unconditioned are and will [always] be. One might object that there is, however, no expression in the absence of the object [to which it refers]. What is then this object? It is the complete and perfect awakening to inexpressible [reality] through the sublime gnosis and vision of the noble ones. But in order to lead [others] to the perfect realization of this very inexpressible nature of phenomena, the Teacher labels this object with the term unconditioned.”
Vidhivatparipṛcchaka asked, “O son of the Victorious One, as the noble ones completely and perfectly awaken to inexpressible [reality] through their sublime gnosis and perception, why do they label this object with the terms conditioned and unconditioned in order to lead [others] to the perfect realization of this very inexpressible nature of phenomena?”
Gambhīrārthasaṃdhinirmocana replied, “Noble son, it is like the following example: A magician or his skillful apprentice, finding himself at the juncture of four great roads, assembles grass, leaves, twigs, pebbles, or stones and produces all kinds of magic illusions, such as regiments of elephants, horses, chariots, and soldiers or collections of jewels, pearls, beryl, seashells, crystal, and coral, as well as an abundance of wealth and grain in treasuries and granaries. At that time, in the presence of these illusions, those who are naive, slow-witted, or confused, not perceiving the grass, leaves, twigs, pebbles, or stones, see and hear those magical tricks and think that whatever appears exists—that these regiments of elephants, horses, chariots, and soldiers or collections of jewels, pearls, beryl, seashells, crystal, and coral, as well as this abundance of wealth and grain, treasuries and granaries, exist. Clinging to these magical illusions according to the way they see and hear things and strongly believing in them, they express themselves through conventions, such as ‘This one is true but the other is false.’ They still need to examine these illusions.
“Those who are not naive or confused but have wisdom perceive the grass, leaves, twigs, pebbles, or stones. They see and hear those magical tricks and understand that whatever appears does not exist—that these regiments of elephants, horses, chariots, and soldiers or collections of jewels, pearls, beryl, seashells, crystal, and coral, as well as this abundance of wealth and grain, treasuries and granaries, do not exist. Yet, they understand that the conception of an elephant regiment exists since its manifestation as a conception through an expedient exists, as do the manifestations as conceptions of regiments of horses, chariots, and soldiers or collections of jewels, pearls, beryl, seashells, crystal, and coral, as well as this abundance of wealth and grain, treasuries and granaries, together with other similar manifestations. So they understand that all those magical illusions, these magic illusions deceiving the eye, exist [in the way magical illusions do]. Thinking in this way, [these wise beings] do not express themselves through conventions, such as ‘This one is true but the other is false,’ on account of clinging to these magical illusions in the way they see and hear things and thus strongly believing in them. However, they do express themselves through conventions in order to convey the true nature [of these illusions to others], although they do not need to further examine these illusions.
Likewise, some childish or ordinary beings have not attained the transcendent sublime wisdom. They have not understood that the nature of all phenomena is inexpressible. When those beings perceive conditioned and unconditioned phenomena, they believe that whatever appears as a conditioned or unconditioned phenomenon exists, and they express themselves through conventions, such as ‘This one is true but the other is false,’ on account of clinging to these appearances according to the way they see and hear things and thus strongly believing in them. They still need to examine these appearances.
“With regard to this, some beings who are not childish and have seen the truth have attained the transcendent sublime wisdom. They have understood that the nature of all phenomena is inexpressible. When they perceive conditioned and unconditioned phenomena, they believe that whatever appears as a conditioned or unconditioned phenomenon does not exist. However, with respect to these appearances, they think that the conceptions in terms of conditioned and unconditioned, the manifestation of conceptions through an expedient in terms of conditioned and unconditioned, the occurrence of conceptualization, and the phenomenal appearance of conditioned phenomena exist in the way magical illusions do. That which deludes the mind exists [in the way magical illusions do]. Thinking in that way, they do not express themselves through conventions, such as ‘This one is true but the other is false,’ on account of clinging to these appearances according to the way they see and hear things and thus strongly believing in them. However, they do express themselves through conventions in order to convey the true nature [of these appearances to others], although they do not need to further examine these appearances.
“Noble son, the noble ones are thus completely and perfectly awakened to inexpressible [reality] through their sublime gnosis and vision of this object, but in order to lead [others] to the perfect realization of this very inexpressible nature of phenomena, they label this object with the terms conditioned and unconditioned.”
At that time, the bodhisattva Gambhīrārthasaṃdhinirmocana recited these verses:
This was the chapter of the bodhisattva Gambhīrārthasaṃdhinirmocana—the first chapter.
Then the bodhisattva Dharmodgata spoke these words: “Blessed One, very long ago in ancient times, beyond as many universes as there are grains of sand in seventy-seven Ganges rivers, I was residing in the world Kīrtimat of the tathāgata Viśālakīrti. There I saw 7,700,000 non-Buddhists, together with their teachers, who had gathered in one place to consider the ultimate defining characteristic of phenomena. Although they had examined, analyzed, investigated, and considered in detail the ultimate defining characteristic of phenomena, they did not understand it. They had changing opinions, lacked certainty, and were slow-witted as well as argumentative. Insulting one another with harsh words, they became abusive, agitated, unprincipled, and violent. Then, Blessed One, I thought to myself, ‘This is so sad, and yet, how marvelous, how wonderful are the manifestations of the tathāgatas in the world and, through their manifestations, the realization and actualization of the ultimate whose defining characteristic is beyond all speculation!’ ”
The Blessed One answered to the bodhisattva Dharmodgata: “So it is, Dharmodgata. So it is. I have completely and perfectly awakened to the ultimate characterized as being beyond all speculation. Yet, after I attained complete and perfect awakening, I communicated through words, gave explanations, established distinctions, expressed myself through conventions, and imparted teachings. One might ask why I did this. I have explained that the ultimate is what is cognized by noble beings in a personal and intuitive way, whereas ordinary beings’ knowledge [resulting from interacting] with one another belongs to the domain of speculation. Therefore, Dharmodgata, you should know in this way through this approach that the ultimate is what is characterized as transcending all speculation. Moreover, Dharmodgata, I have explained that the ultimate represents the domain in which there is no phenomenal appearance, whereas speculation is the domain of phenomenal appearance. Therefore, Dharmodgata, you should know in this way through this approach that the ultimate is what is characterized as transcending all speculation. Moreover, Dharmodgata, I have explained that the ultimate is inexpressible, whereas speculation is the domain of verbalization. Therefore, Dharmodgata, you should know in this way through this approach that the ultimate is what is characterized as transcending all speculation. Moreover, Dharmodgata, I have explained that the ultimate is free from all conventions, whereas speculation is the domain of conventions. Therefore, Dharmodgata, you should know in this way through this approach that the ultimate is what is characterized as transcending all speculation. Moreover, Dharmodgata, I have explained that the ultimate is devoid of argumentative disputation, whereas speculation is the domain of argumentative disputation. Therefore, Dharmodgata, you should know in this way through this approach that the ultimate is what is characterized as transcending all speculation.
“Dharmodgata, it is like this: beings who have only tasted pungent or bitter flavors their entire lives cannot imagine, infer, or appreciate the taste of honey and sugar. Those who have indulged in desire and have been burnt by the torment of desire for a long time cannot imagine, infer, or appreciate the inner happiness of the recluse, which is independent from all phenomenal appearances related to form, sound, smell, taste, and contact. Those who have indulged and taken delight in conversations for a long time cannot imagine, infer, or appreciate the inner happiness of the noble beings who remain silent. Those who have indulged and taken delight in conventions for a long time through seeing, hearing, discriminating, and cognizing cannot imagine, infer, or appreciate the cessation of all conventions, the nirvāṇa that is the extinction of transitory aggregates. Dharmodgata, it is like this: Those who have indulged and taken delight in argumentative disputations for a long time on account of their attachment to the self cannot imagine, infer, or appreciate that there is no attachment to the self and no argumentative disputations in Uttarakuru.
“Dharmodgata, likewise, those who [have indulged for a long time in] speculation cannot imagine, infer, or appreciate the ultimate whose defining characteristic transcends all speculation.”
Then, at that moment, the Blessed One spoke these verses:
This was the chapter of the bodhisattva Dharmodgata—the second chapter.
Then the bodhisattva Suviśuddhamati addressed the Blessed One, “Blessed One, at an earlier time, you spoke these words: ‘The ultimate is subtle and profound. Characterized as transcending what is distinct or indistinct [from conditioned phenomena], it is difficult to understand.’ How wonderful indeed are these words of yours! Blessed One, regarding this point, I once saw many bodhisattvas who, having attained the stage of engagement through aspiration, assembled in one place to discuss in the following way whether conditioned phenomena and the ultimate are distinct or indistinct. Among them, some declared, ‘The defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate are indistinct.’ Others replied, ‘It is not the case that the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate are indistinct, for they are distinct indeed.’ Some others, who were perplexed and lacked certainty, said, ‘Some pretend that the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate are distinct. Some pretend that they are indistinct. Which bodhisattvas speak the truth? Which speak falsity? Which are mistaken? Which are not?’ Blessed One, I thought to myself, ‘So, none of these noble sons understands the ultimate whose subtle defining characteristic transcends whether it is distinct or indistinct from conditioned phenomena. These bodhisattvas are truly naive, confused, dull, unskilled, and mistaken.’ ”
The Blessed One replied to the bodhisattva Suviśuddhamati, “So it is, Suviśuddhamati. So it is. Indeed, none of these noble sons understands the ultimate whose subtle defining characteristic transcends whether it is distinct or indistinct from conditioned phenomena. These [bodhisattvas] are truly naive, confused, dull, unskilled, and mistaken. Why is this so? Suviśuddhamati, it is because those who analyze conditioned phenomena in this way neither realize nor actualize the ultimate.
“Why? Suviśuddhamati, if the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate were indistinct, [even] spiritually immature people—all ordinary beings—would, as a consequence, realize the truth. As mere ordinary beings, not only would they attain nirvāṇa, the unsurpassable good, but they would also fully and completely awaken to unsurpassable complete and perfect awakening.
“If the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate were distinct, even those who realize the truth would, as a consequence, not be detached from the phenomenal appearances of conditioned phenomena. Since they would not be detached from the phenomenal appearances of conditioned phenomena, they would also not be liberated from the bondage of phenomenal appearances. If they were not liberated from the bondage of phenomenal appearances, they would not be liberated from the bondage of corruption. If they were not liberated from these two kinds of bondage, those who realize the truth would neither attain nirvāṇa, the unsurpassable good, nor fully and completely awaken to the unsurpassable complete and perfect awakening.
“Suviśuddhamati, ordinary beings do not realize the truth and, as mere ordinary beings, neither do they attain nirvāṇa, the unsurpassable good, nor do they fully and completely awaken to the unsurpassable complete and perfect awakening. For these reasons, it is not correct to say that the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate are indistinct. Regarding this point, you should know through this approach that those who consider the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate to be indistinct are not right but wrong.
“Suviśuddhamati, it is not the case that those who realize the truth are not detached from the phenomenal appearance of conditioned phenomena, for they are indeed detached from it. Neither are they not liberated from the bondage of phenomenal appearance, for they are indeed liberated from it. Nor are they not liberated from the bondage of corruption, for they are indeed liberated from it. Since they are liberated from these two kinds of bondage, not only do they attain nirvāṇa, the unsurpassable good, but they will also fully and completely awaken to the unsurpassable complete and perfect awakening. For all these reasons, it is not correct to say that the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate are distinct. Regarding this point, you should know through this approach that those who consider the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate to be distinct are not right but wrong.
“Moreover, Suviśuddhamati, if the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate were indistinct, then, just as the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena is encompassed by the defining characteristic of affliction, so too would the defining characteristic of the ultimate be included in the defining characteristic of affliction.
“However, Suviśuddhamati, if the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate were distinct, then the defining characteristic of the ultimate could not be the universal defining characteristic within all the defining characteristics of conditioned phenomena.
“Suviśuddhamati, the defining characteristic of the ultimate is not encompassed by the defining characteristic of affliction, and the defining characteristic of the ultimate is the universal defining characteristic within all the defining characteristics of conditioned phenomena. For these reasons, it is not correct to say that the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate are either indistinct or distinct. Regarding this point, you should know through this approach that those pretending that the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate are indistinct or distinct are not right but wrong.
“Moreover, Suviśuddhamati, if the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate were not distinct, then, just as the defining characteristic of the ultimate is not specific to any defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena, so too would all defining characteristics of conditioned phenomena not be specific to any conditioned phenomenon, and yogis would also not look for the ultimate beyond whatever they see, hear, distinguish, or know with regard to conditioned phenomena.
“However, Suviśuddhamati, if the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate were distinct, then, the mere selflessness and essencelessness of conditioned phenomena would not be the defining characteristic of the ultimate. The defining characteristic of affliction and the defining characteristic of purity themselves would be simultaneously established as distinct defining characteristics of conditioned phenomena.
“Suviśuddhamati, the defining characteristics of conditioned phenomena are specific and not unspecific to conditioned phenomena; yogis do look for the ultimate beyond whatever they see, hear, distinguish, or know with regard to conditioned phenomena; the ultimate is indeed characterized by the mere selflessness and essencelessness of conditioned phenomena; and the defining characteristic of affliction and the defining characteristic of purity also are not simultaneously established as distinct defining characteristics of conditioned phenomena. For all these reasons, it is not correct to say that the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate are neither indistinct nor distinct. Regarding this point, you should know through these approaches that those pretending that the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate are indistinct or distinct are not right but wrong.
“Suviśuddhamati, it is like this: It is not easy to decide whether the whiteness of the conch is distinct or indistinct from the defining characteristic of the conch, likewise with the yellowness of gold. It is not easy to decide whether the quality of the sound produced by a vīṇā is distinct or indistinct from the defining characteristic of sound, likewise with aloe and its fragrance, pepper and its heat, myrobalan and its astringency, cotton and its softness, and clarified butter and butter. Thus it is not easy to decide whether the impermanence of all conditioned phenomena is distinct or indistinct from the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena, likewise with the suffering of all beings with outflows and the defining characteristic of beings with outflows, as well as the selflessness of all phenomena and the defining characteristic of phenomena.
“Suviśuddhamati, it is like this: It is not easy to decide whether the defining characteristic of restless desire and the defining characteristic of afflictions are distinct or indistinct from the defining characteristic of desire. You should know it is just like this with anger and delusion too. Likewise, Suviśuddhamati, you should not see anything good in deciding whether the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate are distinct or indistinct. In this way, Suviśuddhamati, I have completely and fully awakened to the ultimate that is subtle, extremely subtle, [profound], extremely profound, difficult to understand, extremely difficult to understand, and characterized as transcending being distinct or indistinct from conditioned phenomena. Yet, after I attained complete and perfect awakening, I communicated through words, gave explanations, established distinctions, expressed myself through conventions, and imparted teachings.”
Then, at that moment, the Blessed One spoke these verses:
This was the chapter of the bodhisattva Suviśuddhamati—the third chapter.
Then the Blessed One spoke these words to Subhūti: “Subhūti, do you know how many beings in the world display their knowledge under the influence of conceit? Do you know how many beings in the world display their knowledge without conceit?”
Subhūti answered, “Blessed One, according to my knowledge, there are only a few in the world of beings who present their knowledge without conceit, but countless, innumerable, and inexpressible in number are those who do so under its influence. Blessed One, at one time I was staying in a hermitage set in a great forest. There were many monks living in the vicinity who had also established themselves there. At sunrise, I saw them gather together. They showed their knowledge and revealed their understanding by taking various aspects of phenomena as referential objects.
“Some showed their knowledge by taking the five aggregates as referential objects: their phenomenal appearance, their arising, their disintegration, their cessation, and the acknowledgment of their cessation. In the same way, some showed their knowledge by taking the twelve sense domains as referential objects, some by taking dependent arising as a referential object. Some showed their knowledge by taking the four kinds of sustenance as referential objects: their phenomenal appearance, their arising, their disintegration, their cessation, and the acknowledgment of their cessation.
“Some showed their knowledge by taking the four noble truths as referential objects: their defining characteristic, the comprehension of suffering, the abandoning of the cause of suffering, the actualization of the cessation of suffering, and the practice of the path.
“Some showed their knowledge by taking the eighteen constituents as referential objects: their phenomenal appearance, their varieties, their manifoldness, their cessation, and the actualization of their cessation.
“Some showed their knowledge by taking the four applications of mindfulness as referential objects: their phenomenal appearance, their adverse factors, their antidotes, their practice, their arising from having been non-arisen, their remaining after they arose, and their maintaining, resuming, or increasing. In the same way, some showed their knowledge by taking as referential objects the four correct self-restraints, as well as the four bases of supernatural powers, the five faculties, the five forces, and the seven branches of awakening. Some showed their knowledge by taking as referential objects the eight branches of the noble path: their phenomenal appearance, the antidotes to their adverse factors, their practice, their arising from having been non-arisen, their remaining after they arose, and their maintaining, resuming, or increasing.
“Then I thought to myself, ‘These venerable monks displayed their knowledge by revealing their understanding by taking various aspects of phenomena as referential objects, but they have not perceived the ultimate, whose defining characteristic is of a single nature everywhere.’ These venerable persons have conceit and, without doubt, display their knowledge under the influence of conceit. Blessed One, at an earlier time, you spoke these words: ‘The ultimate is subtle, profound, difficult to understand, extremely difficult to understand, and characterized as being of a single nature everywhere.’ How wonderful indeed are these very words of yours! Blessed One, if even those who practice your teaching, such as these beings who became monks, find it difficult to understand in this way the ultimate whose defining characteristic is of a single nature everywhere, what need is there to mention how difficult it is for those outsiders who do not follow your teaching?”
The Blessed One replied, “So it is, Subhūti. So it is. I have completely and fully awakened to the ultimate that, being characterized as being of a single nature everywhere, is subtle, extremely subtle, profound, extremely profound, difficult to understand, and extremely difficult to understand. Yet, after I attained complete and perfect awakening, I communicated through words, gave explanations, established distinctions, expressed myself through conventions, and imparted teachings. One might ask why I did this.
“Subhūti, it is because I teach that the ultimate is the referential object conducive to purification within the aggregates, as well as within the sense domains, dependent arising, the sustenances, the truths, the constituents, the applications of mindfulness, the self-restraints, the bases of supernatural powers, the faculties, the forces, the branches of awakening, and, Subhūti, the eightfold path. This referential object conducive to purification within the aggregates is of a single nature everywhere and its defining characteristic is not different from theirs. It is just the same from the sense domains up to the eightfold path: the referential object conducive to purification within these various referential objects is of a single nature everywhere and its defining characteristic is not different from theirs. Subhūti, through this approach, you should thus know that what is characterized as being of a single nature everywhere is the ultimate.
“Moreover, Subhūti, once renunciants who practice yoga have realized in reference to a single aggregate the selflessness of phenomena, which is the ultimate reality, they do not look for this ultimate reality, this selflessness, individually within the other aggregates or in the sense domains, dependent arising, the sustenances, the truths, the constituents, the applications of mindfulness, the self-restraints, the bases of supernatural powers, the faculties, the forces, the branches of awakening, and the eightfold path. Instead, they rely upon the nondual gnosis that is in accordance with true reality. Through this alone, they infallibly ascertain and realize the ultimate, characterized as being of a single nature everywhere. Subhūti, through this approach, you should thus know that what is characterized as being of a single nature everywhere is the ultimate.
“Moreover, Subhūti, if ultimate reality itself, the selflessness of phenomena, had a defining characteristic distinct [from the defining characteristics of phenomena] in the way the aggregates, the sense domains, dependent arising, the sustenances, the truths, the constituents, the applications of mindfulness, the self-restraints, the bases of supernatural powers, the faculties, the forces, the branches of awakening, and the eightfold path have defining characteristics distinct from one another, then, on account of this, ultimate reality itself, the selflessness of phenomena, would have causes and arise from causes. If it arose from causes, it would be conditioned. If it were the conditioned, it would not be the ultimate. If it were not the ultimate, one would need to look for some other ultimate. Subhūti, this ultimate, the selflessness of phenomena, does not arise from causes. It is not conditioned. Neither is it the case that it is not the ultimate. One must [therefore] not look for an ultimate other than that ultimate. Thus, whether tathāgatas manifest or not, because it is the case that it permanently and immutably abides within phenomena, only this nature of phenomena, this constituent abiding in phenomena, is constant. Subhūti, for all these reasons, you should know through this approach that the ultimate is characterized as being of a single nature everywhere.
“Subhūti, it is like this: although there are many varieties of forms with distinct defining characteristics within space, since space itself is free from phenomenal appearances, devoid of conceptions, and without change, its defining characteristic is of a single nature everywhere. Likewise, Subhūti, you should know that the ultimate is characterized as being of a single nature everywhere, within all phenomena whose defining characteristics are distinct from one another.”
Then, at that moment, the Blessed One spoke these verses:
This was the chapter of Subhūti—the fourth chapter.
Then, the bodhisattva Viśālamati asked the Blessed One, “Blessed One, when bodhisattvas who are skilled in the secrets of mind, thought, and cognition are called ‘skilled in the secrets of mind, thought, and cognition,’ what does it mean? When they are designated in this way, what does it refer to?”
The Blessed One answered, “Viśālamati, you are asking this for the benefit and happiness of many beings, out of compassion for the world, and for the welfare, benefit, and happiness of all beings, including gods and humans. Your intention is excellent when questioning the Tathāgata on this specific point. Therefore, listen, Viśālamati. I will explain to you in which way bodhisattvas are skilled in the secrets of mind, thought, and cognition.
“Viśālamati, when such and such beings are reborn and manifest in this saṃsāra comprised of six destinies, in any class of beings or state of birth, be it egg-born, womb-born, moisture-born, or spontaneously generated, there is first a twofold appropriation: the appropriation of the physical sense faculties together with their supports, and the appropriation of mental imprints producing the elaboration of conventional expressions with regard to phenomenal appearances, names, and conceptualizations. In dependence upon this twofold appropriation, the mind containing all the seeds matures, merges [with the embryo], grows, increases, and expands. This twofold appropriation occurs in the realm of form but it does not appear in the realm of the formless.
“Viśālamati, this cognition is also called ‘appropriating cognition’ because it grasps and appropriates the body. It is also called ‘subliminal cognition,’ because it dwells and lies hidden in this body, sharing a common destiny. It is also called ‘mind,’ because it is accumulated and developed by visual forms, sounds, smells, flavors, tangible objects, and phenomena.
“Viśālamati, taking this appropriating cognition as support and basis, the six kinds of cognition, that is, visual, auditive, olfactory, gustatory, tactile, and mental cognitions, arise. Among these, a visual cognition arises on the basis of the eye, which is connected with a visual cognition and a visual form. Simultaneously and in conformity with this visual cognition, a mental cognition that conceptualizes the object arises at the same time, having the same object. [Likewise,] Viśālamati, an auditive, olfactory, gustatory, or tactile cognition arises on the basis of a sense faculty connected to a cognition, such as the ear, nose, tongue, or body, and a sound, smell, flavor, or tangible object. Simultaneously and in conformity with this auditive, olfactory, gustatory, or tactile cognition, a mental cognition that conceptualizes the object arises at the same time, having the same object. If only one visual cognition arises at one time, then only one mental cognition that conceptualizes the object arises simultaneously, having the same object. If two, three, four, or five cognitions arise simultaneously, then also in that case, having the same object as the group of five cognitions, only one mental cognition that conceptualizes this object arises simultaneously.
“Viśālamati, it is like this: If the conditions for the arising of a single wave in a large stream of water are present, then only one wave arises. If the conditions for the arising of two or many waves are present, then two or many waves arise. However, the river [itself] neither stops as a stream of water nor becomes exhausted. If the conditions for the arising of a single reflection in a perfectly polished mirror are present, then only one reflection arises. If the conditions for the arising of two or many reflections are present, then two or many reflections arise. However, the mirror neither transforms itself into the object corresponding to the reflection nor manifests reflections by being in close contact [with the reflected objects]. Viśālamati, similarly, taking this appropriating cognition as support and basis, as in the examples of the river and the mirror, if the conditions for the arising of one visual cognition are present, then only one visual cognition arises. If the conditions for the simultaneous arising of up to five cognitions are present, then up to five cognitions simultaneously arise.
“Viśālamati, taking in this way the knowledge of this doctrine as a support and basis, bodhisattvas are skilled in the secrets of mind, thought, and cognition. Yet, when the Tathāgata designates the bodhisattvas as skilled in the secrets of mind, thought, and cognition, they are not designated as completely skilled merely on account of this. Viśālamati, I call bodhisattvas ‘skilled in the ultimate’ as soon as they, by themselves and in their own experience, neither perceive the appropriation nor the appropriating cognition but [instead perceive] in accordance with the truth; as soon as they neither perceive the subliminal nor the subliminal cognition; neither the accumulated nor the mind; neither the eye, nor the form, nor the visual cognition; neither the ear, nor the sound, nor the auditive cognition; neither the nose, nor the smell, nor the olfactory cognition; neither the tongue, nor the flavor, nor the gustatory cognition; and neither the body, nor the tangible object, nor the tactile cognition. Viśālamati, I call bodhisattvas ‘skilled in the ultimate’ as soon as they, by themselves and in their own experience, neither perceive thought, nor phenomena, nor mental cognition but instead perceive in accordance with the truth. Viśālamati, the Tathāgata designates as skilled in the secrets of mind, thought, and cognition the bodhisattvas who are skilled in the ultimate. Viśālamati, for this reason, bodhisattvas are skilled in the secrets of mind, thought, and cognition. Also, when the Tathāgata designates them as such, it is for this reason.”
Then, at that moment, the Blessed One spoke these verses:
This was the chapter of Viśālamati— the fifth chapter.
Then, the bodhisattva Guṇākara asked the Blessed One, “Blessed One, when bodhisattvas who are skilled in the defining characteristics of phenomena are called ‘skilled in the defining characteristics of phenomena,’ what does it mean? Moreover, when the Tathāgata designates them as such, what does it refer to?”
The Blessed One replied to the bodhisattva Guṇākara, “Guṇākara, for the benefit and happiness of many beings, out of compassion for the world, for the welfare, benefit, and happiness of all beings, including gods and humans, you are asking this. Your intention is excellent when questioning the Tathāgata on this specific point. Therefore, listen, Guṇākara, I will explain to you in which way bodhisattvas are skilled in the defining characteristics of phenomena.
“Guṇākara, the defining characteristics of phenomena are three. What are these three? They are the imaginary defining characteristic, the other-dependent defining characteristic, and the actual defining characteristic.
“Guṇākara, what is the imaginary defining characteristic [of phenomena]? It is what is nominally and conventionally posited as the essence or the distinctive [characteristic] of phenomena, even just in order to designate [them].
“Guṇākara, what is the other-dependent defining characteristic [of phenomena]? It is the dependent arising of phenomena. It is like this: ‘When this is, that arises; because this arises, that arises.’ It is also from ‘[in dependence upon ignorance as a condition,] conditioning mental factors [arise]’ up to ‘thus, the whole great mass of suffering comes to be.’
“Guṇākara, what is the actual defining characteristic [of phenomena]? It is their true reality, namely, the unsurpassable complete and perfect awakening that is finally attained by bodhisattvas as they realize this [true reality] through their diligence and correct application of mind and then become perfectly familiar with the realization of this [true reality].
“Guṇākara, it is like this: you should consider the imaginary defining characteristic to be just like the falsity of the visual aberrations [perceived] by someone suffering from the timira visual disorder.
“Guṇākara, it is like this: you should consider the other-dependent defining characteristic to be just like the phenomenal appearances manifesting to this very person suffering from the timira disease, such as [actually nonexistent] hairs, flies, sesame seeds, [or patches of] blue, yellow, red, or white [in their visual field].
“Guṇākara, it is like this: you should consider the actual defining characteristic to be just like the original and unerring visual object seen by the same person when their vision is healthy and free from the visual aberrations resulting from the timira disease.
“Guṇākara, it is like this: when a pure crystal is in contact with something blue, it appears to be a sapphire. Because people perceive it by mistake as a sapphire, they are deceived by it. When this pure crystal is in contact with something red, green, or yellow, it appears to be a ruby, an emerald, or gold. Because people perceive it by mistake as a ruby, an emerald, or gold, they are deceived by it.
“Guṇākara, it is like this: You should consider the mental imprint of conventions in terms of an imaginary defining characteristic upon the other-dependent defining characteristic to be just like the contact of colors with a pure crystal. Thus, you should consider the perception of an imaginary defining characteristic [superimposed] on the other-dependent defining characteristic to be just like the mistaken perception of a sapphire, ruby, emerald, or gold [superimposed] on the pure crystal.
Guṇākara, it is like this: You should consider the other-dependent defining characteristic to be just like this pure crystal itself. Thus, you should consider the actual defining characteristic as the permanent and immutable lack of any actuality or essence in the imaginary defining characteristic [superimposed] on the other-dependent defining characteristic, just as there is permanently and immutably no actuality or essence in the defining characteristic of a sapphire, ruby, emerald, or gold [superimposed] on a pure crystal.
Thus, Guṇākara, bodhisattvas distinctly perceive the imaginary defining characteristic on the basis of names denoting phenomenal appearances. They distinctly perceive the other-dependent defining characteristic on the basis of the erroneous conception [that superimposes] an imaginary defining characteristic on the other-dependent defining characteristic. They distinctly perceive the actual defining characteristic on the basis of the nonexistence of any erroneous conception [that superimposes] an imaginary defining characteristic on the other-dependent defining characteristic.
“Guṇākara, when bodhisattvas distinctly perceive the imaginary defining characteristic [superimposed] on the other-dependent defining characteristic of phenomena exactly as it is, they distinctly perceive the phenomena devoid of any defining characteristic exactly as they are. Guṇākara, when bodhisattvas distinctly perceive the other-dependent defining characteristic exactly as it is, they distinctly perceive the phenomena characterized by affliction exactly as they are. Guṇākara, when bodhisattvas distinctly perceive the actual defining characteristic exactly as it is, they distinctly perceive the phenomena characterized by purification exactly as they are. Guṇākara, when bodhisattvas distinctly perceive the phenomena devoid of a defining characteristic [superimposed] on the other-dependent defining characteristic exactly as they are, they abandon the phenomena characterized by affliction. Once they have abandoned the phenomena characterized by affliction, they will obtain the phenomena characterized by purification. Guṇākara, since bodhisattvas distinctly perceive in this way the imaginary, other-dependent, and actual defining characteristics of phenomena exactly as they are, they distinctly perceive the phenomena devoid of a defining characteristic, those characterized by affliction, and those characterized by purification exactly as they are. Having distinctly perceived the phenomena devoid of a defining characteristic exactly as they are, they abandon the phenomena characterized by affliction. Once they have abandoned the phenomena characterized by affliction, they will obtain the phenomena characterized by purification. For all these reasons, bodhisattvas are skilled in the defining characteristics of phenomena. Moreover, when the Tathāgata designates the bodhisattvas as ‘skilled in the defining characteristics of phenomena,’ it is for these reasons.”
Then, at that moment, the Blessed One spoke these verses:
This was the chapter of Guṇākara —the sixth chapter.
At that time, the bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata asked the Blessed One, “Blessed One, when I was alone in a secluded place, I had the following thought: ‘The Blessed One also spoke in many ways of the defining characteristic specific to the five aggregates, mentioning the defining characteristic of their arising, disintegration, abandonment, and comprehension. In the same way, he spoke of the twelve sense domains, dependent arising, and the four kinds of sustenance. The Blessed One also spoke in many ways of the defining characteristic of the four noble truths, mentioning the comprehension of suffering, the abandoning of the cause of suffering, the actualization of the cessation of suffering, and the practice of the path. The Blessed One also spoke in many ways of the defining characteristic specific to the eighteen constituents, mentioning their varieties, manifoldness, abandonment, and comprehension. The Blessed One also spoke in many ways of the defining characteristic specific to the four applications of mindfulness, mentioning their adverse factors, antidotes, practice, their arising from being non-arisen, their remaining after they arose, and their maintaining, resuming, or increasing. Similarly, he also spoke in many ways of the defining characteristic specific to the four correct self-restraints, the four bases of supernatural powers, the five faculties, the five forces, and the seven branches of awakening. The Blessed One also spoke in many ways of the defining characteristic specific to the eight branches of the path, mentioning their adverse factors, antidotes, and practices, their arising from being non-arisen and remaining after they arose, and their maintaining, resuming, or increasing.’
“When the Blessed One further said, ‘All phenomena are without an essence, unborn, unceasing, primordially in the state of peace, and naturally in the state of nirvāṇa,’ what was the underlying intent of the Blessed One? I would like to ask the Blessed One about this point: what was the Blessed One thinking when he said, ‘All phenomena are without an essence, unborn, unceasing, primordially in the state of peace, and naturally in the state of nirvāṇa’?”
The Blessed One replied to the bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata, “Paramārthasamudgata, this reflection of yours arose virtuously and appropriately. It is excellent indeed. You are asking this for the benefit and happiness of many beings, out of compassion for the world, and for the welfare, benefit, and happiness of all beings, including gods and humans. Your intention is excellent when questioning the Tathāgata on this specific point. Therefore, listen, Paramārthasamudgata. I will explain to you what my underlying intent was when I declared, ‘All phenomena are without an essence, unborn, unceasing, primordially in the state of peace, and naturally in the state of nirvāṇa.’
“Paramārthasamudgata, the essencelessness of all phenomena has three aspects. Having in mind essencelessness regarding defining characteristics, essencelessness regarding arising, and essencelessness regarding the ultimate, I thus taught what is called the essencelessness of all phenomena.
“Paramārthasamudgata, what is the essencelessness of all phenomena with regard to defining characteristics? It is the imaginary defining characteristic [of phenomena]. Why? Because as much as this defining characteristic is nominally and conventionally posited, it is not posited on the basis of an essence or a distinctive [characteristic]. Therefore, it is called the essencelessness of all phenomena with regard to defining characteristics.
“Paramārthasamudgata, what is the essencelessness of all phenomena with regard to arising? It is the other-dependent defining characteristic of phenomena. Why? Because this is [the defining characteristic] arising on account of causes other [than itself] and not by itself. Therefore, it is called essencelessness with regard to arising.
“Paramārthasamudgata, what is the essencelessness of all phenomena with regard to the ultimate? Phenomena arising in dependence upon causes, which lack an essence on account of lacking an essence in terms of arising and also lack an essence on account of lacking an ultimate essence. Why? Because, Paramārthasamudgata, I showed that the referential object conducive to purification within phenomena is the ultimate, but the other-dependent defining characteristic is not the referential object conducive to purification. Therefore, this essencelessness is called essencelessness with regard to the ultimate.
“Moreover, Paramārthasamudgata, the actual defining characteristic of phenomena should also be referred to as essencelessness with regard to the ultimate. Why? Because, Paramārthasamudgata, the selflessness of phenomena is called the essencelessness of phenomena, which is the ultimate, but the ultimate is characterized by the essencelessness of all phenomena. Therefore, it is called essencelessness with regard to the ultimate.
“Paramārthasamudgata, it is like this: consider essencelessness with regard to defining characteristics to be exactly like a [nonexistent] sky flower; consider essencelessness with regard to arising, as well as essencelessness with regard to the ultimate in one of its aspects, to be exactly like a magic illusion; consider essencelessness with regard to the ultimate in its other aspect, which consists in the selflessness of phenomena and pervades everything, to be exactly like space, which consists in the essencelessness of form and pervades everything.
“Paramārthasamudgata, with this threefold essencelessness in mind, I taught what is called the essencelessness of all phenomena. Paramārthasamudgata, having in mind essencelessness with regard to defining characteristics, I taught, ‘All phenomena are without an essence, unborn, unceasing, primordially in the state of peace, and naturally in the state of nirvāṇa.’ Why? Because, Paramārthasamudgata, what lacks a specific defining characteristic is unborn. What is unborn is unceasing. What is unborn and unceasing is primordially in the state of peace. What is primordially in the state of peace is naturally in the state of nirvāṇa. For what is naturally in the state of nirvāṇa, there is nothing in the slightest that passes into the state of nirvāṇa. Therefore, having in mind essencelessness with regard to defining characteristics, I taught, ‘All phenomena are without an essence, unborn, unceasing, primordially in the state of peace, and naturally in the state of nirvāṇa.’
“Paramārthasamudgata, having in mind essencelessness with regard to the ultimate, which is characterized by selflessness, I taught, ‘All phenomena are without an essence, unborn, unceasing, primordially in the state of peace, and naturally in the state of nirvāṇa.’ Why? Because essencelessness with regard to the ultimate, which is characterized by selflessness, indeed abides permanently and immutably. As the nature of phenomena, it is unconditioned and free from all afflictions. What permanently and immutably abides as the very nature of phenomena, being unconditioned, is unborn and unceasing due to being unconditioned. Because it is free from all afflictions, it is primordially in the state of peace and naturally in the state of nirvāṇa. Therefore, having in mind essencelessness with regard to the ultimate, which is characterized by selflessness, I taught, ‘All phenomena are without an essence, unborn, unceasing, primordially in the state of peace, and naturally in the state of nirvāṇa.’
“Paramārthasamudgata, I did not designate three kinds of essencelessness because those in the world of beings consider that the imaginary essence and the other-dependent essence, as well as the actual essence, are different by nature. Rather, I did so because they superimpose an imaginary essence on the other-dependent essence and the actual essence and because they designate the other-dependent essence and the actual essence as the defining characteristics of an imaginary essence. While they designate them in this way, their minds, which are saturated with designations, become confined to such designations and predisposed toward them. On this basis, they wrongly conceive the other-dependent essence and the actual essence as the defining characteristics of an imaginary essence. Wrongly conceiving them in this way, with their wrong conception of the other-dependent essence as the defining characteristic of an imaginary essence acting as a cause and condition, they will give rise in the future to an other-dependent essence. As a result of this, they will be afflicted by the afflictions of defilements, karma, and birth. Because they will not pass beyond saṃsāra, they will transmigrate and wander among hell beings, animals, hungry ghosts, gods, demigods, and humans for a very long time.
“Among these beings, Paramārthasamudgata, some do not produce roots of virtue from the very beginning. They do not clear obstructions or bring their mental continuums to maturity. Their confidence in my teaching is limited and they have not accomplished the accumulations of merit and gnosis. I impart to those beings the teaching on essencelessness with regard to arising. Once they have heard this teaching, they understand that conditioned phenomena arising in dependence on causes are of an impermanent, unstable, and unreliable nature. They develop aversion and repulsion towards conditioned phenomena. Once they have done this, they turn away from wrongdoing. Not committing any wrongdoing, they establish themselves in virtue. With this as a cause, they produce the roots of virtue that were yet to be produced. They clear obstructions that were yet to be cleared. They bring their mental continuums, which were not yet mature, to maturity. As a result, their confidence in my teaching becomes vast, and they will accomplish the accumulations of merit and gnosis.
“Although such beings have produced in this way roots of virtue up to the accomplishment of the accumulation of merit and gnosis, they do not understand essencelessness with regard to arising just as it is, as the essencelessness with regard to defining characteristics and the essencelessness with regard to the ultimate in its two aspects. For this reason, they will not be completely repulsed by all conditioned phenomena, completely free from desire, or completely liberated. They will not be completely liberated from all the afflictions of defilements, karma, and birth. It is therefore for them that the Tathāgata imparts the teaching on the essencelessness with regard to defining characteristics and the essencelessness with regard to the ultimate. He does so in order to make them feel repulsion towards all conditioned phenomena, as well as to free them from desire, to completely liberate them, and to take them perfectly beyond the afflictions of defilements, karma, and birth.
“Once they have heard this teaching, they do not wrongly conceive the other-dependent essence as the defining characteristic of an imaginary essence. As a result, they accept the essencelessness with regard to arising as the essencelessness with regard to defining characteristics and the essencelessness with regard to the ultimate in its two aspects. They discern and understand it exactly as it is. It is like this: Their minds, which are no longer saturated with designations, are not confined to these designations or predisposed toward them. As a result, by attaining the powers of wisdom in this life and perfectly cutting off the continuity [of the aggregates] into a future existence, they will put an end to the other-dependent defining characteristic. On this basis, they will be completely repulsed by all conditioned phenomena, completely free from desire, and completely liberated. They will be completely liberated from all the afflictions of defilements, karma, and birth.
“Moreover, Paramārthasamudgata, even those belonging to the lineage of the hearers’ vehicle attain nirvāṇa, the unsurpassable happiness, through this very path and journey, as do those belonging to the lineage of the solitary realizers’ vehicle and the lineage of the tathāgatas. This is why it is the single path of purification for hearers, solitary realizers, and bodhisattvas. Since there is only a single purification, there is no other. Therefore, with this in mind, I taught the Single Vehicle. Yet, it is not the case that those in the world of beings are not of various types corresponding to their capacities, be they weak, average, or sharp in accordance with their nature.
“Paramārthasamudgata, even if they were to exert themselves as all buddhas did, individuals belonging to the hearers’ lineage with the state of peace as their sole journey could not reach the heart of awakening and attain the unsurpassable, complete and perfect awakening. Why? Because, having limited compassion and a great fear of suffering, they belong to a lineage that is by nature inferior. Thus, having limited compassion, they avoid striving for beings’ welfare. Being afraid of suffering, they stay clear from the conditioning process of the mental factors. However, I did not teach that avoiding striving for beings’ welfare and staying clear from the conditioning process of the mental factors was the unsurpassable, complete and perfect awakening. Therefore, these individuals are called those who have the state of peace as their sole journey.
“I taught that hearers who evolve toward awakening belong to the category of bodhisattvas because, liberated from the obscuration of defilements and inspired by the tathāgatas, they liberate their minds from the obscuration of cognitive objects. It is [only] because they first liberated themselves from the obscuration of defilements for their own sake that the Tathāgata designated them as the lineage of hearers.
“Thus, Paramārthasamudgata, there are beings with various degrees of confidence in my Dharma and my Vinaya, which are well proclaimed, well imparted, pure in their intention, and well communicated. In this teaching, Paramārthasamudgata, the Tathāgata, having in mind the three kinds of essencelessness, teaches through a discourse of provisional meaning: ‘All phenomena are without an essence, unborn, unceasing, primordially in the state of peace, and naturally in the state of nirvāṇa.’
“Among such beings, Paramārthasamudgata, some have produced roots of virtue, purified their obscurations, and brought their mental continuum to maturity. They have much confidence in my teaching and have accomplished the accumulations of merit and gnosis. Once they have heard my teaching, they understand my explanations in accordance with my underlying intent exactly as it is. Moreover, they recognize that this teaching is the truth. Through their wisdom, they realize its meaning exactly as it is. By also engaging in the practice of this realization, they will very quickly attain the ultimate state. They will develop faith in these teachings, and think, ‘Amazing! The Blessed One is completely and perfectly awakened. Through him, one becomes perfectly awakened with respect to all phenomena.’
“Among such beings, some have not produced roots of virtue, purified their obscurations, and brought their mental continuums to maturity. Their confidence in my teaching is limited and they have not accomplished the accumulations of merit and gnosis. They are honest and sincere. Unable to evaluate and refute [others’ views], they do not consider their own as supreme. Once they have heard my teaching, although they do not understand my explanations in accordance with my underlying intent exactly as it is, they still develop confidence and faith in these teachings: ‘The Tathāgata’s discourse is profound and has the appearance of profundity. [Because] emptiness is the topic of this discourse, it is difficult to perceive and difficult to understand. Being beyond judgment, it does not belong to the domain of speculation. It can [only] be known by intelligent scholars well versed in the subtle.’ They think, ‘We do not understand the meaning of this sūtra and these teachings that were taught by the Blessed One. Profound is the awakening of the Buddha and the nature of phenomena. Only the Tathāgata understands them. We, however, do not. The Dharma taught by the tathāgatas arises according to the various inclinations of beings. Their gnosis and perception are infinite, whereas ours are merely like the [shallow] hoofprints left by a cow.’ Filled with devotion for these discourses, they also write them down. Having written them down, they also keep them in mind, read them, propagate them, venerate them, expound them, recite them, and chant them aloud. However, because they do not understand these profound teachings in accordance with my underlying intent, they are unable to engage themselves in the various aspects of practice. As a consequence of this, they will further develop their accumulation of merit and gnosis, and those whose mental continuums are still immature will bring them to maturity.
“Other beings have not perfectly completed these stages up to the great accumulation of merit and gnosis. They are dishonest and insincere. Capable of evaluating and refuting [others’ views], they consider their own as supreme. Once they have heard my teaching, they do not understand my profound explanations in accordance with my underlying intent exactly as it is. Although they have confidence in this teaching, they wrongly conceive it according to its literal meaning: ‘All phenomena are only without an essence, only unborn, only unceasing, only primordially in the state of peace, and only naturally in the state of nirvāṇa.’ As a consequence of this, they acquire the view that all phenomena are inexistent and the view that they are without defining characteristics. Then, once they have acquired these views, they negate all phenomena by [negating] all defining characteristics, thereby negating the imaginary defining characteristic as well as the other-dependent and actual defining characteristics. Why is it said that they negate all three defining characteristics? Because, Paramārthasamudgata, if the other-dependent and actual defining characteristics are accepted, then the imaginary defining characteristic also will be distinctly perceived. Now, those who consider the other-dependent and actual defining characteristics as inexistent have already negated the imaginary defining characteristic. This is why they are called those who negate all three defining characteristics. They consider my teaching to be the truth while considering some nonsense to be its meaning. Those who consider my teaching to be the truth while considering some nonsense to be its meaning cling to my teaching as the truth while at the same time clinging to some nonsense as its meaning. Since they have confidence in my teaching, they will progress by developing virtuous qualities. However, because they wrongly conceive some nonsense to be the meaning of my teaching, they will stray from wisdom. Straying from wisdom, they will stray from the vast and immeasurable virtuous qualities.
“Others hear from those beings that my teaching is the truth while some nonsense is its meaning. Then, delighted by this view, they accept that my teaching is the truth and some nonsense is its meaning. Thus, they wrongly conceive my teaching as the truth with some nonsense as its meaning. As a consequence of this, you should know that they will likewise stray from virtuous qualities.
“Others who take no delight in this view are overcome by fear and anxiety when they hear that all phenomena are without an essence, unborn, unceasing, primordially in the state of peace, and naturally in the state of nirvāṇa. They then say, ‘These are not the words of the Buddha but the words of Māra!’ Thinking in this way, they reject this discourse, disparage it, denigrate it, and criticize it. As a consequence of this, they will obtain the great misfortune as well as the great karmic obscuration [of rejecting the truth]. This is precisely why I said, ‘Those who mislead the multitude of beings into obtaining the great karmic obscuration, who consider all defining characteristics as inexistent and teach some nonsense as the meaning of my teaching, are burdened with great karmic obscuration [of rejecting the truth].
“Paramārthasamudgata, among such beings, some have not produced roots of virtue, purified their obscurations, and brought their mental continuum to maturity. Their confidence in my teaching is limited, and they have not accomplished the accumulations of merit and gnosis. They are dishonest and insincere. Although they are unable to evaluate and refute [others’ views], they consider their own as supreme. When they hear my teaching, they neither understand my explanations in accordance with my underlying intent exactly as it is, nor do they develop confidence in this teaching. They accept that my teaching is not the truth and its meaning is some nonsense. They say, ‘These are not the words of the Buddha but the words of Māra!’ Thinking in this way, they reject this discourse, disparage it, denigrate it, criticize it, and distort [its meaning]. In many ways, they apply themselves to discarding, undermining, and subverting this discourse, considering as enemies those who are devoted to it. From the very beginning, they are affected by the karmic obscuration [of rejecting the truth]. As a consequence of this, they also cause [others] to be obscured by this karmic obscuration. Although it is easy to determine the beginning of this karmic obscuration, it is difficult to know how many myriad eons it will last.
“Thus, Paramārthasamudgata, those are the various degrees of confidence in my Dharma and my Vinaya, which are well proclaimed, well imparted, pure in their intention, and well communicated.”
Then, at that moment, the Blessed One spoke these verses:
Then, the bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata said to the Blessed One, “Blessed One, the speech expounding the underlying intent of the buddhas is subtle, extremely subtle, profound, extremely profound, difficult to understand, and extremely difficult to understand. How marvelous, how wonderful it is!
“This is how I understand the meaning of the words spoken by the Blessed One: The phenomenal appearance of conditioned phenomena, namely, the basis of the imaginary defining characteristic, the object of conceptualization, is nominally and conventionally posited as an essential characteristic or a distinctive characteristic, for example as the aggregate of form, its arising, its cessation, its abandonment, or the comprehension of this aggregate. What is posited in this way is the imaginary defining characteristic. For this reason, Blessed One, you referred to essencelessness with regard to the defining characteristics of phenomena. The phenomenal appearance of conditioned phenomena, namely, the basis of the imaginary defining characteristic, the object of conceptualization, is the other-dependent defining characteristic. For this reason, Blessed One, you referred to essencelessness with regard to both the arising of phenomena and the ultimate in one of its aspects.
“This is how I understand the meaning of the words spoken by the Blessed One: this very phenomenal appearance of conditioned phenomena, namely, the basis of the imaginary defining characteristic, the object of conceptualization, is devoid of any actuality or essence as that which has an imaginary defining characteristic. On account of this, this essencelessness or selflessness of phenomena, true reality, the referential object conducive to purification, is the actual defining characteristic. For this reason, Blessed One, you referred to the essencelessness of phenomena with regard to the ultimate in its other aspect.
“One should proceed in exactly the same way with the remaining aggregates as well as with each of the twelve sense domains, the twelve factors of conditioned existence, the four kinds of sustenance, and the six and eighteen constituents.
“This is how I understand the meaning of the words spoken by the Blessed One: The phenomenal appearance of conditioned phenomena, namely, the basis of the imaginary defining characteristic, the object of conceptualization, is nominally and conventionally posited as an essential characteristic or a distinctive characteristic, for example as the noble truth of suffering or the comprehension of suffering. For this reason, Blessed One, you referred to essencelessness with regard to the defining characteristics of phenomena. The phenomenal appearance of conditioned phenomena, namely, the basis of the imaginary defining characteristic, the object of conceptualization, is the other-dependent defining characteristic. For this reason, Blessed One, you referred to essencelessness with regard to both the arising of phenomena and the ultimate in one of its aspects.
“This is how I understand the meaning of the words spoken by the Blessed One: This very phenomenal appearance of conditioned phenomena, namely, the basis of the imaginary defining characteristic, the object of conceptualization, is devoid of any actuality or essence as that which has an imaginary defining characteristic. On account of this, this essencelessness or selflessness of phenomena, true reality, the referential object conducive to purification, is the actual defining characteristic. For this reason, Blessed One, you referred to the essencelessness of phenomena with regard to the ultimate in its other aspect.
“As with the noble truth of suffering, one should proceed in exactly the same way with the other truths. As with the truths, so one should proceed in exactly the same way with each of the applications of mindfulness, the self-restraints, the bases of supernatural powers, the faculties, the forces, the branches of awakening, and the branches of the path.
“This is how I understand the meaning of the words spoken by the Blessed One: The phenomenal appearance of conditioned phenomena, namely, the basis of the imaginary defining characteristic, the object of conceptualization, is nominally and conventionally posited as an essential characteristic or a distinctive characteristic, for example as correct concentration, its adverse factors and antidotes, its practice, its arising from being non-arisen, its remaining after it arose, and its maintaining, resuming, increasing, or expanding. For this reason, Blessed One, you referred to essencelessness with regard to the defining characteristics of phenomena. The phenomenal appearance of conditioned phenomena, namely, the basis of the imaginary defining characteristic, the object of conceptualization, is the other-dependent defining characteristic. For this reason, Blessed One, you referred to essencelessness with regard to both the arising of phenomena and the ultimate in one of its aspects.
“This is how I understand the meaning of the words spoken by the Blessed One: This very phenomenal appearance of conditioned phenomena, namely, the basis of the imaginary defining characteristic, the object of conceptualization, is devoid of any actuality or essence as that which has an imaginary defining characteristic. On account of this, this essencelessness or selflessness of phenomena, true reality, the referential object conducive to purification, is the actual defining characteristic. For this reason, Blessed One, you referred to the essencelessness of phenomena with regard to the ultimate in its other aspect.
“Blessed One, thus it is said, for example, that dried ginger should be added to all medicinal powders and elixirs. Likewise, this teaching of definitive meaning expounded by the Blessed One in reference to the statement, ‘All phenomena are without an essence, unborn, unceasing, primordially in the state of peace, and naturally in the state of nirvāṇa,’ should also be added to all the discourses of provisional meaning.
“Blessed One, it is like this: for example, the canvas for a painting, whether blue, yellow, red, or white, is identical for all painted figures and thus perfectly clarifies their contours. Likewise, this teaching of definitive meaning expounded by the Blessed One in reference to the statement, ‘All phenomena are without an essence, unborn, unceasing, primordially in the state of peace, and naturally in the state of nirvāṇa,’ is identical in all discourses of provisional meaning and thus perfectly clarifies their interpretable intent.
“Blessed One, it is like this: for example, adding clarified butter to all sorts of stews, meat dishes, and porridge is delicious. Likewise, it is delightful to add to all discourses of provisional meaning this teaching of definitive meaning expounded by the Blessed One in reference to the statement, ‘All phenomena are without an essence, unborn, unceasing, primordially in the state of peace, and naturally in the state of nirvāṇa.’
“Blessed One, it is like this: for example, space is identical everywhere and, [being empty and free from all obstruction,] does not hinder any endeavor. Likewise, this teaching of definitive meaning expounded by the Blessed One in reference to the statement, ‘All phenomena are without an essence, unborn, unceasing, primordially in the state of peace, and naturally in the state of nirvāṇa,’ is identical in all discourses of provisional meaning and does not hinder any endeavor in the course of the hearers’, solitary realizers’, or bodhisattvas’ vehicle.”
Following these words, the Blessed One complimented the bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata: “Excellent, Paramārthasamudgata, this is excellent! You have understood my explanation in accordance with the Tathāgata’s underlying intent. Your examples of the dried ginger, painting, clarified butter, and space perfectly illustrated its point. Paramārthasamudgata, so it is, and not otherwise. Therefore, keep in mind this teaching in this way.”
Then, the bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata spoke again to the Blessed One: “In the deer park of Ṛṣivadana in Vārāṇasī, the Blessed One first set in motion the wonderful wheel of Dharma by teaching the four noble truths to those who were engaged in the hearers’ vehicle. Not a single god or human in the world had previously ever turned such a wheel of Dharma. However, this turning of the Dharma wheel by the Blessed One was surpassable and adapted to the circumstances. Being of provisional meaning, it became a topic of dispute. Then, for those who were engaged in the Great Vehicle, you turned the second, even more wonderful, wheel of Dharma in the form of a teaching on emptiness: ‘All phenomena are without an essence, unborn, unceasing, primordially in the state of peace, and naturally in the state of nirvāṇa.’ However, this turning of the Dharma wheel by the Blessed One was surpassable and adapted to the circumstances. Being of provisional meaning, it became a topic of dispute. Then, for those who were engaged in all vehicles, you turned the third wonderful Dharma wheel of excellent discernment in reference to the statement, ‘All phenomena are without an essence, unborn, unceasing, primordially in the state of peace, and by nature in the state of nirvāṇa.’ This turning of the Dharma wheel by the Blessed One was unsurpassable and not limited to the circumstances. Being of definitive meaning, it did not become a topic of dispute.
“Blessed One, when sons or daughters of noble family have heard the teaching of definitive meaning taught by the Blessed One in reference to the statement, ‘All phenomena are without an essence, unborn, unceasing, primordially in the state of peace, and naturally in the state of nirvāṇa,’ they develop devotion for this teaching and commission its transcription into writing. Once it has been put into writing, they keep it in mind, read it, venerate it, propagate it, expound it, chant it aloud, contemplate it, and apply it in their practice. As they do so, how much merit will they produce?”
The Blessed One answered, “Paramārthasamudgata, these sons and daughters of noble family will produce immeasurable and incalculable merit. Although it is difficult to illustrate this with examples, I will briefly explain it to you. Paramārthasamudgata, it is like this: Compared to the amount of earth, the amount of dirt at the tip of a fingernail does not come close to a hundredth, a thousandth, a one hundred thousandth of it, or anything implying calculation, partition, numeration, analogy, or comparison. Compared to the amount of water contained in the four great oceans, the amount of water contained in the hoofprint of an ox does not come close to a hundredth, a thousandth, a one hundred thousandth of it, or anything implying calculation, partition, numeration, analogy, or comparison. Likewise, Paramārthasamudgata, compared to the amount of merit accumulated by developing confidence in my teaching of definitive meaning up to applying it in one’s practice, the amount of merit accumulated by developing confidence in my teaching of provisional meaning … up to applying it in one’s practice does not come close to a hundredth, a thousandth, a one hundred thousandth of it, or anything implying calculation, partition, numeration, analogy, or comparison.”
The bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata inquired, “Blessed One, what is the name of this teaching as a Dharma discourse that unravels the Tathāgata’s intent? How should I keep it in mind?”
The Blessed One answered: “Paramārthasamudgata, this is a teaching of definitive meaning on the ultimate. Therefore, keep it in mind as The Teaching of Definitive Meaning on the Ultimate.”
As the Blessed One expounded this teaching of definitive meaning on the ultimate, six hundred thousand beings produced the mind directed at the unsurpassable, complete and perfect awakening; three hundred thousand hearers purified the Dharma eye from impurities and contaminations; one hundred and fifty hearers who were without attachment liberated their minds from all outflows; and seventy-five thousand bodhisattvas attained the acceptance that phenomena are non-arisen.
This was the chapter of the bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata—the seventh chapter.
Then, the bodhisattva Maitreya asked a question to the Blessed One, “Blessed One, when bodhisattvas practice mental stillness and insight in the Great Vehicle, what is their support and basis?”
The Blessed One answered, “Maitreya, their support and basis are the discourses teaching Dharma and the constant aspiration to attain the unsurpassable, complete and perfect awakening.
“The Blessed One taught that four things are the referential objects of mental stillness and insight: the image with conceptualization; the image without conceptualization; the point where phenomena end; and the accomplishment of the goal.”
“Blessed One, how many referential objects of mental stillness are there?”
“There is [only] one, namely, the image without conceptualization.”
“How many are the referential objects of insight?”
“There is only one, namely, the image with conceptualization.”
“How many are the referential objects of both combined?”
“There are two, namely, the point where phenomena end and the accomplishment of the goal.”
“Blessed One, once bodhisattvas have taken as a support and basis these four things that are the referential objects of mental stillness and insight, how do they dedicate themselves to mental stillness? How do they become skilled in the practice of insight?”
“Maitreya, I have given to the bodhisattvas discourses teaching Dharma in the following twelve collections of teachings: sūtras, discourses in prose and verse, prophecies, poetic discourses, aphorisms, discourses for specific beings, narratives, parables, discourses on previous lives, extensive discourses, teachings on miracles, and instructions. Once bodhisattvas have properly heard these explanations, once they have memorized them well, recited them, examined them, and understood them by means of discernment, they remain alone in seclusion and settle themselves in a state of inner absorption. Then, they direct their attention in that (1) they direct their attention toward the teachings they have properly contemplated and (2) continuously direct their attention inwardly toward the mind that is directing attention. As they repeatedly engage themselves in this way, their bodies and minds become flexible. The occurrence of this physical and mental flexibility is what is called mental stillness. This is how bodhisattvas dedicate themselves to mental stillness.
“Once they have obtained this physical and mental flexibility, they settle in this very state and abandon some aspects of mind [corresponding to mental stillness]. Then, they apply themselves to analyzing the image that is the object of their concentration according to the teachings they have properly contemplated. Differentiating, discerning, considering, and examining in this way the cognitive aspects of the image that is the object of their concentration, accepting and wishing to do so, and distinguishing, scrutinizing, and investigating [this discerning mind in the same way] is what is called [the practice of] insight. This is how bodhisattvas are skilled in insight.”